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
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VOL. II.

THE SECURITY SERVICE


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1908-1945

VOL. II. (CHAPTER V., PART 1)

THE SECURITY SERVICE

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CHAPTER V

REACTIONS IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

SECOND PHASE

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The 'leit-motiv' in this phase (from the summer of 1941 to the end of the SHAEF period in the summer of 1945) is to be found in the establishment and the working of orderly administrative and executive machinery under the control of Sir David Petrie. The prime factor in the re-establishment of order out of chaos was his insistence on his position as head of the Office, responsible to the Chairman of the Security Executive for its efficient working, but not liable to interference in matters relating to his staff or the day-to-day work. Lord Swinton as Chairman of the Security Executive remained responsible for policy and for the general co-ordination of security problems over the whole field of the machinery of government.

Sir David Petrie restored confidence - almost immediately internally and more gradually among the officers and Departments with whom the Office was in external relation - and helped to secure recognition of the Security Service as an efficient instrument adapted to the discharge of its duties and responsibilities. He accepted Lord Swinton's scheme for the division of the former B Division into B, E and F Divisions. The senior officers of B Division who had opposed Lord Swinton's attempt to impose this re-organisation so long as it was an open question naturally accepted it as a decision of their new head made on taking over most onerous and delicate duties, under circumstances which required that he should have the loyal support of the whole staff. Within three months of Sir David Petrie's taking charge the German attack on Russia went far to remove some of the more immediate reasons for opposing the division into B, E and F. An important effect of this division was to remove from the head of B the duty of combining action and collating information for dealing with the problem of the "Fifth Column" and the hidden British Quislings and to lift these duties to the level of the head of the whole office. The objections to this originally had their strongest motive in the fact that it meant - before Sir David Petrie's assumption of office - a concentration of detailed control in the hands of Lord Swinton and the Security Executive. This threatened not only to produce a concomitant lack of cohesion within the Security Service itself, but even to involve the supersession of B Division in respect to its more vital functions by the Security Executive. These objections now had no force.

/The attack

The attack on Russia removed the immediate danger of invasion and relegated to the background the question of possible active assistance to the invaders. From this point onwards - within the framework of the newly established order of the reorganised machinery - a new motif became increasingly insistent. By good fortune and good work B Division had at last come to grips with its particular enemy, the German Secret Service or "Abwehr"; and in place of the almost complete ignorance on the whole subject which had been the dominating fact of the position in 1939 and 1940 it began to take the measure - uncertainly at first - of its opponents, the agents of the "Abwehr" and the organisation behind them. This improvement in knowledge - and consequently in confidence - arose from the capture of agents parachuted or landed in the British Isles, from the extraction of information from them by interrogation, or by using them as double-agents and above all by the comprehensive knowledge of the organisation under the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht secured by an intensive, skilful and scholarly study of their secret wireless communications. The most effective part of this study was done by R.S.S., G.C. & C.S. and by a committee consisting of representatives of those bodies and of the Security Service and Section V of S.I.S. under the chairmanship of Mr. White.

As the Security Service by these various means developed its power to combat the enemy Secret Services (including the Abwehr and the SD - which latter became increasingly important) a fresh cause of discord was introduced. It arose from the claim of the head of Section V to be responsible for the security of ISOS (the intercepted wireless material) and for controlling its use; and at the same time to have the right to limit the functions or the freedom of action of the Security Service in various ways and especially by confining them to action and to the recording of intelligence within the three-mile limit of the United Kingdom and other British countries. This attitude gave rise to a long drawn-out controversy which was also marked by the failure of S.I.S. - in the Security Service view - to maintain adequate records for the purposes of the collation of information as a basis for counter-espionage action outside the three-mile limit, with consequent reactions within it.

This controversy was unresolved throughout the war and at the close of the SHAEF period was the subject of an independent enquiry. In the meanwhile, the centre of interest shifted after D Day from the British Isles to the Continent where the backbone of the counter-intelligence staff of SHAEF was formed by the deputation of some eighty Security Service officers under Mr. White who was appointed to be a temporary Brigadier on the staff of SHAEF for the purpose. On the Continent, as in the British Isles and on the high seas, the efforts of the Abwehr and SD were successfully combated by the Security Service in the whole field covered by its responsibilities for counter-espionage, counter-sabotage and deception.

/Note

N O T E

The arrangement of the material in Chapters IV and V of this record is, in some respects, anachronistic. This is necessary because, while the summer of 1941 provides a dividing line in the story of the Organisation as a whole - and of the main subjects with which it had to deal, the Russian and the German, it is not so in the case of individual sections and divisions. In A, B, C & D Divisions certain new growths had a beginning in 1939, 1940 or 1941 and developed continuously during the period 1939-1945. It is therefore logical to describe these developments in one place. Any attempt, in these circumstances, to make an artificial separation of the material and to place some of it in Chapter IV and some in Chapter V would break an essential unity.

P A R T 1.

THE GERMAN SECRET SERVICES UNDER THE NAZIS

1941-1945

(i) The German attack on Russia

The German attack on Russia which completely altered the military situation also had important indirect effects on the working of the Security Service. It removed the immediate apprehension of an attempted invasion of the British Isles and therefore reduced the urgency of the question of the organisation of a "Fifth Column" by the Abwehr and other parts of the Nazi machine. As the months went on and it became apparent that the German army would not have the success in over-running Russia which it had expected, the dangers of invasion receded further into the background. The problems which presented themselves thus became gradually simplified and it was possible to concentrate, with more freedom from distraction, on developing a knowledge of the German organisations directing espionage and sabotage. The increase in this concrete knowledge also helped to diminish the need for the indefinite search for the "Fifth Column". The invasion of Russia further affected the work of the Security Service in that there was no longer any reason to apprehend collusion between the German Secret Service on the one hand and the Russians or the Communists of various nationalities on the other. All these factors combined to produce favourable psychological reactions.

(ii) Abwehr agents sent to British territory 1941-1945.

In the period from July 1941 to September 1941 German agents continued to arrive in this country. (Vide Part 2, Pages 20 and 21 of "The German Secret Services, August 1942 - Bibliography No. 33). They fell under the three categories of those arriving by small boats from Norway, long-term agents and seamen, but it is a remarkable fact that between September 1941 and the end of March 1942 no fresh cases of the kind came to notice. This period coincides with that in which the Germans were preparing for their attack on Russia. As mentioned in "The German Secret Services, 1944" (vide Bibliography No. 34) the attention of the Abwehr had been mainly directed towards Russia, the Middle East, Africa, Italy and the Americas, and when in the second half of 1942 the despatch of agents to the British Isles recommenced they were, for the most part, of an uninteresting and unimportant type. The details are given in "The German Secret Services, 1944" which deals with the information available to the Security Service up to November 1943.

/(iii)

(iii) The reorganisation of the Security Service 1941.

Sir David Petrie adopted Lord Swinton's proposals for dividing B Division into three parts to be known as B, E and F, but it was not until the 1st August that this scheme was finally brought into effect. Reorganisation instructions issued on 22nd April, 1941, announced the decision of the Lord President to alter the title of Director to that of Director-General. Consequential changes were that the heads of the three existing Divisions A, B and C & D, became Directors, while certain B sections were placed under a Deputy-Director E Division and others under a Deputy-Director F Division. Further instructions announcing the Office reorganisation and renaming and renumbering the sections in B, E and F Divisions came into effect on 1st August 1941.

The question of the organisation of the Registry was also finally settled by the Director-General's approval of the scheme which changed the system in force since it had grown up in the last war (by which sections of the Registry specialised in a knowledge of the work of the sections in the various Divisions) and substituted a more mechanical one. It was simplified in the sense that the whole process was split up into a number of acts each of which was performed by a member of the staff while the responsibility for carding and extracting was placed on sectional officers; and after the agreement with Section V officers in April 1941, the overall responsibility for carding names abroad was allocated to Section V while, subject to certain reservations, the Security Service retained the practice of carding only important names of more than local importance in foreign countries.

Special sections in the Registry continued to subserve the purposes of the B sections dealing with German espionage and of the section dealing with the Communist Party of Great Britain, as will be described in greater detail below. They provided for fuller carding including, in the case of the German Intelligence Service and its agents, the carding of names abroad.

The fact of a decision on these two questions which had been the subject of divided opinion inside the Office for a long period - since about July 1940 in the case of the Registry and since December 1940 in the case of B Division - had a good psychological effect on the staff as a whole. During the period in which Lord Swinton had directly interfered in the internal working of the Office, but had delayed for so long in giving effect to the ideas which he had adopted, morale was inevitably adversely affected; and this was aggravated by the consequences of the fire in the Registry and the move to Blenheim.

/The

The Director-General's decision removed the organisational question from the arena of discussion and the staff settled down to work on the lines prescribed for it and on the basis of the new internal division of functions. Briefly, there was no important change in the functions and working of A Division (Director Lt.-Colonel Butler) or C & D Divisions (Director Brigadier Allen). B Division (Director Captain Liddell, Assistant Directors Mr. White and Major Frost) remained responsible for the investigation of enemy espionage and was relieved of the work described as "Aliens Control" which was transferred to the newly created E Division (Deputy-Director Mr. Turner, Assistant Director Major Younger), and that for "Subversive Activities" which was transferred to the new F Division (Deputy-Director Mr. Curry, Assistant Directors Mr. Hollis and Mr. Aiken-Sneath). In effect the responsibilities of E Division were for dealing with cases of internment and release of enemy aliens (except the Japanese whose cases remained with B Division) and for liaison with the Allied Governments and for questions connected with all Allied and neutral aliens in the United Kingdom. The functions of the section dealing with Aliens War Service (Lt.-Colonel Ryder) also came under the Deputy-Director of E Division. F Division's responsibilities covered all the so-called "Left" and "Right" subversive movements and included Pacifism. They were also responsible for all investigation work connected with Russian espionage.

At the same time the Director-General's staff was created and consisted of a Deputy-Director-General (Brigadier Harker), the Secretariat, Legal Advisers, Operations Section and Room 055. The Secretariat (under Mr. Abbot) was responsible for the preparation of papers dealing with all policy questions and other major problems, especially those concerning more than one Division, which required the Director-General's decision, and for matters connected with the Security Executive; the Legal Advisers under Mr. Pilcher were available to give advice to the Director-General or any officer of the Security Service on matters connected with his duties; the Operations Section under Major Lennox was responsible for obtaining and co-ordinating information from the Fighting Services and other Departments regarding military operations and certain matters of special importance which it was desirable to protect by security and other measures from the attentions of the enemy Intelligence Services. Room 055 at the War Office, under Mr. Orr, performed certain special functions based on the former relationship between M.I.5. and the War Office, serving as a means of contact with the public where it was desired to screen the identity of the Security Service and also facilitating contacts between sections in the Security Service and different parts of the War Office. In October 1941 an addition was made to the Director-General's staff in the shape of "Research" to which Mr. Curry was appointed. Mr. R. Butler was the Personal Secretary to the Director-General.

/The most

The most outstanding activities of the Security Service in connection with the war were now centred in B Division as being responsible for the investigation of all cases of known or suspected agents directly connected with the German, Italian and Japanese Secret Services, while the preventive and security functions were divided between C, D, E and F Divisions, of which E and F continued to be responsible for investigation of a preventive nature and in cases not directly connected with the enemy Secret Services.

Thus an important effect of the separation of B Division into B, E and F was to centralise the control of the whole Office in the hands of the Director General assisted by his staff, and to remove the control of the sections which now constituted the new E and F Divisions and the co-ordination of their work with that of other parts of the Office from the head of B Division.

(iv) B Division 1941-1945.

The sections of B Division may be roughly divided into two groups: (A) a group of sections under centralised direction, and (B) the auxiliary sections of B Division.

(A) A Group of Sections under centralised control.

During 1940-1941 a group of sections in B Division directly in touch with the German Secret Service, either through their communications or their agents, gradually grew up to form, as it were, a central organ under the direction of Mr. White as Assistant Director B Division (later D.D.B.).

The early stages of this growth were referred to in Chapter IV above under the heading "The beginning of effective counter-espionage work" (page 158). As indicated there this development arose from the combination under Mr. White of a system for absorbing the intelligence derived from ISOS and using it to supplement the information obtained by interrogation at Camp 020 and from other sources including the results of Major Robertson's manipulation of double agents. During 1941 steps were taken to deal with the situation created by the influx of refugees from German-occupied Europe and this brought the intelligence work at the Royal Patriotic Schools (later London Reception Centre) and then the S.C.O.s at the ports into the orbit of this centralised direction. B.I.C., as the section responsible for the investigation of enemy sabotage, was also in direct touch, through ISOS and the investigation of sabotage cases, with enemy agents and the organisation behind them.

Mr. White's view was that as B Division was organised on a subject basis (in contrast to Section V, which was on a territorial basis), it followed that the principal sections of the Division were organised by sources, among which he included the products of Section V. He explained that in order to focus the sources upon the subject - the German Secret Services - it was

necessary "to create a central mart, or exchange of information, which was the daily 12 o'clock meetings" held in his room. At these meetings he co-ordinated the study of the enemy Secret Services as organisations. The individual officers of the B.1 sections described current developments in regard to individual cases and the accumulation of intelligence regarding enemy organisations. While it normally fell to these officers to take action within their own province on their own material, there was a considerable amount of overlapping and this made it necessary for a daily allocation of work to be made at these 12 o'clock meetings.

Mr. White further described these meetings as the B Division "committee of action" and said that out of its daily discussions emerged a consciousness of counter espionage methods which had been lacking prior to their inauguration. They became training grounds for counter espionage specialists and he formed the opinion that it was hardly too much to say that they resulted in placing the Security Service in a predominant position in the counter espionage field at a time when the control of ISOS might have placed Section V in that position. Out of the discussions at the 12 o'clock meetings a definite sense of direction was developed and, in consequence, it fell to Mr. White, with the approval of the Director of B Division, to take the lead in formulating Security Service plans and procedure in counter espionage work.

These 12 o'clock meetings were at first confined to the small group of specialists in the B.1 sections, but they gradually developed during 1942 into a medium for keeping all officers of B Division in touch with the central action against the Abwehr and the Sipo und SD. They thus became too large to fulfil their original function and they were, therefore, contracted to their original size while the secondary purpose of keeping the whole of B Division informed was fulfilled by a weekly meeting under the chairmanship of Captain Liddell.

A detailed description of the working of these principal sections follows under the headings:-

1. the study of ISOS or the intercepted wireless system of the Abwehr and the Sipo und SD (B.1.B.);
2. the examination of persons (including refugees from enemy-occupied Europe, whether arriving by regular means, by sea or by air, or by an 'escape' boat or 'escape' plane) by the S.C.O.s at the ports working under the direction of A.D.D.A.;
3. the interrogation at the L.R.C. of British and alien subjects and all persons arriving from enemy-occupied territory or neutral countries otherwise than on fully authenticated business (B.1.D.);

4. the interrogation of suspected or known spies at Camp 020 (in close association with B.I.B.);
5. the investigation of cases of enemy sabotage (B.I.C.);
6. the employment of captured enemy agents who had been "turned round" with a view to using them to supply the enemy with false information or to carry through deception plans (B.I.A.).

From this account it will appear that ISOS and interrogation at the ports, at the L.R.C. and at Camp 020 were primary sources of intelligence and that under the centralised direction of Captain Liddell and Mr. White the officers at the ports - under the supervision of Lt. Colonel Adam, A.D.D.4. - and at the two interrogating centres became, in effect, the principal part of the executive machinery for countering the enemy organisations as an instrument of the German General Staff. In the same sense an important part was played by the machinery of B.I.A. under Major Robertson, which contributed through its double agents towards the execution of the plans formulated by the machinery under the Allied Chiefs of Staff for the deception of the enemy.

While Mr. White co-ordinated the counter measures against the Abwehr and SD and their agents, Captain Liddell supervised and directed this work and, in addition, co-ordinated the working of B Division with the general security or preventive work of B and other Divisions and gave shape to the work of the whole office in its relations with military operations in the most extended field of counter espionage, security and deception under the general control of the Director General. This work culminated in the successful measures which ensured the security of the landings in North Africa, Sicily and Normandy, but before this successful culmination was reached B Division went through a long and sometimes difficult period of development during the years from 1941 onwards. In order to understand this period it seems desirable to refer in some detail to the developments in some of the principal sections.

As mentioned in Chapter IV above, the first results of the integration of information received by the interrogation of German agents arriving in this country and that derived from the intercepted wireless of the Abwehr and the SD was contained in Mr. White's report on the German Secret Service dated December 1940 (vide Bibliography No. 39). The second compilation of the same kind was prepared by Mr. Curry in 1942 in two editions; one known as the esoteric edition for very limited circulation (vide Bibliography No. 32) was produced in June of that year, and the other for wider circulation was printed in August (vide Bibliography No. 33). These two editions summarised the information available up to the end of March 1942. A further report on the German Secret Service was prepared to include the information available up to November 1943 (vide Bibliography No. 34) by which time the detailed knowledge of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (R.S.H.A.) had been greatly improved as a result of further interception of their communications and the capture of

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some of their agents. Several other papers were prepared on different aspects of the subject, notably a paper on the R.S.H.A. prepared in Section V, a technical note entitled "Amt Auslandsnachrichten und Abwehr" (vide Bibliography No. 5) on the intercepted material prepared by Mr. Palmer of G.C. & C.S., and several papers by Major Trevor Roper's section. (At the time of writing no final and comprehensive report for the last period of the war has been prepared).

Of all the sources of information from which these compilations were prepared and from which the day to day work was done in the shape of collating evidence against individual agents and in building up the compilations about the different parts of the enemy organisations prepared in B.I. Information, one of the most important was ISOS or the intercepted wireless. Its importance lay in the fact that it not only led directly to the detection of enemy agents, but it also connected the agents directly with the Abwehr organisation behind them as an instrument of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (the German General Staff); and it illuminated in a positive if often incomplete manner the whole structure of that organisation in a way which could not be done by the unaided interrogation of captured agents, if only for the reason that few, if any, of those captured had any detailed knowledge of the organisation as a whole. It was not only positive evidence, but, in so far as it could be correctly interpreted, irrefutable. Many agents had only a slight knowledge of certain parts of the organisation and even individual Abwehr officers were very far from being acquainted with the whole machine of which they formed a part. At the same time the interrogation of known agents at Camp 020 or the L.R.C. and the work of B.I.A. in dealing with the traffic of agents who were turned round, all combined to furnish complementary pieces of evidence without which the ISOS material by itself could not be fully understood or explained, and had a very limited practical value.

1. ISOS or the intercepted wireless system of the Abwehr and the Sipo und SD.

ISOS was the generic name (for security reasons it was officially changed subsequently) given to a wide range of Abwehr and SD wireless communications as intercepted by R.S.S. and deciphered by G.C. & C.S. This important and fruitful source of information about the enemy became available to us as a direct result of the manipulation by the Security Service of the double agent as already mentioned. While wireless traffic was being monitored one of our wireless operators noticed that the Hamburg Control Station was carrying on wireless traffic with a number of other points which subsequently proved to be other Abwehr Stations in regular wireless contact with Hamburg. At first the suggestion that the series of messages thus noticed as passing to and from the Hamburg Control were

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of counter espionage importance was greeted with scepticism,*but after an amateur had succeeded in deciphering one of them there was no room for doubt on the point and G.C. & C.S. then developed a section to deal with the network which R.S.S. had disclosed with Hamburg as a centre.

From the autumn of 1940 onwards R.S.S., starting from this small beginning, developed their organisation for the interception, identification and "discrimination" of Abwehr and SD traffic until it, eventually, uncovered the almost world-wide Abwehr network and led to the identification of German agents in many countries, and furnished authentic evidence of the working of the R.S.H.A. and the Sipo und SD. The intercepted messages were deciphered and translated and distributed by G.C. & C.S. to representatives of the D.M.I., D.N.I., A.C.A.S.(I), the Security Service and various sections in S.I.S. The Ds of I were included as from the first it was obvious that this material was of operational importance, but it was only at a later date that this operational importance was properly appreciated and exploited.

All through 1941 and well into 1942 the study and exploitation of this material was dealt with in separate compartments by the different recipients largely as a result of the attitude of Colonel Cowgill who was constituted the guardian of the security of the material in consequence of instructions emanating from the Prime Minister himself to the effect that material of this kind should be kept strictly secret and only communicated to those directly concerned in the work arising out of it. Colonel Cowgill's interpretation of his position was the cause of acute controversy between himself and the Security Service over a long period, but whatever the merits of his attitude may have been, the fact remains that great benefits accrued when, without his knowledge or contrary to his intentions, different recipients got into touch with one another and exchanged views on the nature of the material and the possibilities of exploiting it. The necessary study of the material before it could be exploited was in the nature of textual criticism and the expert skill in such work of the trained minds of classical scholars and others (such as Mr. Palmer, Major Trevor-Roper and his assistants) was appropriately applied to its elucidation.

A partial synthesis of the structure of the German organisation sending or receiving messages or referred to in them was constructed from inferences based on the results of the gradual collection and collation of a large number of details compiled from many series of messages. These messages were very largely administrative in character and they sometimes

* As an instance of the difficulty of this work the following may be quoted:- On 26.9.39. the Security Service sent a copy of a message believed to be from the station that worked to which, it was thought, might be in the Stuttgart area. S.I.S. replied that G.C. & C.S. could not break the messages and suggested that they were Russian telegrams and originated from Shanghai; it was not thought that they were German. They were, however, subsequently identified as Abwehr traffic in Europe.

only gave a clue to the identity of an Abwehr agent or prospective agent as a result of oblique references. The analogy to textual criticism was enhanced by the fact that when the messages had been deciphered they were often found to contain codes and code names within the ciphers, and these in turn had to be subjected to a process of induction - or of trial and error - from a number of known facts before their full meaning could be determined and the resultant intelligence could be exploited.

It is necessary at this stage to go somewhat fully into the question of Colonel Cowgill's attitude to the whole scale of problems arising out of ISOS, because this attitude dominated the use of ISOS for counter espionage and operational purposes and, incidentally, had far-reaching effects on the relations between Section V and B Division. In the first place it is necessary to understand the factors which went to make up the situation. Chief among them were the facts that ISOS material was of practical value in the following directions:-

(a) It led to the identification and arrest of spies.

(b) It filled in - in the course of time - a large detailed background picture of the Abwehr and SD organisations, their methods of working, their technique of espionage, their cover addresses, their secret inks, the identity of their officers and their relations with other parts of the German military machine.

(c) It supplied information regarding the technique of sabotage, especially against British shipping, and thereby assisted in the development of counter-measures by the Security Service.

(d) It provided a valuable means of checking the elaborate and complicated working of an extensive ring of double agents manipulated by the Security Service.

(e) It provided information of operational value, e.g. the formation or assembly of Abwehr Commandos before and in the neighbourhood of a projected German advance.

(f) It provided political information, e.g. the nature and extent of Spanish collaboration with the Germans.

(g) It provided valuable material concerning the German organisation and its detailed working which was used with good effect in order to obtain information during the course of interrogation.

A second point was that, broadly speaking, action on the information obtained from this material could be taken by the Security Service in the way of arrest of enemy agents in British territory, or on the high seas,

/or for

or for the purposes of interrogating captured agents. On the other hand there was little or no action, except to make enquiries in neutral countries, which could be taken by Section V except, perhaps, in the later stages of the war through S.C.I. units employed by them in the field, i.e. in the operational zones in Africa, Italy and after the Normandy landing. The enquiries in neutral countries took the form of supplementing intelligence obtained from ISOS by the employment of agents to obtain information about the German organisation in such countries and in some cases they were able to obtain information officially or otherwise from the local police and other authorities about the names of travellers and numerous other details. This type of information was often useful in identifying Abwehr officers or agents or in helping to explain the meaning of ISOS references. It thus played a part in building up the general body of intelligence, but unless it concerned an agent who arrived in or was intended for British territory the normal attitude of Section V was that it did not concern the Security Service.

Again, as the result of the practice of maintaining separate compartments, i.e. as between G.C. & C.S., the Security Service, Section V and the Fighting Services, there was over a long period, as a result of a failure to compare notes, not only a lack of understanding of each other's problems, but often the failure to interpret correctly the information available in the various isolated compartments.

This "compartmentalisation", to use the ugly current word, also occurred within Section V, where the geographical sub-sections suffered similarly in kind, if not in degree.

The Security Service view was that this excess of security by isolation not only served no useful purpose, but should not have occurred, because, in fact, all the different parts of the organisation, R.S.S., G.C. & C.S., V.W. (afterwards R.I.S.), Section V and the Security Service all existed in order to achieve a single objective, namely, the arrest of enemy agents and the compilation and use for that purpose of all relevant intelligence. It involved the risk of failure to act in matters involving operational or Security Service responsibilities, such as the prevention of sabotage, for the sake of the mistaken aim of ensuring an impossible degree of security - impossible because the essential fact, i.e. that Security Service action was often based on wireless interception, necessarily became known to many hundreds of people in the Security Service, in S.I.S. and in the intelligence and operational staffs of the armies in the field.

Thus the practical value and use of ISOS material was marred by a failure to co-ordinate the machinery dealing with it and this lack of co-ordination was accentuated by - and in a sense the cause of - the fact that a number of independent indices were maintained, some of which were too incomplete to serve

/as a basis

as a basis for adequate exploitation of the intelligence available from it.

The enormity of this mistaken point of view in handling this very valuable source of information can only be fully appreciated in the light of a knowledge of the geographical area covered by the Abwehr wireless system and its relationship with the military operations directed by the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht under Field Marshal Keitel to whom the Abwehr under Admiral Canaris was subordinated. This has been partly set out in the various reports on the German Secret Service already mentioned; and the fact that the Abwehr was in many ways ineffective and incompetent did not in any real sense diminish its usefulness if properly interpreted by the British Services or mitigate the errors involved in the obstruction of their smooth functioning which was due to Colonel Cowgill's attitude. These errors would have been mitigated if he had appreciated the intrinsic importance of the material at its real value and established an adequate machine to cope with it based on an efficiently organised ISOS index, but he only did so in 1943 as the result of pressure from B Division. These are the main facts of the situation in which his attitude dominated the use of ISOS for counter espionage and operational purposes.

The direct effect of all this on certain Security Service problems is illustrated by the following instances in which Colonel Cowgill attempted to prevent the Security Service from obtaining information which was essential to the proper discharge of their responsibilities:-

(a) A small fraction of the wireless of the R.S.H.A. Intelligence Service, i.e. the Sicherheitsdienst, was intercepted in 1940 and 1941, but at the instance of Colonel Cowgill this was suddenly stopped, and in June 1941, after it had been withheld for some time, the Security Service came to hear unofficially that there were references on it to an attempt by the SD to arrange for London telephone directories to be smuggled out to them through Japanese diplomatic channels. Copies of these messages were only obtained after considerable delay and as a result of a request to Section V for information. When a general request for the whole series was made, Section V replied that it was of no counter espionage interest and that they had adequate and efficient machinery for communicating any material of a counter espionage nature which might appear in it. In fact it was of the greatest interest and importance as is shown by the references to the R.S.H.A. in "The German Secret Service, August 1942 and August 1944" (vide Bibliography Nos. 33 and 34) and subsequent developments. The event proved that the machinery in Section V was not adequate at that time, and for a long time afterwards, to formulate a proper appreciation of this (SD) material, which as a result of inadequate general knowledge about Nazi Germany they did not understand, and in regard to which their first duty and their principal function was to keep the Security Service informed so as to enable it to take necessary counter-measures. B Division were themselves

/at that time

at that time (i.e. 1940-41) ignorant of the important facts that this group of traffic represented SD communications and even that the letters SD in ISOS stood for Sicherheitsdienst. At the instance of Section V they had interpreted them as representing an unexplained "Sonderdienst". It was only when the facts came to the notice of "Research" in the Security Service that the identification of the SD of ISOS with the Sicherheitsdienst and its real significance were recognised early in 1942.

(b) In pursuance of his policy for safeguarding ISOS Colonel Cowgill decided that the interrogators at Camp 020 should not be allowed the undisguised text of intercepted messages relating to agents or suspects whom they were interrogating and that blanketed versions only should be supplied to them, and he obtained the unwilling consent of B Division to this course. The inevitable happened and experience soon showed the danger of this arrangement, but it was only after a great deal of argument and subject to the restriction that the Director of B Division should personally decide on the appropriate arrangements in each case that Colonel Cowgill waived his objection. From September 1941 onwards - subject to restrictions which were only eliminated by slow degrees - the examiners at Camp 020 were allowed to see the material on the ground that it was only in this way that they could appreciate the nature and delicacy of the source and avoid putting questions to persons under examination in such a way as to avoid the risk of giving it away.

(c) As a result of a slip on the part of someone in Section V it was discovered in April 1942 that G.C. & C.S. had been instructed to withhold certain ISOS messages which were believed, very often mistakenly, to refer to British agents. By the time these facts were disclosed it came out that more than a hundred messages had been withheld from the Security Service, some of which directly concerned double agents who were operating under Security Service control. In many cases these arrangements had a direct bearing on the control which had been exercised, and the fact that they were withheld involved a serious risk of avoidable contretemps. In spite of the obvious importance of these facts it was only after protracted negotiations that it was agreed that this type of message (known as ISBA) should be supplied to B Division, and then only with the unreasonable and useless proviso that they should be received and kept personally by the Director.

(d) In May 1941 arrangements were made for a fortnightly meeting of a Joint Committee composed of officers of Section V and the Security Service to consider the technical aspects of the work of radio interception by R.S.S. in so far as these two departments were concerned. Colonel Cowgill aimed at confining discussions to these technical aspects and to the question of regulating the priority of the various ISOS services. As was inevitable, however, the intelligence content of the messages of these services formed the basis of discussion, and many members of the Committee were persuaded by the facts before them that the representatives of the Intelligence Directorates of the Services who received the ISOS material as well

/as representatives

as representatives of G.C. & C.S. ought to attend the meetings of the Committee. They were also convinced that the terms of reference should be extended to deal with any aspect of the problems arising from the interception including questions of their intelligence content. These proposals met with the strongest opposition from S.I.S., who attempted to have the Committee closed down on the ground that it had outlived its usefulness, in spite of the fact that all members, with the exception of Colonel Cowgill, were agreed that the terms of reference and the membership should be extended. With the assistance of Mr. Reilly of the Foreign Office, at that time personal assistant to C.S.S., a decision was obtained on the lines desired by the Security Service and from that time onwards, i.e. the beginning of 1943, the reformed Committee attained greater importance and efficiency and played a useful part in a much more successful exploitation of the intelligence content of the intercepted material.

(e) The evidence of the intercepted messages showed that the enemy claimed to have a number of agents in the Middle East, including Egypt, in 1941, but it became evident that the S.I.S. representative in the Middle East who was responsible for communicating this type of information to S.I.M.E. had no adequate means of doing so. Some of this intelligence was derived from a particularly delicate type of material (because the cryptographical solution which had been achieved by G.C. & C.S. was one involving such unusual skill that the enemy could be assumed to regard it as insoluble). It was therefore treated with special care and was only communicated to the S.I.S. representative in the Middle East in a scrambled form with the result that the information supplied to S.I.M.E. was insufficient in quantity as well as inaccurate. From the point of view of the Security Service officers here who understood the problem of applying this type of information to the practical question of identifying a spy and obtaining the requisite evidence against him, it appeared that the officers in Section V had no conception of what the Security organisation in the Middle East required. To meet this difficulty an officer from the Security Service in London was deputed to S.I.M.E. to receive and deal with the ISOS material. (Further details are given below in dealing with the Middle East).

(f) In the light of experience the Security Service officers concerned formed the opinion that the ISOS material could only be properly exploited as the result of analysis by experts who were in a position to make a complete study of the whole material including a large quantity of undeciphered material which, again, in the hands of these experts, was capable of producing intelligence of great value. A body of qualified experts existed in Section V.W. (later R.I.S.) under Major Trevor-Roper, assisted by Mr. Palmer of the intelligence section of G.C. & C.S. Colonel Cowgill, however, had a different opinion and regarded these experts as unreliable on the ground that they made mistakes by basing themselves on the internal evidence of the texts without access to other sources of information. His view on this point was contested

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on the ground that what was required was to integrate the evidence obtained by an analysis of the texts with information available from other sources. Colonel Gowgill also claimed that the personnel of Section V were the experts in the interpretation of this material and the proper staff to decide questions of making use of it in conjunction with other information. Section V, however, were handicapped by the fact that they were divided into sub-sections on a geographical basis and studied the material after dividing it into corresponding geographical groupings with the result that their inexperienced and more or less isolated sub-sections were not able to understand much of the material or to see it as a whole as could be done by the experts in V.W. The Security Service pressed for an extension of the charter of V.W. because they were convinced of the value of their analyses. As a result the sub-section was ultimately separated from Section V and in 1943 became a separate department of S.I.S. directly responsible to C.S.S. with the title of R.I.S. With the extended charter then granted to it R.I.S. made contributions of great value to all recipients of the material.

It must be emphasised that as a means of detecting enemy agents ISOS, by itself, had in a sense a limited usefulness. Full value could only be extracted from it in combination with the records of the Security Service as a repository of information received from other sources. These sources included records which were obtained for the purpose such as crew lists and passenger lists which helped to identify agents when travelling, even if they were only known to us as code names in ISOS. Other most important sources were names and other information derived from interrogations at the L.R.C. and Camp 020 or from such mundane and routine papers as a list of clerks at the Portuguese Embassy in London. In some cases Section V was able to obtain evidence of movements which made it possible to identify an agent otherwise only known to us under an Abwehr cover name. In effect ISOS did not supplant other records but was complementary to them and in combination with them made it possible to take action leading to arrests either in this country or in other British countries, especially in Trinidad and the African Colonies, as the result of the control by British authorities of the movements of vessels on which they were travelling. During the period 1940-1944 inclusive, out of a total of 102 German spies known to have been sent to the United Kingdom 18 were caught as a result of information derived from ISOS and 9 who were caught in other ways or surrendered themselves could have been arrested on ISOS information. Some corroboration was furnished by subsequent references on ISOS in the cases of 53 of those who were arrested either on ISOS information or in other ways. During the same period the number arrested at Trinidad and brought to the United Kingdom for a more thorough interrogation than was possible abroad was 21, while 3 were arrested in Africa, 2 in Iceland and 3 in Gibraltar.

The following table indicates the proportion of spies who were caught as a result of the ISOS information to the total detained in the United

/Kingdom

Kingdom or brought here for interrogation and detention as well as that of those who were referred to in the ISOS messages:-

	Total of spies detained in the U.K. or brought to the U.K. for detention.	Numbers caught on ISOS information.	Number subsequently reflected on ISOS.
1941	28	7 (25%)	9 (32.1%)
1942	43	15 (35%)	24 (55.8%)
1943	54	21 (40%)	39 (72.2%)
1944	41	9 (22%)	21 (51.1%)

It is possible that some of the German agents who were arrested here as a result of ISOS information would have been detected without it, but it is virtually certain that very few of those who were captured overseas and brought here would have been caught but for the fact of this interception of Abwehr communications. It would have been virtually impossible for interrogating officers at various points such as Trinidad or the African ports to have detected the enemy agents among the large numbers of travellers whom they had to scrutinise. Their capture, which can therefore be attributed solely to ISOS, had in many cases important consequences apart from the fact that they were prevented from carrying out their particular missions. For instance, the case of Osmar Helmuth who was arrested at Trinidad and examined at Camp 020 was one which was largely responsible for the rupture of relations between the Argentine and Germany and, even more important, for exacerbating the deteriorating relations between the Abwehr and the SD. The capture of numerous Spaniards who were acting as German agents led the Foreign Office, in accordance with our views and advice, to adopt a stiffer attitude towards Spanish collaboration with the Germans. In some of these cases this was substantiated by a signed confession which Camp 020 was able to produce for the benefit of the Spanish Ambassador when he made a complaint to the Foreign Office. Moreover the widespread nature of the action which it was possible to take on the basis of the intercepted messages as a centralised source of information - as opposed to the very different position which would have obtained if local officers had been dependent on local sources of information in isolated British territories or foreign countries such as those in South America - resulted in the assembling of a large amount of information covering every field of German espionage in different parts of the world through the interrogation of this wide range of spies after they had been roped in and brought to this country. This information derived from interrogation eventually - after being compiled and assembled - began to rival in importance and comprehensiveness the ISOS information itself; and this had the advantage that it was possible to utilise it for the instruction of outlying branches of the Security Service with far greater freedom than was possible in the case of ISOS information which could therefore be held in reserve without exposing it to undue risks.

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The delicacy of ISOS as a source of the information made it difficult at first to provide for the arrest of German agents discovered through this widespread interception in the case of those passing through overseas British territories en route to other countries. With this in view, the Security Service took steps in 1942 and was able to induce the Colonial Office to advise the various Colonial Governments to pass legislation enabling them to remove an alien from vessels or aircraft by an administrative act not subject to appeal to a court or an advisory committee. This legislation made it possible to effect arrests under conditions which did not compromise the source of information and the usual practice was to obtain an order under D.R.18BA from the Home Secretary to provide for the transferring of the individual agents from the Colonial territory for detention in the United Kingdom. There was no appeal against detention under D.R.18BA; and ISOS as a source was protected accordingly in this country. This important preventive action was taken as the result of advice tendered by B Division.

An extraordinary, and from our point of view troublesome, feature of the Abwehr was the number of fictitious reports which came to notice through being communicated from Abwehr posts to Berlin. Vast numbers of these fictitious reports, which were invented by unreliable enemy agents and sometimes condoned by corrupt Abwehr officers, had to be carefully checked by the Security Service because many of them had a sub-stratum of fact and some appeared to contain dangerous information. Among this mass of fraudulent fiction there was at the end of the war in Europe a hard core of three cases in which it had not been possible to establish definitely whether the ISOS evidence represented real spies who had escaped our controls or imaginary characters. There were also half a dozen cases of agents mentioned as being destined for British territory without any express reference to their arrival or agents destined for an unspecified destination which might be British territory.

Apart from this use for detecting and dealing with enemy agents in British territories and for preventing or countering the work of the Abwehr and SD on the lines sketched above, the operational significance of the corpus of intelligence which was mainly based on the intercepted wireless material was of considerable importance. This question was raised in Part 4, Paras. 210-221 of the German Secret Service, August 1942 (vide Bibliography No. 33). Para. 215 in particular raised the question of how far the existing machinery was suitable for the purpose; and subsequent to this arrangements were made whereby intelligence arising directly out of the analysis of the material by Mr. Palmer of the Intelligence Section of the G.C. & C.S. was passed directly and immediately to the officers concerned in the Directorates of Intelligence in the War Office, Admiralty or Air Ministry. This direct communication was necessary because of the delay involved in passing it through the sub-sections of Section V

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and the impossibility of a complete integration by its geographical sub-sections, inexperienced and restricted as they were. This development was due in part at least to the emphasis laid on the operational significance of this material in "The German Secret Service" of August 1942. In March of that year in the course of preparing this document "Research" was led to get into touch with Major Melland in the Directorate of Military Intelligence with a view to including in it more comprehensive details concerning the German military machine. This contact led directly to a liaison with Mr. Palmer in G.C. & C.S. who was introduced to various officers in the Security Service on a basis which had to be unofficial in view of Section V's attitude to G.C. & C.S. and - incredible though it may appear - their objection to direct relations between them and the Security Service. The liaison was immediately fruitful and enabled Mr. Palmer to interpret certain important texts which had previously defied him. The first of these was one dealing with the technical arrangements for sabotaging British ships in Spanish ports. The resultant interpretation of the messages enabled him to give warning of the enemy's plans so that they could be forestalled. It also led to preventive action by Lord Rothschild of B.I.C. which greatly minimised the possibility of losses to British shipping through enemy sabotage. The liaison with Mr. Palmer and the emphasis placed by "Research" on the operational significance of ISOS also led to Major Melland being introduced to the fortnightly meetings of the Technical Committee and to a general exchange of information which enabled various parts of the whole machine to arrive at a better appreciation of the operational significance of the material. There are further references to the general question of the operational significance of ISOS in "The German Secret Service, August 1944" (vide Bibliography No. 34).

Lt. Colonel Melland, after leaving M.I.14(D), gave it as his opinion that ISOS contained material of operational value in various ways. Its potential value was recognised from the beginning and it was for this reason that it was supplied to M.I.14(D). Subsequent experience had shown that the material was often of negative value in that it showed what the Abwehr did not know; and again, it showed in many instances that the information obtained from their agents was of little value or very doubtful accuracy. ISOS was of negative value in one important instance, when it showed that the Abwehr had no previous information about the landings in North Africa. There had been indications that the Germans were preparing to withdraw from Greece and there had been important indications regarding their plans in connection with their offensive in South Russia. Just as, when the German armies were advancing, the assembling of Einsatz Kommandos had indicated preparations for an advance, in the same way when they were preparing for a withdrawal in Western Europe the fact was indicated by the decrease or disappearance of fixed Abwehr posts and the formation of mobile units. ISOS, he added, had been of special importance in connection with the landings in Normandy and had shown that the Abwehr attached great importance

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to and relied on the information they obtained from double-cross agents under the control of B.I.A. In this respect there was of course the unknown factor: that we did not then know how far the German General Staff relied on Abwehr reports. The fact that the Abwehr was relying on this double-cross information which we planted on them and had no other important sources of information was a factor in building up our General Staff's appreciation of the whole position. (The very great importance and significance of this question of Abwehr reliance on double-cross information is dealt with under the account of B.I.A. below).

A number of papers based on ISOS and containing appreciations of its operational value were prepared by M.I.14(D).

2. The examination by S.C.O.s of persons arriving at sea or air ports.

The work of D.4 and S.C.O.s at sea and air ports in connection with the arrival of aliens or British subjects illustrates the complementary nature of the preventive functions of D and the investigation work of B Divisions. This has been brought out in the "Manual on the German Secret Service and British Counter Measures", pages 1 and 2 (vide Bibliography No. 31), in which the part played by the different sections is clearly, if briefly, explained. It is more fully set out in the L.R.C. History (S.F.50/24/44(32)), and the D.4 History (S.F.50/24/44(56)).

The functions of D.4 and the S.C.O.s were preventive in the sense that by examining the canalised traffic into and out of the United Kingdom they prevented the incoming and outgoing, without the knowledge of B Division, of suspects, known agents, or those elements which might be expected to include such suspects or agents; and they arranged through the Immigration Officers to divert them to the L.R.C. or supplied intelligence about them to other divisions of the Security Service for use as might be desirable. Their functions also included the preliminary stages of detection whenever by search or interrogation they obtained intelligence relevant to counter espionage problems. It should be added, however, that the position of the S.C.O. at a port is not an easy one as there is usually neither time nor suitable facilities for detailed interrogation.

The conditions under which S.C.O.s worked varied during the course of the war as a result of changes in travel conditions. At the beginning of the war, as a result of the Home Office decision, aliens were encouraged to leave, and Germans, except those notified for detention, were allowed to go. Thereafter all Exit Permits were referred to the Security Service, while travel into the United Kingdom was only permitted, and visas were only granted, when it was in the national interest.

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There were passenger services between neutral countries calling at United Kingdom ports and these required attention from the S.C.O.s. A number of enemy aliens, particularly seamen, were taken off and interned. Early in 1940 France demanded relaxation in the restriction of travel in the national interest in order to maintain tourist travel to the Riviera.

After the collapse of France and the occupation of Western Europe in May and June 1940, Spanish, Portuguese and U.S.A. vessels were not allowed by their Governments to enter the United Kingdom, and passenger traffic was consequently severely restricted. A little later U.S.A. ships were registered in Panama and arrived here under the Panamanian flag bringing supplies and munitions. In 1941 about a thousand Norwegians escaped to the Shetlands in fishing vessels, but this traffic was practically stopped by the Germans in 1942, although a certain number, sometimes including German agents, continued to trickle through. From 1941 until the landing in Normandy large numbers of refugees and persons escaping from enemy territory were allowed to come to this country in response to the call to join the Allied Forces. Others came for the same purpose from North and South America. After France was liberated in 1945 a limited amount of passenger traffic across the Channel was allowed.

The work of S.C.O.s at the ports was based on W.S.18 and their legal powers were set out in W.S.18(A).

At the beginning of the war passenger travel was heavy and S.C.O.s were guided by the Central Security War Black List, and in the absence of more authentic information could only rely on impressions formed while interrogating individuals. Aliens arriving at United Kingdom ports could be sent to Cannon Row Police Station for examination (subject to the Immigration Officer agreeing to refuse leave to land under the Aliens Order 1920). This procedure was in accordance with that followed in the last war when aliens were sent to Cannon Row from the ports to be examined by Special Branch under the direction of Sir Basil Thomson, but in June 1940 Sir Norman Kendal, in a letter to Captain Liddell, suggested that the Security Service should deal with all such cases and carry them through to the end.

Just before the fall of France it was proposed that large numbers of refugees should come to the United Kingdom. It was decided that these should all be examined, aliens being sent to camps in London and British subjects detained if necessary under special powers. The Defence Regulations were amended by the addition of D.R.18(3) to give the necessary authority.

On the fall of France the flood of refugees from occupied territories was dealt with from the security point of view by a section of

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B Division (B.24), which was formed mainly from staff previously working under S.I.S. This section interrogated the refugees in a somewhat haphazard and very unsatisfactory manner until better arrangements could be improvised. The first flood having been disposed of, it became clear that numbers of aliens would continue to arrive and would require more detailed examination. It was decided that these aliens must be diverted to a central point, to which they could be brought under escort from the ports, or from authorised landing places. It was not until the 10th January 1941 that the Royal Patriotic Schools were opened for this purpose, with a view to facilitating arrangements for a more thorough examination than was possible at the ports.

It is worth noting that this change from examination by Special Branch at Cannon Row to the establishment of an intelligence organisation (later known as the L.R.C. or London Reception Centre) had an important effect in altering the status of the Security Service and in rendering possible systematic intelligence work based on an appropriate type of intelligence records. (This will be described in the next sub-section). The fact that the authority to refuse leave to land or refuse leave to embark rested in the early stages with the Immigration Officer on the advice of the S.C.O. led to difficulties as there were frequent disagreements. When the coast of Western Europe was occupied from Norway to Bordeaux, it was essential to have a clear understanding about their respective responsibilities in view of the increased likelihood of the arrival of enemy agents. For example, information received from S.I.S. showed that the Germans were seizing the clothing of Breton fishermen. It was clear that this might mean an attempt to introduce agents in this guise. While individuals could be checked at the ports there was also the possibility of an attempt to send fishing boats to the United Kingdom. Similarly the Ministry of Labour were recruiting certain classes of technicians from among refugees in Spain, Portugal and elsewhere. While this was necessary from the point of view of the supply of munitions, it offered an opportunity to the Germans to arrange to include agents among them. It was agreed that they should be subjected to security examination on arrival.

The question was taken up and as a result the Immigration Branch agreed to an instruction being issued to Immigration Officers and S.C.O.s. On 9.1.41. A.D.D.4. issued a circular to S.C.O.s explaining this agreement, which was to the effect that certain categories of aliens should be refused leave to land and sent to the L.R.C. The categories were mainly aliens without a visa, those wishing to join any of the Allied Forces, those who in the opinion of the Immigration Officer or the S.C.O. gave any ground for suspicion of being connected with any hostile or subversive or otherwise undesirable organisation, refugees, or the crews of foreign fishing vessels arriving from enemy occupied territory, alien technicians from Spain, Portugal or Northern Africa. A secret memorandum explaining the reasons for these instructions was furnished to Security Control Officers, who were instructed to communicate its

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3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
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contents to Immigration Officers on request. This secret memorandum was based on the information which had been accumulated by the Security Service regarding the activities of the German Secret Service up to that point. It was to the effect that the German Secret Service was very active in recruiting and despatching a large number of agents to this country, presumably in the hope that some at least would get through and obtain useful information. The agents in question were mainly unimportant people with no previous contact with the German Secret Service and no experience as agents. They were to be looked for among people who would have no difficulty in entering this country legally and included applicants for enlistment in the Allied Forces; seamen signing for service on British or Allied ships; women of Allied nationality joining their husbands serving with the Allied Forces and neutral journalists. Certain details were given regarding the German questionnaires, the use of for secret writing purposes and other similar points.

This action proved to be timely as shortly after the issue of this circular two foreign fishing vessels arrived from occupied territory, both of which, it subsequently transpired as a result of further examination, had been sent by the Germans for the purpose of committing sabotage. In one case the Immigration Officer was satisfied with the crew and wished to land them, but was prevented from doing so on the authority of the above-mentioned instructions. Another case was that of Joseph August LAUREYSSENS, who had arrived on 5.12.40. The S.C.O. wished to refuse leave to land, but the Immigration Officer disagreed and granted leave. It was proved that he was an enemy agent when the Censorship detected his reports in secret ink to the Abwehr.

The general question was referred to Lord Swinton, and on the 21st March 1941, as a result of an agreement between him and the Home Office, the latter issued instructions to Immigration Officers to the effect that the Security Control Officer was the representative at the port of the Security Service, and would often be in possession of information which was not available to the Immigration Officer. The Immigration Officer should, therefore, refuse to any alien leave to land or to embark if the Security Control Officer advised him that it was not in the interest of national security that the alien should be granted such leave. The instructions went on to say that the S.C.O. would give his reasons to the Immigration Officer whenever possible, but if he were unable to do so (e.g. because he was acting on instructions from headquarters) he would notify the Immigration Officer accordingly and the latter would refuse leave, a report being forwarded to the Home Office by the Security Service in such cases.

The effect of this, one of the most important results achieved by Lord Swinton, was to give the power of decision as to the landing and subsequent interrogation to the Security Service. It thus gave - in effect - executive powers to enable the Security

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Service to discharge its responsibilities, and incidentally lifted that responsibility from the shoulders of the Home Office. (It should be noted that in law the powers remained with the Immigration Officers not with Security Service officers).

These arrangements, however, did not always work smoothly as the Immigration Department are reported by A.D.D.4 to have collaborated fairly well on the whole, but to have taken every opportunity to raise objections. As a result, at the instance of B Division, an attempt was made to restrict or eliminate the S.C.O.s' discretion by a list of categories exactly defining which aliens should be sent to the L.R.C. Protracted discussions on a draft agreed at a meeting with the Home Office on 27.10.42. resulted in a final decision which they did not issue until the 3rd December 1943. It specifically mentioned that S.C.O.s should use their discretion and furnished a list of categories to be used as a guide. It laid down that the S.C.O. should give one of the following reasons to the Immigration Officer in making a request for a male or female alien, other than a volunteer for the British or Allied Forces, to be refused leave to land:-

(a) Security Service Headquarters have information which makes it advisable for the individual to be sent there for further examination.

(b) From impressions formed during the examination, as to his manner or statements, the S.C.O. considers further examination is necessary.

(c) The individual has been in circumstances or in an area where he may have been subject to enemy influences.

It also pointed out that the procedure of sending people to the L.R.C. was not a punitive measure, but was intended to ensure that aliens who might be dangerous to the national interest should not be landed without full examination. It was further laid down that members of Allied Forces or those coming to join the Allied Forces should be examined at the L.R.C. prior to their becoming entitled to the legal privileges accorded to members of the Allied Forces enlisted in the United Kingdom.

Immediately before the fall of France in 1940 it was proposed that some eight hundred thousand refugees from France, Belgium and Holland should be conducted to this country and the Home Office finally agreed to accept three hundred thousand; but, as a result of the rapidity of the collapse, only about thirty-five thousand arrived. Among the aliens were a certain number of British subjects, many of whom had scarcely any other connection with England beyond the technical fact of nationality, e.g. as a result of birth on British territory. In view of the possibility that some of them might be suspect the "Arrival from Enemy or Foreign Territory Order" was issued as an amendment to D.R.18 under the heading of D.R.18(3). The object in view was to make it possible to detain

/British subjects

British subjects in these circumstances, but defects in the Order came to light, and it was not until the 22nd December 1943 that the Home Office decided on its final form. The essential provision in the Order of 1943 was to enable the Secretary of State to make orders for securing that, if there was reasonable cause to believe that a person had recently been assisting, or associating with persons assisting, the enemy, he might be detained pending enquiries.

In the meanwhile, in the summer of 1942, B Division had realised that a number of individuals having British nationality were arriving in this country under circumstances similar to those of the aliens who were being sent to the L.R.C., and early in 1943 arrangements were made to deal with them on similar lines and in the light of the L.R.C. records. On the 16th April 1943 the Home Office issued an instruction enjoining the same principles of co-operation as in the case of aliens between Immigration Officers and S.C.O.s in respect of refusal of leave to embark on the part of British subjects under Article 2 of the Passenger Traffic Order 1939.

A case occurred in December 1942 which illustrated the possible danger of British subjects arriving here in the employ of the enemy as well as the impossibility of binding S.C.O.s strictly to categories and the desirability of trusting to their discretion and of keeping them as fully informed as possible of current intelligence relevant to this subject. This was the case of Johannes de GRAAF, who arrived in this country from Spain having been employed since the previous April on the staff of the British Embassy in Madrid in the section dealing with individuals escaping from occupied Europe. The S.C.O. formed the opinion that he was a suspect and arranged for him to be sent to Brixton Prison under the "Arrival from Enemy or Foreign Territory Order" 1751/1940 under D.R.18(3). After two interrogations by the L.R.C. examiner, the view was taken that there was nothing against him, but later, on his story being checked with details in the Information Index, it became apparent that part of De GRAAF's escape from Belgium early in 1942 had been arranged by a suspect enemy agent. This led to further interrogation and to his eventual confession that he was an enemy agent with instructions to commit sabotage. This confession could not have been obtained but for the initiative of the S.C.O., which was thus responsible for results having an important bearing on the preventive and intelligence work of the Security Service.

The point is emphasised because the question of categories and discretion was the subject of some divergence of views between B and D Divisions. It is also to be noted that in the case of aliens arriving from Western Europe under enemy occupation the S.C.O. had no option but to send persons from those countries to the L.R.C. In the case of British subjects, in the absence of a satisfactory regulation and of arrangements for dealing with them, the matter depended entirely on the S.C.O.'s discretion and on his having

/the knowledge

the knowledge or insight which might enable him to detect a suspect.*

Thus the S.C.O., stationed as he was at the point of entry into the United Kingdom, played an important part - under the general guidance of A.D.D.4 and backed by the general intelligence and records of the Security Service. He was in fact, if not in name, the executive officer by whose action the body of a suspect or a spy came into the hands of the L.R.C. or the custody of Camp 020 under the authority of the Home Secretary.

The question whether adequate steps were taken to keep the S.C.O. well enough informed and to make him feel himself a full member of the team was the subject of the divergence of views between B and D Divisions. It can only be said here that, *prima facie*, the mere fact that D Division felt that they were not sufficiently well informed is an indication of an unsound tendency to keep knowledge about the enemy too exclusively to B Division. The reason for this is to be sought in the importance of maintaining the secrecy of ISOS and other sources of intelligence; but in retrospect, at least, it may be suggested that via media satisfactory to both parties should have been found.

3. Interrogation at the L.R.C. of British and alien subjects and all persons arriving from enemy-occupied territory or from neutral countries.

The means by which the L.R.C. (London Reception Centre - earlier known as the R.P.S. or Royal Patriotic School) was made to play its part in the machinery for counter-measures described in the "Manual on the German Secret Service and British Counter-Measures" (vide Bibliography No. 31) were developed gradually and in the light of experience of the difficult conditions of 1940-41. The solution was found in a combination of interrogation and elaborately developed records of a special kind known as the Information Index of the L.R.C., which differed in scope and purpose from any other index used by the Security Service.

The elaborate system which was eventually developed at the L.R.C. has been fully explained in the L.R.C. History (S.F.50/24/44(32)) and this cannot be readily abridged so as adequately to explain the extremely competent manner in which this part of the machinery was developed.

* The S.C.O. was also in a position to take action on the basis of information received from other parts of the Security Service so as to disclose the presence of an enemy agent in the traffic flowing through the ports. An instance of this is the case of John Oswald JOB. The only clue to his identity received from a B.1.A. double agent was that he would be carrying a bracelet and a tie pin (exact details were not available). Six weeks later he was picked out. He proved to be a British subject of German extraction and subsequent enquiries produced evidence on which he was hanged.

It has been mentioned in the last sub-section that the Royal Patriotic School was opened on the 10th January 1941 for the purpose of dealing with the circumstances arising from the arrival of refugees from occupied Europe; and that at the same time, i.e. in the first week in January, a circular was issued to S.C.O.s based on the information which had been accumulated by the Security Service up to that point. This information showed that the German Secret Service had been despatching a number of agents to this country and that they were relying on quantity rather than quality and employing indifferent types in the hope that some at least would get through our controls and prove useful. Details about the agents who were detected are given in Part II of the Report on the German Secret Service dated August 1942, on page 19 of which it is mentioned that the preparations seemed to have been hastily made and the men had been led to expect that they were to play a part in an imminent invasion. These agents mostly arrived by parachute or small boats. During 1940 the Germans were evidently not prepared to take advantage of the flood of refugees for the purpose of inserting agents among them.

As mentioned above in Chapter IV, Part 2 (v), the hastily improvised section, B.24, was unable to evolve any systematic method of dealing with the problems connected with these refugees; but the urgency of these problems impressed itself on the heads of B Division, to whom the possibility of agents arriving among the refugees was an obvious danger. It was decided that the best course was to arrange for examination at a central point, and the Royal Patriotic Schools were made available for the purpose by the Home Office. It was not, however, until the autumn of 1941 that satisfactory arrangements were made to deal with the problem, and in the meanwhile the examiners made the best of a bad job in the face of insuperable difficulties. The Security Service at this time had no records with which to check an alien's story when he arrived, and an individual's bona fides, or otherwise, could only be based on interrogation and the examiner's personal impression. The examinations were often cursory, reports on each case were very brief and no attempt was made to build up systematic records which could form the basis of intelligence for dealing with future arrivals.

As mentioned in the report on the German Secret Service dated August 1942 in Part II (page 20) - (see also the cases of the M.V. "Taanevik", M.V. "Hernie" and M.V. "Hornfjell" pages 103-109 idem) - the Abwehr began to insert their agents among refugees and persons escaping from occupied Europe.

These cases emphasised the danger and steps were accordingly devised by Mr. White to reorganise the staff at the L.R.C. and to establish a system of records which would help the examiners in their interrogation by making it easier to distinguish between the "sheep" and the "goats", i.e. between genuine refugees and would-be recruits to the forces on the one hand and suspects or enemy agents on the other.

/All through

All through the years 1941-44 refugees were being allowed to land in this country, having got away clandestinely by 'escape' boat or 'escape' plane, or by escape routes into Vichy France and the Iberian Peninsula. Many of them were encouraged to come to join the Allied Forces which were being recruited and developed in this country by the Allied Governments established here. The escape routes in question were organised by the Allied Governments or their intelligence services. Some were used or organised by S.I.S. or S.O.E. for the purpose of facilitating the journey to this country of their agents or of Allied officers and other personages whose presence was desired for purposes of the war effort. These circumstances led to the gradual development of the solution already mentioned, i.e. of the combination of interrogation and elaborate records devised specifically for this purpose. The new system was started in October 1941 and some time between January 1942 and June 1942 the L.R.C. began to be an effective instrument for counter espionage purposes. From about the middle of 1942 onwards it achieved positive results by its success in throwing up suspect enemy agents for further and more elaborate interrogation at Camp 020.

In 1942 - as indeed in 1940 and 1941 - the German Intelligence Service obviously required information about British, and later Allied, plans and the Allied war potential, and apart from Russia the three areas from which they could obtain information directly concerned with our war effort were the British Isles, the Middle East and the Americas. Some time during 1941 it began to be apparent - contrary to our previous and justified over-estimate of their efficiency - that the Germans had no previously established espionage network of any appreciable size or effectiveness. The obvious conclusion, therefore, was that if they had no established network and could not land or parachute agents clandestinely with any success, the only means open to them was to use the channel offered by the refugees and other Allied subjects coming to join the Allied Forces from occupied territory, or - a much smaller category - the neutrals coming to fight on the Allied side.

In the circumstances of that time when Western Europe was occupied by the enemy from Norway to Bordeaux it was possible to provide for a system of travel control round the whole coast of the United Kingdom which effectively intercepted all arrivals and diverted virtually the whole stream (that is of those from occupied Europe and those otherwise suspected) to the L.R.C. in accordance with the control exercised at the discretion of the S.C.O.s at the ports. This fact created an entirely new situation, which made it possible to develop the L.R.C. on the specialised lines which it assumed from the autumn of 1941 until the landing in Normandy in 1944.

At first the separation of the "sheep" from the "goats" was of necessity based largely on guesswork, but, as has been explained, the Germans were fortunately as unprepared to utilise their opportunities as we were to meet the situation prior to the reorganisation of the L.R.C.

/By card-indexing

By card-indexing details regarding methods and routes used by enemy agents or bona fide members of the Allied resistance movements, together with a great variety of other relevant details obtained from hundreds of incoming travellers, a body of valuable information was gradually built up in an accessible form for the use of the officers examining the new arrivals; and at the same time a sound system of interrogation was developed.

The underlying idea of this system - the first object of which was to detect all enemy agents attempting to enter the United Kingdom - was that it was not a hostile cross-examination, but was conducted on a friendly, if formal, basis. The reason for his temporary detention and the examination at the L.R.C. was made clear to each individual, and the result, in the vast majority of cases, was a readiness to supply any information which would be valuable to the British Intelligence officers. In all cases the first statement was checked against records of all available information, and if, for instance, a man was found to have travelled on a suspect escape route known to have been penetrated by the Abwehr and used to despatch their agents among bona fide refugees, the individual was naturally the subject of a more intensive interrogation.

An illustration of the comprehensiveness and competency with which the L.R.C. was organised is the "Analysis Book" filled in by the Information Section at the time of carding each alien's report. The object of this was to make it possible to re-examine past L.R.C. cases whenever a new class of agent (as regards background) or a new cover story came to light, in order to see whether a similar agent might not have slipped through previously.

The Information Index facilitated the uncovering of suspects in virtue of its comprehensive nature. An outstanding feature of it was that - unlike the Central Registry or other counter espionage registries - it carded the "sheep" as well as the "goats", the object being to compile information about individuals and organisations on the Allied side, because this information was necessary to enable the interrogating officer to recognise a friendly arrival and distinguish him from a suspect or an enemy. In other words it was necessary to have a large background of real general knowledge about each country in addition to secret intelligence narrowly restricted to the enemy organisation. The Information Index eventually contained some hundred thousand cards, and was composed of two distinct parts: a Name Index gave all the available details about an individual's description, addresses, occupation and history; the Geographical Index was sub-divided for addresses, town cards and subjects. The subjects carded included an immense number of details under headings including pro-Allied organisations or resistance movements, escape routes, pro-German organisations, youth organisations, political parties, enemy, or other intelligence services, the police and other

/authorities

authorities, "including Mayors, Prefects, etc.", welfare organisations, regulations and controls in different countries and areas, prisons and concentration camps, the press including the secret press, boats used by the enemy Intelligence, firms, if used as cover by the enemy Intelligence, labour conditions, Government Departments, Embassies and Consulates in all occupied territories. In addition the Information Section collected a number of intelligence files giving general information for each country in regard to living conditions, suspect organisations and resistance movements, national minorities, political parties and photographs and originals of documents used for travel control and other purposes in occupied territory. Information was collected from a great variety of sources, including such reference books as the P.W.E. Basic and Zone Handbooks, Chatham House reports, S.I.S. and S.O.E. reports and summaries, French Black Lists, Belgian Sureté reports and reports from all sections of the Security Service, including Camp 020 material, D.S.O. reports on travellers and Imperial Censorship reports.

The vital part of L.R.C. work lay in the examiner's selection, interpretation and assessment of facts supplied by incoming aliens. In order to enable him to perform this function effectively it was necessary to ensure that each examiner should have at his disposal a large background of available information. This information was obtained from two sources: the examiner's own personal local knowledge, including that acquired by his experience in the L.R.C. and from records. The records included not only the information immediately accessible to him in the Information Section with its index, and the L.R.C. monthly summary of cases and other matters of current intelligence interest, but also three other registries: (i) the Central Registry of the Security Service; (ii) the R.B. Registry; and (iii) the S.I.S. Registry. Of these (i) was of negligible value because after April 1941 it did not card names abroad and prior to that it had only done so to a limited extent; (ii) was of great value because it contained a fairly comprehensive record of Abwehr and SD personnel and of their agents carded from ISOS material; and (iii) was of great use as apart from the Information Index of the L.R.C. it was the only one which carded names and addresses on the Continent. It also contained information about S.I.S. agents and organisations which was essential for the purposes of dealing with certain classes of L.R.C. cases. Unfortunately owing to the inadequacies of its staff and methods, it was found to function very erratically. All these registries produced information only on specific names and addresses. The Information Index of the L.R.C. went further in that it made it profitable to look up such vague indications as christian names or an un-numbered address in a particular street. It also provided on cards or in intelligence files information of all kinds on specific areas: countries, districts, towns and so on; and it contained information specifically suited to L.R.C. purposes, such as, for instance, plans and routine details about prison camps, from which a suspect under interrogation might pretend to have escaped, or about which he might give details which would make it possible for the interrogator to

/discover

discover that he was not telling the truth. The outstanding importance of the Information Index arose from the fact that it made all this information readily accessible; and the skill, care and thought with which it was compiled was a remarkable achievement. Numerous officers contributed to this, but the idea was originally conceived by Mr. White, and this conception was given shape and developed by Major Haylor, Colonel Baxter and Miss Wadson, who was in charge of it from the time it was started at the end of 1941 until the end of 1944, initiated many of its important features and was mainly responsible for its outstanding success.

As has been mentioned above in connection with the S.C.O.s, B Division realised in the summer of 1942 that a number of individuals having British nationality were arriving in this country under circumstances similar to those of the aliens who were being sent to the L.R.C. On the 12th February 1943 a section known as B.I.D/U.K. was formally constituted under the orders of the Director General with a view to dealing with these British subjects. As a large proportion of them were persons escaping from enemy-occupied territory, investigations regarding them were necessarily based on the L.R.C. and its Information Index. Between February 1943 and the end of the war some 600 individuals were interrogated by the officers of B.I.D/U.K. at Devonshire House, where space was obtained for the purpose.

The procedure was that the circumstances of British subjects arriving in this country from enemy-occupied territory and of every other British arrival, against whom something was known or suspected, were scrutinised. Whenever it was thought desirable that he or she should be interrogated they were invited to call at Devonshire House with the intimation that their presence was considered desirable as it was thought likely that they might have information useful to the war effort. This form of invitation obviously involved a rather less intensive interrogation than was possible at the L.R.C., but in practice no difficulty was found in obtaining an individual's story and no invitation was ever refused.

As a British subject could not be refused leave to land and could only be detained if there were positive grounds for doing so, B.I.D/U.K. devoted its attention to obtaining information about British subjects who were liable to return to this country. This was done in a variety of ways, e.g. from persons who had already returned; by the appointment of a representative in Lisbon and later in Paris, whose function it was to forward reports, before they arrived, of individuals intending to return to this country; by the introduction on "repatriation" ships of a Security Officer as part of the administrative staff; and by the use of records, especially the Information Index of the L.R.C. and a card index kept in the section. This sectional card index incidentally produced a useful by-product. It became the main basis of the information available against the category of persons subsequently described as renegades.

The British subjects returning to this country fell into two main categories: those escaping from enemy or occupied territory and those brought home under official repatriation schemes.

In addition to interrogating persons on arrival the section made enquiries with a view to keeping track of individuals whose bona fides were not fully established. This was effected by means of a Home Office warrant on the subject's correspondence; by collateral enquiries from other Government departments; by interrogation by the R.S.L.O.; and other routine methods.

An outstanding aspect of the functions of the L.R.C. arises from its inescapable connection with S.I.S. and S.O.E. organisations in enemy or enemy-occupied territory. L.R.C. examiners necessarily had to obtain from S.I.S. or S.O.E. agents vetted by them as much information as possible about the organisation for which they were working with the double purpose of keeping the Information Index up to date, and of discovering whether the organisation had been penetrated at any point. This information was vital for the purpose of checking any subsequent agents who might arrive and for the security of future operations in the field. This question was always a source of overt or covert friction between the L.R.C. and the department running the organisations. S.I.S. insisted - on the plausible pretext of limiting the circulation of such information - that as little as possible should be asked as was consistent with security requirements. Section V even went to the length of setting up a staff of three or four examiners at the L.R.C. for the sole purpose of establishing their claim that the Security Service was not concerned with names and addresses and organisations abroad, but this claim, as will be obvious from the facts given above, could not be sustained. Nevertheless the small staff was maintained by them although, as they did not avail themselves of the Information Index or any other comparable records, their interrogations, based on a fixed questionnaire, were of no practical value, whereas if they had known how to use it the Information Index would have been of great value to S.I.S. S.O.E. on the other hand, by means of a liaison with the Information Index, both supplied information to be put on the Index and obtained information from it relevant to cases under enquiry of agents who fell under suspicion. (It should be borne in mind that accredited agents of both S.I.S. and S.O.E. were not passed through the L.R.C., but only those who arrived in the United Kingdom for the first time after being recruited in the field).

There were several major disasters, some of which might have been avoided if S.I.S. and S.O.E. had arranged from the beginning for all the information about their organisations to be centred at one point in the L.R.C. S.I.S. consistently refused to do this, but S.O.E. were anxious to do it as soon as they realised the nature of the dangers and the protection

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which the L.R.C. could afford. As it was, the L.R.C. charter was never recognised as including responsibility for the security of these Allied organisations. On the other hand it included responsibility for the security examination of a limited category of their agents, i.e. those recruited in the field. As the L.R.C. report points out, such a dichotomy was patently absurd and proved to be so in practice. This whole question is an important illustration of the advantages to be secured either by the central direction of or close co-operation between the Security Service and the other two Services; and of the grave disadvantages which follow from fragmentation or a lack of co-operation.

It is not feasible to set out an estimate in any very concrete form of the part played by the L.R.C. in detecting spies and bringing their guilt home to them. The part it played was undoubtedly very valuable, but in practical working it interlocked so closely with other parts of the machine - and especially with those responsible for ISOS information and Camp 020 - that in many cases there is no dividing line on the basis of which it could be said that success was to be attributed to one or the other section. In numerous cases all played their parts in the co-ordinated machinery.

A few instances may, however, be quoted:

There were some cases in which the L.R.C. "broke" a spy unaided, for instance, +Joseph Van MOVE. There were others in which the result was mainly achieved by the L.R.C. substantially assisted by ISOS, of which the case of +Johannes IRONKERS is an illustration. A third category is illustrated by the case of +Jucien RAMBAUT, whose identification as a spy is to be attributed wholly to ISOS. There were cases in which the L.R.C., after interrogation, were not satisfied and sent the individual to Camp 020, where a confession was obtained. the Icelanders, was one of these. Again, there were cases in which an admission or a partial confession was made to the L.R.C. interrogator, but the full story was only obtained after a more intensive interrogation at Camp 020, as in the case of +Gabriel PRY. Finally there were cases in which the L.R.C. Information Index furnished details which led to the realisation that an individual, otherwise unsuspected, was an enemy agent. The outstanding case is that of +Johannes de GRAAF (already mentioned on account of the important implications arising from it).

Altogether something over 50 individuals who eventually confessed were sent on to Camp 020 from the L.R.C.

The detection of enemy agents was not the sole function of the L.R.C. and a large part of their work was concerned with some 200 individuals who were sent to the Oratory Schools or were the subject of an Order under Article 12(5A) of the Aliens Order 1920, as amended, i.e. for deportation and, under war conditions, for detention pending deportation. These 200 individuals

* Reference to all these cases will be found in Chapter 3 of the L.R.C. Report.

were dealt with in this way on the ground of being collaborators or generally having hostile associations without there being ground to regard them as agents of the enemy secret services.

Altogether some thirty-three thousand aliens were passed through the L.R.C. and examined, and so far as is known only three enemy agents with missions in this country got through without being detected.

The interrogators or examining officers of the staff were divided into six sections, each of which dealt with a specific nationality or group of nationalities: (i) French; (ii) Belgian and Dutch; (iii) Polish; (iv) Scandinavian; (v) Spanish and South American; (vi) South Eastern Europe and miscellaneous. It was found that this system of allocating officers to a nationality - and consequently a geographical area - made for efficiency; it enabled the officer to become thoroughly acquainted with all the vital background information to assist him in interrogation and the assessment of each case. The officers were selected on the basis of high language qualifications and as far as possible residence in the countries concerned. A senior officer was appointed to each nationality section, and he was responsible for its internal administration. Generally speaking the Allied Security Services were not invited or encouraged to assist in interrogation. Experience showed that the disadvantages which their permanent presence in a British establishment of this kind entailed outweighed any occasional advantage which might be obtained from their knowledge of their own countries. Exceptions had to be made in connection with Polish and Czechoslovak cases owing to the difficulty of obtaining British officers with a knowledge of the language. Among the disadvantages of introducing Allied interrogators were that the greatest secrecy had to be observed in regard to many matters, including the use of information obtained from intercepted enemy wireless. It was also found that central control of the L.R.C. staff was necessary and the presence of officers owing allegiance to their own national security services tended to lead to difficulties. It was found, on the other hand, that aliens coming to this country in time of war expected to be interrogated by British officers and were somewhat more willing to impart information to British officers in uniform than to civilians. For this reason it was advantageous to recruit the staff from a military establishment.

4. The interrogation of suspected or known spies at Camp O20 (in close association with B.I.B.).

Camp O20, which was opened on the 10th July 1940 at Latchmere House, Ham Common, eventually became one of the most important sources of information as a result of successful interrogation of enemy spies, but when it was first opened no spies had arrived and until they did so it could not develop its true functions.

/For a few weeks

For a few weeks it was primarily concerned with the interrogation of members of the British Union of Fascists as well as a number of suspect aliens, some of whom had been arrested in England and others brought over from Dunkirk in June 1940. None of these cases proved important from the espionage point of view. In the beginning of September the first Abwehr spies arrived in England and the real work began. They consisted of two groups of two each, who landed in small boats on the South Coast with English money, wireless sets and codes, and instructions to report military information and to join up with the German forces which were expected to invade this country almost immediately. Other spies followed in rapid succession.

In case of invasion or serious damage from air raids (a direct hit which only killed one German prisoner had been received in November 1940) a reserve camp was prepared at Huntercombe Place near Henley-on-Thames.

Up to the end of the war in Europe (9th May 1945) 440 internees were admitted to Camp O20, the yearly figures being as follows:-

1940:	107
1941:	55
1942:	67
1943:	65
1944:	119
1945:	27

Thirty-four nationalities were represented, namely: Belgian, German, French, Norwegian, Dutch, British, Spanish, Icelandic, Italian, Portuguese, Polish, Danish, South and Central American, Swiss, Swedish, Austrian, Hungarian, Russian, Roumanian, Czechoslovak, Greek, Irish, Canadian, Yugoslav, Lithuanian, Egyptian and stateless persons.

In addition a considerable number of women have been brought daily to Camp O20 for interrogation or examined by officers sent to Holloway Gaol as there were no facilities at the former place for the detention of women.

Of the 440 men examined, 50 were released as innocent. 14 spies were executed in England during the course of the war. Of the remaining cases about 180 had had some contact with the Abwehr in circumstances which precluded their release and about 200 were spies of whom one half had been sent on missions to the United Kingdom and the other to other countries. The reasons for not placing this considerable number before the courts are to be found in the policy which was adopted to the effect that it was undesirable that any spy should be tried where there was a risk of failure to secure a conviction and the death penalty. The proposal that it was undesirable to obtain a conviction on a minor charge which would result in imprisonment and thus lead the public and the enemy to believe that espionage could be punished otherwise than by the death penalty was put forward by Mr. Milmo of B.I.B. and approved by higher authority.

Cases in which there was no material evidence, such as the possession of a wireless transmitter or secret ink, were not sent for trial, nor were those arrested at British ports in Africa or America on account of missions in those continents or elsewhere abroad; nor the small number who were used as double agents by B.I.A. The view was also held that many of the spies were valuable to us as human reference libraries to assist in detecting other cases of espionage, and from this point of view were better alive than dead.

All enemy agents or other suspected persons received into Camp O20 were held under the following powers: for short periods under a "refusal of leave to land" by an Immigration Officer or by a detention order by an Immigration Officer or other authorised officer under the "Arrival from British and Foreign Territory Order"; and for long term cases under the Royal Prerogative in the case of enemy aliens; an order under Article 12(5A) of the Aliens Order or under D.R.18B in the rare cases of British subjects and D.R.18BA in the case of foreign nationals.

Colonel Stephens as Commandant was in charge of the military guard under the D.P.W., War Office, who were responsible for the physical security of the camp. He was also in charge of the Intelligence Officers as personnel of the Security Service. The relations with the Home Office were governed by the fact that prisoners were held under the authority of the Home Secretary who was responsible for the administration of all matters concerning their persons.

The cases handled at Camp O20 have varied greatly in importance and have illustrated the constant change in Abwehr espionage methods. Officers of Camp O20 have made an analysis of the trends of a series of 'waves' of espionage arising out of these changes directed against this country and our Allies.

The first of these waves began on the 3rd September 1940 when, as already mentioned, spies began to arrive either by boat or by parachute as a prelude to the planned invasion of England.

A number of German agents were captured in the autumn of 1940 on expeditions which had been sent to Greenland and Jan Meyen Island for the purpose of obtaining weather reports from that area. These were presumably required in connection with the proposed invasion and for the use of the Luftwaffe.

These were followed in the spring of 1940¹⁹⁴¹ by those who were inserted among genuine refugees arriving from Norway in small boats. There were also German agents among Norwegians who came via Stockholm. Two who were landed from a sea-plane in the north of Scotland in April 1941 immediately gave themselves up and professed to give full information about their mission and their German contacts. They arrived at Camp O20 on April 9th and were transferred to B.I.A. on the same day with a view to their employment as double agents.

/The employment

The employment of seamen as agents, as might be expected, came to notice at an early date and continued to recur at intervals. There were also cases of Spanish trawlers, equipped with wireless, employed for transmitting shipping information and weather reports from the Eastern Atlantic, which came to notice through ISOS messages. The case of a Portuguese cod-fishing vessel with a wireless operator who was arrested on the 6th August 1942, on the basis of two intercepted messages giving details of Allied war vessels and shipping at St. Johns, Newfoundland, assumed importance as the boat returned to Lisbon at the time that the Allied fleets were massing for the invasion of North Africa in November 1942.

As already mentioned in connection with the S.C.O.s at the ports and the L.R.C., the Abwehr realised that the influx into the United Kingdom of persons escaping from occupied territory gave them opportunities for inserting agents among them; and this continued sporadically until the early months of 1944. In most of these cases they came via Spain and Portugal, but some came direct from France and Holland.

Another category consisted of a large number of agents who were sent to the American continent from the Iberian Peninsula and were detained at Trinidad and other ports; arrangements being made for their eventual interrogation at Camp 020.

From the end of 1941 onwards numbers of Belgians were sent through Spain and Portugal with the intention of reaching the Congo. Other agents were found to be operating in the Union of South Africa from a base in Laurence Marques and the crews of vessels plying between Portugal, Portuguese East Africa and intermediate ports were found to be acting as couriers. Many of these agents destined for Africa were intercepted at various places and brought to Camp 020.

Shortly before the invasion of the continent the Abwehr sent a number of agents to Iceland to obtain military information, evidently on the assumption that that country would serve as a base for the purpose.

After D Day, 6th June 1944, large numbers of operational agents were brought from the Allied military zones and liberated territories in Europe.

Among the miscellaneous interrogations undertaken at Camp 020 were those of a certain number of Italian spies, and some cases examined on behalf of the French authorities. One of the most interesting of the miscellaneous cases was that of Edward Arnold CHAPMAN, an Englishman with a long record of crime in this country, who was in prison in Jersey when the German occupation began and after his release was taken to Paris in November 1941. He was trained as an agent by them and was the subject of a large number of ISOS messages which supplied numerous details about the German plans for using him and their intention to drop him by parachute. On his arrival in this country

/in December

in December 1942 his first step was to approach the police and ask for an interview with the intelligence authorities. After an intensive interrogation lasting for a week it was decided to use him as a double agent. Messages were transmitted, replies were received and after a notionally successful act of sabotage at the De Havilland works he was sent back to Germany via Lisbon. The Germans then employed him in Norway for a year where he occasionally acted as an instructor for the W/T and sabotage schools. Early in 1944 he was prepared for a further mission to England in order to obtain information about British anti-submarine devices, American bombers, details of radio location apparatus fitted to night fighters, the effect of V weapons and other details. After numerous delays he was eventually dropped on the night of June 27th, again reported to the police and again, after detailed interrogation at Camp 020, was transferred to B.I.A.

Numerous other cases of varying interest are described in detail in the Camp 020 report. An outstanding point is that the great majority of the agents were not German nationals and very few of the other nationalities were influenced by ideological sympathies. Many of them were half-trained, ill-equipped for their missions and "small fry" in every sense of the word; but even so their interrogation helped to build up information about the Abwehr and SD organisations. Many were recruited by pressure being put on them in some form and the Germans hoped to maintain a hold over them in the same way. For instance in the case of CHAPMAN, mentioned above, they hoped that as a convicted prisoner he would avoid the British authorities. Some were influenced by hope of gain. The Intelligence Officers at Camp 020 sometimes received the impression that 'waves' of these agents were sent out hurriedly and without proper preparation in order to meet the demands of higher authorities.

The outstanding success of Camp 020 was one of the most important contributory factors in the general success of B Division in countering the Abwehr and Sipo und SD. This success is attributed to the personality of Colonel Stephens and his flair for this work; to the skill developed by the staff; and to a number of other factors, among the most effective of which was the psychological reaction produced by the atmosphere of efficiency deliberately created for the purpose. A prisoner on arrival was treated with a display of military precision and efficiency. Arriving in handcuffs he was stripped, given prison clothes, allowed no contact with other prisoners, photographed, put through a personal catechism, brought in for interrogation, faced by an array of four or five officers and treated with apparent severity (but no physical violence and no curtailment of rations was ever allowed). In almost all cases guilty agents signed confessions within a few days of their arrival. The number who were known to be guilty and did not confess is insignificant, while the number of doubtful cases is scarcely greater.

/The success

The success is also to be attributed to three important sources of information. By far the most valuable of these was ISOS, because it was completely reliable and gave concrete facts and circumstantial evidence regarding the agents and the actual messages concerning them transmitted between the various Abwehr officers. Every precaution had to be taken not to jeopardise this source, and it could therefore not be used directly in interrogation. The ISOS messages obviously required careful examination in order to ensure a correct interpretation, especially, as often happened, when all the relevant messages were not intercepted. The second source of information consisted of 'traces' from Security Service records including those based on S.I.S. agents' reports; though important these were less valuable because less circumstantial, and it was often difficult to assess their accuracy. A third source to which the officers of Camp 020 attached great importance was their own index of the records of statements obtained from interrogation. This information was recorded on index cards which eventually reached a total of over 100,000. It should be remarked, however, that some officers held a different view and considered that it was a mistake to maintain records at Camp 020 and a separate index. This view presupposes that the necessary information could have been made readily accessible to the interrogating officers through the sub-section of B.I.B. under Mr. Milmo, which gradually developed an unexpected relationship with Camp 020. The original intention was that Mr. Milmo's sub-section should serve for liaison purposes between Camp 020 and the sections at headquarters, but it developed wider functions. This development arose mainly from the fact that Camp 020 was necessarily outside the centre of London and therefore affected by the factor of distance; and also that its own function was limited in that it was solely an interrogating centre. Mr. Milmo's section therefore had in one sense the functions of a research section in obtaining all traces from the records and information from all other sources which might be of use to interrogators, but it also dealt with all questions arising out of Camp 020 cases on behalf of the Director and Assistant Director of B Division. This resulted in all questions relating to the disposal of spies being dealt with by Mr. Milmo in accordance with precedents and on lines laid down by decisions on the early cases. For instance as soon as a case appeared to be likely to be one that would go to the Director of Public Prosecutions, Mr. Milmo got into touch with the legal advisers (S.L.) After the D.P.P.'s views had been obtained in a certain number of cases, subsequent cases were dealt with on the same lines; reference being made to the Director B, or higher authority, only when a release was recommended or in certain cases where a vitally important source of information or of paramount security interest might be jeopardised by disclosures at a trial. In cases which did not go to the Director of Public Prosecutions, e.g. because the evidence was not sufficient to secure a conviction involving the death penalty, Mr. Milmo referred to the Home Office direct in regard to disposal by internment. A ruling made by the Director B had laid down that the final decision in

Camp O20 cases should be by the section at headquarters and not by the officers at the Camp who would necessarily be influenced by the personality of the individual. The B.I.B. sub-section also dealt with all correspondence with any other department in relation to matters arising out of Camp O20 cases.

The joint establishment at Camp O20 and Camp O20 R (at Huntercombe) consisted of one Commandant, one Assistant Commandant and twenty-five intelligence officers, including the administrative officers. There were two part-time medical officers and at each camp a large guard, under five officers at Camp O20 and seven at Camp O20 R.

The selection of suitable intelligence officers presented considerable difficulties, especially at first. It was essential to have a combination of a thorough knowledge of certain languages and experience of conditions abroad with the general qualifications of a good education and the other qualities required in an intelligence officer. The English, French, German, Dutch, Flemish, Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, Spanish, Portuguese and Italian languages have been employed in interrogation. The staff included about forty women secretaries, who were sometimes employed on work of a research nature as well as on secretarial duties.

5. Investigation of sabotage.

The formation of B.I.C. (originally B.18) was described in Chapter IV, Part 1 (iii) above, in which an account of the functions allotted to it was outlined. Broadly speaking there was no great change in the section's terms of reference, but they were set out more fully, as they had developed in the light of experience, by Lord Rothschild in July 1942 (vide S.F.50-52-1(5)). Briefly experience showed that it was necessary for the Security Service to have a section which could make an expert study of all intelligence relating to enemy sabotage; supervise the investigation of suspect or actual cases of sabotage; make available all the specialised knowledge acquired by these means; and initiate, prepare and recommend counter-measures to Government Departments and undertakings concerned in the war effort both in the United Kingdom and abroad. As it was not possible for the Security Service to have on its permanent staff all the necessary technical experts to deal with all the sabotage problems which might arise in the innumerable types of installation or establishment concerned with the war effort, it was necessary to have a small staff with the necessary scientific knowledge, training and contacts to enable it to obtain this expert advice and to understand how to use it to the best advantage when obtained. For these purposes liaison was established with some thirty distinguished experts ranging from professors at universities to steel consultants in industry, all of whom made their services available in an unpaid capacity. To illustrate the wide range of problems involved reference may be made to instances such as that of obtaining

/authoritative

authoritative information on all the aspects of the problem suggested by the possibility of agents bringing the Colorado beetle into the United Kingdom as a means of attacking the potato crop.

In order to initiate counter-measures it was necessary for B.I.C. to obtain and collate all the available information about the enemy organisations for sabotage, Abwehrabteilung II and later Amt VIS of the RSHA, as a part of the enemy Secret Service as a whole, the Amt Auslandsnachrichten und Abwehr under the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht and later the RSHA under Himmler.

There were three main sources from which this intelligence was obtained: ISOS or the intercepted wireless communications of the Abwehr; the investigation of cases of sabotage including interrogation of arrested saboteurs and the examination of enemy sabotage equipment; and the employment of agents and double agents, the latter being controlled by B.I.A.

This intelligence picture was built up from nothing in the beginning of 1940 to a very comprehensive and detailed corpus of intelligence. As the information became available, it was distributed in the appropriate quarters in the Admiralty, the Air Ministry, the War Office and among the intelligence staffs of the armies in the field as well as among all the parts of the Security Service and its contacts at home and abroad. This work of distribution reached very large proportions in the latter years of the war and was carried out with due regard to the fact that much of the information was of a high grade of secrecy.

The information regarding the German Secret Services as a whole, including the sabotage branches, was first summarised in the report on the German Secret Service of August 1942 and later supplemented by that of 1944 and the War Room report of April 1945 (vide Bibliography Nos. 33, 34 and 35). The voluminous documents prepared by B.I.C. will be found in S.F.50-24-44(31) and Supplementary Files.

The intelligence eventually received about the Abwehr confirmed the inference that the sabotage division (Abwehrabteilung II) would be closely integrated with the German military machine so that it might be used in subordination to military operations and that it would combine the direction of material and moral sabotage. Abwehrabteilung II was in fact responsible for sabotage in its broadest sense. This included straightforward material sabotage (S-Arbeit); disintegration work within the enemy countries (Zersetzung or Z-Arbeit); the subsidising and inciting of nationalist elements, racial minorities or peoples under foreign rule (Insurgierung or I- or J-Arbeit). There was a headquarters organisation at Berlin with branches under the several Wehrkreis in Germany. There were sabotage training schools - the most important of which was at Quenz near Brandenburg - and a technical laboratory for developments. Abwehrabteilung II was represented in the Abwehr stations outside Germany; in the more important cases by independent 'II' units.

A special para-military formation variously known as the Lehrregiment Brandenburg z.b.V.800, the Sonderverband Brandenburg and the Brandenburg Division, was used as a pool for agents for all the divisions of the Abwehr, but mainly for Abwehrabteilung II, in addition to being engaged in guerrilla warfare, Commando raids in German uniform, operations in enemy uniform behind the enemy lines or operations by small groups and even by individual saboteurs in civilian clothes. This formation originally consisted of Germans from abroad (Auslandsdeutsche) and it was assembled on the Channel coast at the time of the preparations for the invasion of England. Later, foreign nationals were recruited, including men from prisoner of war camps, Arabs and Indians. It was attached to and under the administrative control of the head of Abwehrabteilung II but for operational purposes units were sometimes attached to military formations in the field.

In July 1942, under Himmler's orders, a section for sabotage and political subversion was formed as part of Amt VI, the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Nazi Party under the RSHA. In August 1943 this section was disbanded by Himmler who was dissatisfied with its achievements and a new department, known as Amt VIS, was formed. After the Abwehr as an independent organisation was dissolved in June 1944, it was re-created as a subordinate office (the Militaerisches Amt) of the RSHA. By the end of the summer of 1944 all German sabotage and political subversion was under the control of Otto Skorzeny, head of Amt VIS, who also became head of the Militaerisches Amt D, the new name for Abwehrabteilung II. The functions of Skorzeny's services were:-

(i) to threaten Allied lines of communication by sabotage and by fomenting political trouble in Germany and the former occupied countries, using for these purposes German nationals or Fascist and anti-Allied elements of the countries concerned;

(ii) to mount military operations of a special type which the regular army would not normally undertake.

The close integration of the sabotage organisations, Abwehrabteilung II and Amt VIS, with the para-military formations was the cause of a difficulty in distinguishing between German military or naval operations and Secret Service operations and, therefore, in drawing a line to show where the interests of B.I.C. came to an end. For instance, to carry out his functions Skorzeny had at his disposal a number of units whose headquarters and training camps were widely dispersed throughout Germany. These included an unknown number of SS Jaegerbataillone, later known as SS Jagd-verbaende and the Frontsaufklaerungskommandos und Truppe of Mil. Amt D. Other associated formations were the 150 Panzer Brigade, the Eins Kampfgeschwader (the Luftwaffe formation responsible for parachuting agents and for supplying them by air) and the Marine Einsatz

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Abteilung, afterwards known as the Kommando der Kleinkampfverbaende. The last-named was a purely naval operational service, not a Secret Service, but using secret tactics and devices and controlling the Xth M.A.S. Flotilla, an Italian naval organisation which operated from a neutral country (Spain) as well as from Italian military bases and employed naval personnel - not always in uniform - and scored successes by attaching bombs to the hulls of British battleships and other operations of a secret type. Abwehrabteilung II established liaison with the Xth Flotilla M.A.S. in July 1943 and after the capitulation of Italy not only the Abwehr but also the German Navy and Amt VIS were anxious to obtain control over this unit of whose exploits the Germans had a high opinion. One of its Italian experts was sent to Turkey in 1943 in order to sabotage Allied shipping and succeeded in attaching mines to the bilge-keels of four ships, but all except one were found before they exploded.

The main German sabotage efforts were directed against (1) the British Isles; (2) British shipping in Spanish ports and Gibraltar; (3) the Middle East; and (4) the U.S.A.; but the elaborate organisation set up for the purpose achieved surprisingly small successes. Of these efforts that against (2) was by far the most important.

Not a single case of sabotage occurred in the United Kingdom during the whole course of the war although Abwehrabteilung II made attempts from time to time to introduce sabotage agents, but all these attempts failed. Some of those arrested were used by the Security Service as double agents to obtain useful information about the enemy's plans and sabotage targets. The first of the sabotage agents was already mentioned as having been recruited before the war. After the war started no agent arrived from Germany until three were landed in Eire in July 1940 and six others in the United Kingdom towards the end of the same year. Two Norwegians who arrived in April 1941 were turned into double-cross agents. All the above arrived either in small boats or by seaplane. After April 1941 there were no arrivals until June 1942 by which time the method of introduction had changed and the agents appeared in the guise of refugees. Two of these arrived in 1942, one in 1943 and one in 1944. They were French, Canadian and Belgian by nationality and either confessed their mission at once or were discovered through interrogation at the L.R.C. In December 1942 a British subject was dropped by parachute as a sabotage agent and immediately reported his mission.

The main effort of the Abwehrabteilung II in the West before the invasion of the Continent was directed against Gibraltar and Allied shipping in Spanish ports. The headquarters was in Madrid with representatives in Huelva, Seville, Cadiz, Algeciras, Cartagena, Tangiers, Melilla, Las Palmas. In the most active period about twenty German officials organised networks of Spanish agents, extensive use being made of German ships interned in Spanish ports. Sabotage equipment was manufactured in Spain or sent from Germany

/as

as diplomatic luggage and the fullest co-operation of a number of Spanish officials facilitated the German enterprises. The un-neutral attitude of the Spanish Government hampered counter-measures while the only restrictive effect on German sabotage was their insistence that the workings of the German organization must be so camouflaged that the Spanish authorities would not be too openly embarrassed. This meant that sabotage directed from Spanish soil must not be attributed to German nationals. As a consequence Spanish agents were employed and they tended to be both inefficient and venal - characteristics which were largely responsible for the poor results achieved. In January 1944 Abwehrabteilung II headquarters in Berlin sent orders to Madrid forbidding all sabotage in the Peninsula until further notice. This was a direct result of British protests about explosives in cargoes of oranges and the evidence which was produced to fix the responsibility on the Germans.

As was the case in Great Britain, Abwehrabteilung II had made no adequate preparations for sabotage in the U.S.A. on the outbreak of war and it was, therefore, necessary to attempt to introduce agents into America and to attempt to recruit and organize a large number of potential agents among the population of German origin in the U.S.A. Ambitious attempts were made in June 1942 when parties were landed in the U.S.A. from two submarines. In order to establish direct contact with the American authorities responsible for the enquiry Lord Rothschild visited the U.S.A. and obtained detailed information regarding the equipment supplied to these agents, some of which was new. In return he was able to supply the F.B.I. with information for the purposes of interrogation and an assessment of the equipment.

Some months prior to the Allied landings in Italy and France information was accumulated - from ISOS, through double agents and by interrogation - about German plans for sabotage in both theatres of operations. It became known that a large sabotage stay-behind organization with a network of agents and buried sabotage dumps had been arranged. B.I.C. compiled a note on Abwehrabteilung II's plans for France and the Low Countries on the basis of information from the above-mentioned sources combined with the results of enquiries about the German sabotage preparations in North Africa and Italy. This was circulated to G-2 CI counter-sabotage specialists and members of the S.C.I. units organized by S.I.S. In the event both the Abwehrabteilung II and Amt VIS sabotage networks failed to operate. Their agents were arrested and their dumps were discovered. The Germans thereupon made attempts to re-activate these networks after the occupation of France and Belgium by the infiltration of other agents, some being sent through the lines and others being dropped by parachute. These new agents were given specific missions of sabotage or assassination, but all the undertakings failed because the agents were either

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known collaborationists and were arrested on that ground or they had no incentive to carry out work for the defeated side. Many of the agents had accepted their missions as a chance of returning to their own countries and had been recruited by the Germans without having any intention of working for them. Moreover, the German security arrangements during training were defective and the recruitment of a number of agents from the same collaborationist organisation meant that many agents knew of each other's activities and the arrest of one led to the arrest of others. u/a8

In regard to the question of German sabotage technique and equipment, the Security Service started the war with no information. There were two early reports - one in February and the second in March 1940 - of bombs being placed on board British ships. The first of these was investigated by the Greek police because the steamer was in one of their harbours and the second by the Ceylon police at Colombo as being the first port of call. In spite of attempts to obtain full reports and detailed descriptions in these two cases the Security Service failed to obtain any satisfactory material. The first clear and useful evidence of the existence of a German sabotage service resulted from a report from Cairo in April 1940 when Francois ARKOSSY was arrested in Alexandria with thirty time-clocks and thirty incendiary bombs which had been given to him at the German Consulate in Genoa. Here again great difficulty was experienced in obtaining details and in spite of repeated requests samples of the equipment did not reach London until May 1941. In the next case which occurred when, as mentioned above, the saboteur Obed and his party arrived in Eire, although descriptions were received immediately, the equipment was retained by reason of the neutrality of Eire. The first equipment actually received in London was that brought from Lisbon by the agent in March 1941 and consisted of time-clocks and detonators concealed in articles such as soap, torches and a delay-mechanism, a micro-incendiary disguised as a fountain pen spinal in a leather case. In September 1941 information was received from S.I.M.E. concerning the attempted assassination of the British Ambassador at Istanbul and Turkish diagrams of the delay-mechanism used showed it to be identical with that of ARKOSSY and thus proving that the German Secret Service was concerned in the attempt. From time to time further samples of German equipment came to hand and in July 1942 B.I.C. considered that they had sufficient information to justify the publication of a booklet "Enemy Sabotage Equipment (Technical)" (vide Bibliography No. 25).

The technical details of the various types of equipment are too voluminous to be summarised here and will be found in the numerous papers on the subject distributed by B.I.C. during the war (vide S.F. 50-24-44 (31) and Supplementary Files). An important feature was the series of clockwork fuses labelled by Lord Rothschild Mark I, II, III, IV, V and VI.

/Until

Until the landing on the Continent gave access to a number of sabotage dumps the largest sources of new types of German sabotage equipment were double-cross organisations in Gibraltar and Turkey, the latter being under Turkish control but operated in close liaison with our organisation in the Middle East. The Mark V and Mark VI clockwork delays were obtained from Gibraltar and Turkey respectively and from nowhere else. These types were all expensive to manufacture and were only used by the Germans for important operations. This fact by itself is, therefore, evidence of the value of the two double-cross networks. Incidentally they furnished useful information of errors made by the Germans in points of detail. For instance, in one case some camouflaged equipment had a printed label with an address in the German style "57-56 Chancery Lane" instead of "56-57 Chancery Lane".

At the beginning of the North African campaign it was learnt that German saboteurs were supplied almost exclusively with captured S.O.E. equipment and from 1942 onwards this fact was a source of constant trouble. Attempts were made to persuade S.O.E. to give B.I.C. full details as soon as there was reason to believe that any particular item had been compromised, but it was some time before arrangements with this end in view worked satisfactorily. It sometimes happened that the first intimation that an item had been compromised was received as the result of the interrogation of a captured saboteur. On one occasion a certain item of equipment had only been used in one undertaking which was believed to have been successful until the equipment in question was dropped by the Germans for delivery to the two Norwegian saboteurs in Scotland, who were under control as double agents working for us. This incident thus illustrated not only the value of the Security Service intelligence as a means of furnishing the necessary information to guide the operations of S.O.E., but also the short-sightedness of the Germans in making use of this equipment in such circumstances. The reason for doing so was that the S.O.E. equipment was simpler and more reliable than the German equipment and large quantities of it fell into German hands through misadventure. One marked disadvantage from our point of view was that if any act of sabotage were committed with S.O.E. equipment by an unknown saboteur, it would be impossible to prove that the perpetrators were German. Liaison between S.O.E. and B.I.C. was fruitful of good results on a number of occasions; for instance it was of assistance in elucidating the facts connected with the alleged attempt to assassinate General Sikorski. S.O.E.'s assistance was of value to B.I.C. because their experts were able to assist B.I.C. with technical advice as well as the supply of dummy equipment for demonstration purposes. They gave the greatest help in analysing incendiary or explosive mixtures found in enemy equipment and in identifying articles suspected or known to be connected with sabotage. They also assisted in delicate minor operations such as emptying, rendering harmless and examining the lump of explosive coal supplied by the Germans to one of the double-cross agents.

/By 1941

By 1941 B.I.C. had become the recognised centre of information about enemy sabotage equipment and when in February 1944 a bomb was found in a case of onions which had arrived from Gibraltar Lord Rothschild was sent for by the Chief Constable through the R.S.I.O. to dismantle it. The bomb consisted of blocks of TNT and plastic explosive, the initiating mechanism being two Mark II delays and primers. Lord Rothschild considered that it was important to secure this bomb intact as several others had previously exploded in cases of oranges and that if secured it would furnish valuable evidence of the operations of the German Secret Service based on Spanish soil. While dismantling the bomb Lord Rothschild dictated details of its structure over a field-telephone to a secretary some distance away so that a record might be preserved in case of accident.

As a consequence of this incident B.I.C. established closer liaison with the bomb disposal department of the War Office and the Admiralty. As a result expert knowledge of methods of neutralising and disposal was obtained; and this made it possible to include disposal instructions in information circulated to security counter-intelligence personnel, a course which seemed advisable even though they were not technically responsible for neutralising equipment. After D Day the chief function of B.I.C. was to act as a central body for the co-ordination and distribution of all information about enemy sabotage. Any equipment found in the field and not recognised was sent back to London for examination. By the end of 1944 the Germans, having run out of S.O.E. equipment, were manufacturing their own, for the most part copying British models such as the Flare, the Clam and the Tyre Burster.

The most important innovation made by the Germans was the use of the high explosive, nipolit. The first actual sample was not obtained until September 1944 when it came to hand through the Turkish double-cross network, camouflaged as a leather belt, but its existence had been known since the winter of 1942 when it had been mentioned by captured enemy saboteurs. During the last stages of the campaign in Western Europe it was found in many different forms including a raincoat, a walking-stick, "Clams", hand-grenades and underwater bombs twenty feet long and six feet in diameter.

Only one important item of Italian sabotage equipment (excluding under-water sabotage equipment) was found during the North African campaign. It was known as the P-Delay, was used by the Germans as well as by the Italians and was said by M.I.10 to be similar to Italian army equipment. Italian incendiary and explosive mixtures normally contained a higher proportion of aluminium than the German or British equivalents.

The interrogation of enemy agents and the employment of double-cross agents were subjects which - as sources of intelligence - received constant attention

/from B.I.C.

from B.l.C. while they were necessarily in the hands of other sections, namely B.l.B., Camp 020 and B.l.A. In the case of the Middle East, interrogations under the control of S.I.M.E. were an important source of intelligence about sabotage. M.I.19, the section under the D.M.I. which interrogated enemy prisoners of war was similarly useful. B.l.C. prepared questionnaires for use at these centres with good results. Interrogation reports received from these various sources were analysed and extracted for special files under headings dealing with incendiary mixtures, explosive mixtures, home-made fuses, camouflage and targets as used or designated by the enemy. Case histories of all sabotage agents were also maintained by the section under headings dealing with the life history of the agent, details of recruitment, training, equipment, target, the staff of the enemy organisation and arrangements for despatch of the agent to his destination. These special files and case histories proved useful during the training of counter sabotage personnel as they gave in a concise form information not otherwise available in office files.

Double-cross agents were a profitable source of intelligence. They were employed to obtain information on the types of target of interest to the enemy, methods of attack and samples of new sabotage equipment. During the course of the war three important double-cross sabotage cases were run in this country by B.l.A.; a number in Spain through the D.S.O. Gibraltar under directions from London and the important case already mentioned as run by the Turks while the German effort was directed against Syria. The part of B.l.C. was to collaborate with B.l.A. by supplying technical information and advice in interrogations and in measures to carry out faked acts of sabotage. The double agents were also used to communicate false information to the enemy. From the counter sabotage point of view the use of double-cross agents was most successfully exploited in Spain. The long and detailed story can only be studied satisfactorily in the sectional report, but it may be mentioned that apart from providing samples of new equipment these cases led to the acquisition of considerable information about the organisation and personalities of Abwehrabteilung II and on the possibility of neutralising enemy sabotage attacks on British shipping and targets in Gibraltar harbour. A questionnaire also came into our hands which made it possible to send advice to Gibraltar on possible counter-measures to meet German sabotage activities planned as part of the military operation for an attack on Gibraltar. B.l.C. was responsible for dealing with the London end of the Gibraltar double-cross sabotage cases and because of certain complications which arose, owing to the inter-relations of sabotage and other intelligence, it was decided in December 1943 that B.l.C. should be the focal point for all B Division information from Gibraltar and should be responsible for its distribution to the relevant sections. The Gibraltar

/double-cross

double-cross cases were extremely complicated in themselves, as many as fifteen to twenty agents being employed and difficulties also occurred in the relations with Section V of S.I.S. A number of faked acts of sabotage were carried out, including the detonation of 1,000 lbs. of TNT in Gibraltar Bay for which a German saboteur is believed to have been decorated.

The Turkish double-cross case already mentioned was successfully run from the autumn of 1942 to the autumn of 1944 and from the Turkish and our Middle East point of view was a complete success. It was responsible for saturating the sabotage field and preventing a large amount of sabotage material from being used there. In spite of the difficulties arising from Turkish neutrality a considerable amount of new and useful equipment was obtained from the Turks and the British security authorities were able to assist them by supplying accounts of accidental fires and explosions which could be passed off as acts of sabotage by the notional organisation in Syria. In February 1944 a faked act of sabotage was staged near Beirut.

The successful carrying out of faked sabotage in the United Kingdom presents almost insuperable difficulties arising from the risk of injury to innocent persons in the vicinity, with which is connected the difficulty of deciding on the number of people who must be informed of the plan in order to strike a happy medium between allowing the facts to become general knowledge and causing unnecessary enquiries and action by uninformed authorities. Relations with the police through R.S.L.O.s necessitated their being informed; and the question of publicity in the Press was a major difficulty especially in view of the Government ruling that the Press must not be used in deception plans. In spite of all the difficulties faked acts of sabotage were effectively staged on four occasions during the course of the war.

As in other spheres ISOS was an important source of counter sabotage intelligence and covered the whole field including enemy plans both general and specific, the agents and organisation connected with acts of sabotage, information about the equipment used and the enemy organisation in general. It also furnished a valuable cross-check on double-cross work and furnished us with advance information about the despatch of enemy agents.

Shortly after the material was made available it became obvious that it must be studied by an officer with specialist knowledge from the sabotage point of view, in addition to the study from that of general intelligence. It often contained words in plain language code which could only be interpreted in the light of a knowledge of sabotage equipment. For this purpose B.I.C. maintained a card-index of German code names and terms and compiled a glossary of the correct translations of German technical terms and the interpretations

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of plain language code names which was supplied to G.C. & C.S. and Section V without which it would not have been possible for G.C. & C.S. to interpret much of the material relating to sabotage (vide S.F.50-24-44 (31) in Appendix I).

The traffic of Abwehrabteilung II in the Peninsula was the most important from this point of view and was closely studied, but all parts of the Abwehr network contributed to fill in the picture of German sabotage intentions. Miss Clay of B.I.C. was acknowledged (by S.I.S. and G.C. & C.S.) as the expert on the sabotage aspects of ISOS and by her knowledge of the technicalities played an important part in elucidating the texts. As a result of the study devoted to it this traffic helped to disclose the Abwehr plans in Persia and the Middle East generally, in the Balkans, in Italy and in France and in the Low Countries where preparations were made to organise stay-behind networks for sabotage with a view to the Allied landing on the Continent. All this was concerned with material sabotage or, as the Germans phrased it, S-Arbeit. ISOS also furnished information regarding the plans and operations of Abwehrabteilung II in connection with disintegration work and the subsidising and inciting of nationalist elements and minorities - Zersetzung und Insurgierung. Instances of the latter were observed, at the time of the invasion of Yugoslavia, in Southern Russia, the Middle East and in North Africa. Special formations of White Russian, Caucasian, Arab and Indian elements were organised in the Balkans and Southern Russia in preparation for the advance through Egypt and the Caucasus which was checked at Stalingrad and El Alamein. After the serious danger of an invasion of England had passed this aspect of the German organisation was of little more than academic interest in this country, but it would have been a problem of great importance in the East if the tide had not turned at the end of 1942.

The staff of B.I.C., having been trained in the methods of scientific research, realised perhaps more acutely than others the defects which arose from the fact that, until the formation of the War Room in the spring of 1945, there was no one body which had access to all the fields of intelligence about the German sabotage organisations as part of the general problem of the Abwehr and the Sipo und SD. There was, therefore, no one in a position to utilise material from all these sources in order to compile comprehensive records and maintain them in a form which would serve the purposes of all the workers in these various fields. The staff of Section V, R.I.S., G.C. & C.S. and within the Security Service of B.I. Information, B.I.B., B.I.C., Camp O2O and the L.R.C. could all have contributed, and the special needs of each would have been met more satisfactorily than was the case if this centralised and comprehensive study could have been arranged. This was eventually done in March 1945 by the War Room and especially by WR-E; and the B.I.C. history suggests that if this had been formed earlier in the war, it would have

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resulted in a considerable saving in manpower, paper and energy and produced results which would have benefited all the Services concerned and especially the G-2 CI Staff in the field during the invasion of Western Europe.

In the early stages of the war our general lack of information about the enemy's organisation made it necessary to examine all possible fields for enemy action and to plan security measures on as thorough a scale as possible in conformity with the requirements of production and other major war interests. As intelligence increased the elaborate nature of the enemy's organisation had a similar effect and counter-measures were planned or attempted accordingly. In retrospect the position may be summed up by saying that the enemy achieved very slight results in his efforts to organise sabotage against the Western Allies where the conditions were generally difficult. Their only substantial successes were scored in Spain where the special local conditions offered certain advantages, but even in Spain British counter-measures, to a great extent, succeeded effectively in reducing the results of their work.

Counter-measures fell under the following headings: (1) physical counter-measures of a security nature; (2) moral counter-measures; (3) the collation and distribution of information; (4) general and special enquiries.

Physical counter-measures included arrangements for guards on British ships in Spanish waters which were initiated by B.I.C. and the elaboration of instructions for security measures for the benefit of everyone concerned with the movement of shipping across the seas. Details of the enemy's sabotage successes and his attempts against British shipping will be found in Appendix II of the sectional history. There can be no doubt that but for the counter-measures initiated by B.I.C. the losses would have been much heavier.

In the United Kingdom the Security Service had been concerned in the general discussions concerning the security of electricity and gas undertakings, while certain sources of water supply of Service interest were declared protected places on the outbreak of war. In the middle of 1941 one of the double-cross agents was asked by the Germans to supply information about the layout and protection of water supplies in this country. At the same time the Bacteriological Warfare Committee of the Cabinet was interested in the subject. In August 1941 Lord Rothschild was instructed to prepare a paper on the general subject for the Home Defence Executive. After some discussion regarding the respective responsibilities of B and D Divisions in the matter, it was decided that B.I.C. should deal with it from the point of view of protection against sabotage. Protracted discussion ensued with all the interests involved, for details of which reference must be made to the sectional history. Among outstanding points which emerged was the fact that if some twenty generating stations in Great Britain could be put out of action simultaneously, the whole war production of England would be completely stopped and consideration was,

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therefore, given to this and other priority and super-priority undertakings. The question of which parts of an electric generating station were most vulnerable to attack by the small amount of high explosive which a saboteur could carry was the subject of much difference of opinion among the experts. The whole subject was investigated in great detail by B.I.C. with the assistance of the R.S.L.O.s. Special precautions were taken in the period before D Day as it was thought the enemy might make more intensive attempts at sabotage with a view to its possible effect on the operation.

Other subjects dealt with in a similar way were the security of explosives, the control of chemicals and the examination of objects dropped from aircraft.

Moral counter-measures took the form of protests and prosecutions in the Gibraltar area. In spite of the penetration of the enemy network by agents and double agents and in spite of elaborate security measures, it was impossible to stop all sabotage directed against Gibraltar and Allied ships in Spanish ports. These measures had the effect of compelling Abwehrabteilung II to alter its methods by placing high explosive bombs in the cargo before loading. This method, although less efficient than the others, was often impossible to prevent and the next counter-measure was to attempt to force the Spanish authorities to take action against the German sabotage organisations in Spain. This took the form of direct protests by the British Minister in Madrid, direct protests by the Governor of Gibraltar to the Military Governor in Algeciras, protests in Madrid accompanied by memoranda compiled in London and interviews between the Foreign Secretary and the Spanish Ambassador. A number of facts were furnished regarding the sabotage committed and lists of names of agents were given against whom it was considered that the Spanish authorities could take action.

In June 1943 two Spaniards were arrested in Gibraltar and after protracted proceedings were executed in January 1944. Both of them had been working for Abwehrabteilung II. One of the men was employed in H.M. Dockyard in Gibraltar and succeeded in placing a "Clam" underneath a fuel tank. The explosion was successful and considerable damage was done. The other was a Spaniard who was working for a group consisting mainly of young Spanish army officers who, in turn, were working under the directions of Abwehrabteilung II. He was persuaded to accumulate a store of sabotage equipment which was smuggled into Gibraltar in a car.

In connection with counter-measures Lord Rothschild made a number of journeys abroad visiting, besides the U.S.A. as already mentioned, Gibraltar (three times), Cairo, Persia and Italy. The purpose of these journeys was to institute and develop counter-measures in connection with enemy

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attempts against shipping and to look into the arrangements for running double agents in the Gibraltar area. In the Middle East he dealt with the problem of setting up a counter sabotage network with particular reference to Syria and Iraq and with the establishment of counter measures at the Abadan railway. In Italy he supervised the digging up of stay-behind sabotage dumps and co-operated with S.I.S. in investigation and in running double agents.

After the landing in Normandy he was in charge of counter sabotage for SHAEF, including all work connected with sabotage double-cross cases and the supervision of measures for digging up, clearing and examining the enemy's dumps of material. He was also responsible for the re-organisation of counter sabotage for the 21st Army Group in Belgium and in Germany was in charge of counter sabotage, the interrogation of saboteurs and the control of sabotage cases for the 12th U.S. Army Group.

In addition to the large number of papers for which B.I.C. was responsible (vide S.F.50-24-44(31) and Supplementary Files), numerous lectures were given by Lord Rothschild. The general object in view was to ensure that as much information as possible regarding the methods of the enemy should be given not only to Security Service officers, but to police, military and other officials who might be concerned in taking the necessary counter-measures. Among the many detailed arrangements made B.I.C. was in close touch with the L.R.C. and took steps to provide for the examination of luggage of refugees arriving there. Special arrangements were made for X-raying. Suitable apparatus was installed at the L.R.C. and where necessary articles to be examined were sent to technical laboratories for the purpose. All the numerous types of enemy equipment which came into our hands were photographed and the photographs were given a wide distribution in this country.

Although no case of sabotage by the enemy occurred in the United Kingdom, there were a large number of cases in which sabotage was suspected and enquiries had to be made. Some of these cases were due to malicious damage either by 'disgruntled workmen' or otherwise and some as the result of accident or misadventure. In the conditions of wartime it was necessary that all such matters should be thoroughly sifted because if this was not done such cases were liable to leave in the mind of the public or of the authorities concerned the impression that sabotage was being committed by the enemy without being detected. This effect would obviously be bad for morale and, moreover, it was apt to leave the impression outside the Security Service that sufficient attention was not being paid to the matter. It might also raise doubts in the minds of Security Service officers as to the extent of the activities of the enemy and the efficiency of his sabotage organisation. A further point of some importance which affected all these issues was the natural tendency of insurance companies to attribute

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all such cases to war damage, i.e. enemy sabotage, unless an enquiry was held to prove the contrary. For all these reasons an important part was played by the competent staff of police officers under Chief Inspector Burt of Scotland Yard which was attached to B.18 (B.I.C.) for the purpose of visiting the scenes of such occurrences and maintaining contact with a large number of enquiries relative to this aspect of the problem.

B.I.C. was also responsible for counter sabotage instruction in preparation for the "Second Front". Between December 1943 and August 1945 thirty-seven officers passed through the section from the armies and navies of Great Britain, the U.S.A. and France. These men were given various periods of instruction and in some cases a week was spent in this office to hear lectures by officers of B.I.C., B.I.B., B.I.A. and B.5. The men also received a week's practical training at S.O.E. and later two or three days' revision and examination in Paris by Lord Rothschild.

In addition to covering the wide field of sabotage, including the investigation of the mechanical and other sabotage equipment of the enemy, in regard to which their technical knowledge in matters of general science and engineering was indispensable, the officers of this section made a study of the German sabotage organisation on the basis of the material available from all sources. They supplemented this by enquiries into possible component elements in a "Fifth Column" here. Finally they filled an important gap in that, but for them, the Security Service had no contact with the general field of scientific enquiry and no means of getting into touch with the right persons or acquiring essential knowledge. In a world dominated by scientific achievement this is a gap which has to be filled.

6. Employment of captured enemy agents who had been turned round with a view to using them to supply the enemy with false information or to carry through deception plans.

The question of running double-agents was first considered in 1938 as a result of consultation with the French Deuxieme Bureau, who were using this method. At that time the work was entrusted to Major Sinclair, but few details are now available and it appears that very little progress was made. Early in the war Major Sinclair collaborated in this matter with Major Cowgill of Section V, and one of his cases, that of "RAINBOW", continued to run for several years afterwards.

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It may be noted that the system of giving pseudonyms to this type of agent, which was also followed by the Germans, was adopted for obvious security reasons, and the pseudonyms appeared on all ordinary papers connected with such cases.

The first case which led to any really valuable development of the use of double agents was that of SNOW (the already mentioned), an agent who had been working for S.I.S. In 1938 we had reason to believe that he was working for the Germans, and we learned that he was to receive a wireless transmitting set from them. Arrangements were made by which we were able to examine it without his knowledge before he obtained possession of it. After he obtained it he showed the set to us, and it was arranged that he should keep it. Being a British subject he was interned under D.R.18(B) at the beginning of the war, but a little later, after obtaining considerable and important information from him with regard to the Abwehr system of codes employed by them for agents' wireless traffic, Major Robertson decided to attempt to exploit him as a double agent. Incidentally this information about his codes was one of the most important factors which led to the unravelling of their wireless system and the subsequent developments described above under the heading of "ISOS".

*RAINBOW - a commercial agent, son of a Portuguese father and German mother, who lived in Germany until 1938 when he came to England to marry a Rumanian girl. In this country he made friends with a certain Gunther SCHUTZ, a commercial spy for Germany. In January 1940 an approach was made through SCHUTZ to recruit him for the German Secret Service. He became afraid and reported the matter to the police with the result that the British Secret Service recruited him instead, and he was duly despatched to Antwerp to make contact with SCHUTZ. His meeting was successful and he was established as a double agent.

*SNOW - a Welsh electrical engineer employed before the war by S.I.S. to supply information obtained during his business visits to Germany. SNOW independently made contact with the German Secret Service and, to all intents and purposes, acted henceforth as a straight German agent in England. Some months afterwards he admitted this association, but no action was taken and he continued his career unmolested until the outbreak of war when he was taken into custody on 4.9.39. In the previous January he had received a radio transmitter from the Germans and had handed this over to the British authorities. By means of this radio SNOW was now induced to contact the German Secret Service and a personal meeting was arranged for him in Holland. This meeting, which duly took place, resulted in the supply to G.C. & C.S. of information of the greatest possible value to the future history of the war. SNOW's subsequent career continued to be one of drama and double-crossing in the period in which his services were used.

During the first year of the war, the fact - as already mentioned - that we had very little knowledge of the German Secret Service and were completely in the dark as to the extent of their espionage network in this country made the business of running a double agent an extremely difficult one, based as it necessarily was on a number of unknown factors which obtruded themselves at every turn. In actual fact - although we did not know it - and were therefore bound to over-estimate the enemy's efficiency - no effective German network existed in this country at that time.

The obverse of these facts presented a problem for the Germans, as after the fall of France they were as entirely cut off from England as we were from the Continent. They had no satisfactory means of obtaining intelligence and the problem of introducing their agents into this country presented serious difficulties. In the autumn of 1940 they made various attempts to introduce agents by small boats or submarines and by parachuting them, as has been described above and in "The German Secret Service, August 1942" (vide Bibliography No. 33). Their object at this time was to obtain intelligence for purposes directly connected with the invasion of this country. Under the circumstances two courses were open to us: one was to treat it as a simple security problem and to have every agent we could lay hands on apprehended and executed; the other was to employ some at least of those caught as double agents and to let the Germans think that they were still at large and working for them.

The second course was adopted because by that time some of the many advantages of the double agent system had become apparent.

It will be convenient not to attempt to describe the system as it gradually developed - that is a very long story and is described in detail in the sectional report of B.I.A. - but to indicate in brief outline the eventual developments in B.I.A., the objects aimed at and achieved by the section and the methods by which its success was obtained.

The section was under a Directorate composed of Major (afterwards Lt. Colonel) Robertson, Major Masterman and Mr. Marriott, which decided all matters of policy and dealt with relations with the operational and intelligence staffs of the fighting services and with other departments. An important part in these relations and the conduct of the whole double agent system was played by the Twenty Committee, of which Major Masterman was Chairman, Mr. Marriott Secretary and Major Robertson the Security Service representative. The Committee also included representatives of D.M.I., D.N.I., A.C.A.S.(I), S.I.S., Home Forces, C.C.O. (Lord Louis Mountbatten), SHAEP, L.C.S. (Colonel Bevan, responsible for working out cover plans in conjunction with operational planning) and the Home Defence Executive (Sir Findlater Stewart).

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In the early stages two major problems presented themselves. One arose out of the case of the agent SNOW and was due to the fact that the Germans expected him to produce two daily weather reports. The problem was solved by obtaining the consent of the Air Ministry through Air Commodore Boyle, then Director of Intelligence, Air Ministry, with whom Major Robertson had been in touch for some time for the purpose of exchanging information about questions asked of this agent by the enemy. The other difficulty was a more serious one and arose out of the question whether accurate information should be transmitted to the Germans through their agents under our control about the bombing of British cities. The responsibility for deciding that attempts should be made to mislead them by giving false information about the bombing of British cities which might have the consequence of diverting their bombers to other cities or places was taken by Sir Findlater Stewart of the Home Defence Executive. These two cases will serve as an illustration of the type of problem with which the Twenty Committee had to deal.

The scope of B.I.A. and the Twenty Committee was, however, much wider than this implies and as the double agent system developed it became clear that it could be used for the following specific purposes:-

- (1) To control the German Intelligence system in this country. This was an end in itself, because we felt that if we provided a reasonably satisfactory reporting system from this country the Germans would be satisfied and would not make excessive efforts to establish other agents. Naturally it was better for us to know what was being reported from this country than not to know. Even if a good deal of true information had to be given, we did at least know what information the Germans had and what they had not. Furthermore, we could not enjoy the other benefits on the deception side unless we had a fairly complete control of the German Intelligence system.
- (2) For the apprehending of other spies. This was the primary object of the system, but it became less and less important because, while ISOS, the S.C.O.s, the L.R.C. and Camp O20 were uncovering new agents as they arrived, the Abwehr showed signs of being satisfied with the intelligence they were receiving from those agents working under our control.
- (3) Code and cipher work. Apart from the original 'break' through the use of SNOW's traffic already mentioned, the traffic of some of our later agents was found to be of great assistance to G.C. & C.S. in reading messages over an important part of the widespread Abwehr network. G.C. & C.S. said on one occasion that 'GARBO's new cipher had

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saved them nearly six months' work, and some agents were kept going, e.g. *TREASURE, merely to act as a crib to G.C. & C.S., after their value as agents had otherwise ceased.

(4) Assistance to Censorship. Information provided by letter-writing double agents in the form of cover addresses in neutral countries and types of secret ink used by enemy agents were communicated to Censorship, thus enabling them to keep in touch with German secret ink technique and developments, to discover the best re-agents and to put on the Watch Lists all over the world the addresses thus obtained. One important indirect consequence of this was to enable the U.S.A. authorities to obtain an insight into and watch over the activities of enemy agents in the Western Hemisphere.

(5) To gain evidence of enemy intentions. The questionnaires and individual questions given to agents gradually built up a very complete picture of what the Germans wanted to know and therefore what their operational intentions were. For example, when their questions about this country shifted from anti-invasion defence in South-East England to the location of food dumps and kindred subjects, we were able to suggest to appropriate authorities that German strategy no longer envisaged an invasion but was busy with the thoughts of a more long drawn out war of attrition based on a submarine warfare and an attack on our supply lines.

(6) To gain knowledge of the personalities and methods of the German Intelligence Services, particularly of the Abwehr. This is self-explanatory.

(7) To prevent enemy sabotage by controlling their saboteurs and thus securing knowledge of their methods and equipment. One of the most remarkable aspects of the generally low standard of efficiency in the Abwehr during the war was the ineffectiveness, broadly speaking, of their sabotage in this country

*GARBO - a Catalan industrialist, equally hostile to Communism and Fascism, who induced the German Secret Service in the Iberian Peninsula to accept him as an agent operating from England. His purpose in so doing was to enhance his value to the British Secret Service who had hitherto refused to employ him. In this objective he succeeded, and in April 1942 he was brought to England where his subsequent career as a double agent became a classic of brilliance and ingenuity.

*TREASURE - a French citizen of Russian origin, an intelligent but temperamental woman, taught by the German Secret Service to receive instructions by radio but to communicate with them by secret writing. Later she succeeded in obtaining a transmitter of her own.

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(the work of Abwehrabteilung II). We were satisfied that apart from the sabotage carried out under our control the Abwehr achieved practically nothing, certainly nothing of any importance. The most important incidents were three which were effected through *MUTT and JEFF (which were duly publicised in the press) and a fourth by *ZIGZAG, which was important as it supplied us with knowledge which made it possible to take precautions against other attempts on the same lines, i.e. by placing explosives contained in a piece of coal on board a ship (in this case the s.s. "City of Lancaster"). The Germans dropped special sabotage equipment for the purposes of these incidents staged under our control and the fact that most of it proved to be captured S.O.E. material indicated that they regarded it as superior to their own at that time.

(8) To give misinformation to the enemy;
in other words to take part in deception. Further details on this subject are given below.

These eight points cover the aims and objects of the work of B.I.A. as they gradually developed in the light of experience and the changing circumstances of the war. The original - and fundamental - idea and the basic policy which throughout governed all the rest was to control the German Intelligence agents in this country in such

*MUTT and JEFF - MUTT, a ladies' hairdresser, son of a father and British mother, born in London and consequently possessing British nationality. He spoke English, German and fluently; was intelligent, unobtrusive and impetuous. He arrived with JEFF.

ostensibly to join the free forces in this country, but covertly on a He and JEFF handed themselves over to the authorities upon arrival, and MUTT thereafter under supervision operated a radio transmitter, with which he had been equipped by the Germans, and was successfully established as a double agent. JEFF proved less tractable and was only used in support of MUTT, for most of the time being detained in the Isle of Man and at Stafford Gaol and Dartmoor.

*ZIGZAG - a British criminal with a long pre-war police record who was in prison in Jersey for safe-blowing and other activities. When the Germans took over the island in 1940 he offered his services with intent to escape. He was duly recruited for the German Secret Service and received instruction in sabotage and radio transmission. In December 1942 he was dropped by parachute in England, and immediately reported his story to the authorities. He agreed to act as a double agent and was successful in establishing radio contact with the enemy. He made several journeys abroad to meet members of the German Secret Service both on German and neutral territory, and was apparently much respected and trusted by them.

a manner as to satisfy the Abwehr and thus to facilitate means of preventing them from establishing other agents not under our control both by making it appear to be unnecessary and by apprehending those who arrived. These two primary objectives were the complementary parts of a whole; and governed the policy of the Security Service in combating the efforts of the Abwehr as conceived by Captain Liddell and carried out by B Division under his direction.

In order to achieve these objectives B.I.A. controlled a team of agents - the number varied with circumstances - including some who were captured and others who presented themselves to us. This team was first built up at the end of 1940 and during 1941 consisted of about twenty-five members. These twenty-five agents were controlled by case officers, the number of whom ordinarily did not exceed five. Each case officer was responsible for not more than one or two important agents and others who were quiescent or of minor importance. The case officers were responsible for the preparation of the agent's wireless communication with the Abwehr and for the well-being and care of each agent and all matters connected with him.

This was not a simple matter; on the one hand agents' traffic had to be run not as that of individuals, but in accordance with plans and general conceptions co-ordinated by the directorate of the section. On the other hand extensive administrative arrangements were necessary; for instance a single wireless agent, if of enemy origin, e.g. a parachutist, needed a complete establishment of his own, a house or flat, a house-keeper to run the establishment, a wireless operator and at least two guards. His actual living conditions had to be very carefully arranged so that he should not attract attention and comment in the district where he lived. The administrative problem included all arrangements for the control of the agents and their establishment, negotiations with the police, with the Registrar-General, with Food Control Officers, and so forth. In the early days the situation was complicated by the fact that B.I.A. had no means of knowing whether there were other, and if so how many, uncontrolled agents whose reports to the Abwehr might contradict those arranged by us, or otherwise complicate the position of each individual agent under control. To meet these difficulties the principle laid down and followed was to instruct each case officer that he must, as far as possible, lead the life of each important agent; steep himself in the style and thoughts of the agent; make a careful psychological study of him and introduce into his messages every sort of confirmatory detail which might convince the Germans that the agent was free and working honestly for them. If, for instance, the Germans required a report on an aerodrome, the agent himself or an officer specially detailed for the purpose was sent to that aerodrome to make a report, and such visits were always made on the assumption that the visitor was in fact a spy who would risk

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his neck if he were caught asking questions or finding his way into any place or area to which admission was not open or in which his presence would attract the attention of the authorities concerned. Another important point which required close attention was the necessity of arranging for suitable answers to personal questions relating to the agents. When they were satisfactorily given they often proved to be a means of convincing the Germans that the agent was not under control. (An important instance of this is proved by the statement of Dr. Friedrich Karl PRAETORIUS (P.F.602299) on the subject of the double agent known to us as TATE).

It is important to understand the methods followed by B.I.A. in achieving the general objects outlined in the eight sub-headings above. This question of methods had two aspects arising out of the fact that B.I.A. was dealing through these agents and their employers in the Abwehr with the German General Staff (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) on the one hand, and with the authorities responsible for British operations on the other. The object of the Abwehr, acting under the general control of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, was to obtain intelligence through the secret agents. The more limited counter espionage - or Security Service - object was to prevent them from doing so and the British authorities in question were pursuing a wider objective, i.e. to use the B.I.A. agents for the purpose of deceiving the enemy - in conjunction with larger deception plans - about major military plans and operations.

An important point is that the agents in question were German agents and not agents employed by our own organisations, except in the case of S.I.S. and S.O.E. agents on the Continent who had become "blown". In this last case the main object was to give the agent a chance to get away, and they played a minor part in the general scheme. The essential part was played by four types of agent of whom the best was that which on being approached by the Germans immediately reported the fact to a British authority. One of the

*TATE - a Dane of German parentage who arrived in this country by parachute on 19.9.40. on an espionage mission. He confessed and agreed to act as a double agent, establishing contact by radio transmitter with the enemy in October 1940. He became a most successful and trusted agent and was instrumental in securing large sums of money from the German Secret Service. He held the long-distance record of all double agents for radio transmission, which he maintained from October 1940 until the fall of Hamburg in May 1945.

best examples of this was *TRICYCLE. Another type consisted of those who arrived in this country after being despatched on a mission by the Germans and gave themselves up immediately on arrival. A third consisted of those who were genuine German agents, and after being captured were induced to work for us. Important results were also achieved by grafting real or notional sub-agents on to another agent. There were cases where the Germans appeared to dangle an agent in front of us, but these were, for obvious reasons, regarded as unsuitable.

A serious difficulty which presented itself to the Germans, because of the fact that they had no adequate organisation in this country at the beginning of the war, was that involved in the problem of making payments to agents after they arrived here. Their difficulties in arranging for payments assisted us in detecting the agents and also enabled us to realise the inadequacy of their organisation here. Agents under our control obviously required considerable sums to enable them to carry on if they survived for any length of time, and an important point in dealing with an agent was to arrange for him to agitate for money at frequent intervals. One such agent, TATE, was paid by means of a plan evolved by B.I.A. known as plan "Midas", by which having invented a wealthy but chicken-hearted Jew who required money in his name in dollars in New York, for which purpose he was prepared to pay over sterling in this country, the Germans were persuaded to pay out the dollars in New York, while B.I.A. on behalf of the imaginary Jew went through the motions of handing over the sterling to TATE in this country. By a similar plan, known as plan "Dream", the Germans were persuaded to pay pesetas to nominees in Madrid, in return for which certain Spanish fruit merchants paid sterling to an important self-made double agent, GARBO, who had reported to the British authorities that he had successfully provoked the Germans into recruiting him and had been brought to this country by us to facilitate their designs - and ours. In all, between 1940 and the spring of 1945 the Germans paid about £85,000 to B.I.A. for running their agents under our control. This fact alone is some indication of the quantity of the material which had to be prepared to satisfy the Abwehr that they were receiving value for their money. It was conveyed to them partly by wireless and partly by secret ink letters.

*TRICYCLE - a Yugoslav of good family, educated in France and Germany. Due to his social connections he became a figure of interest to the German Embassy in Belgrade, members of which considered that his entree to British social circles might prove of espionage value to them. TRICYCLE reported these developments to the British representative in Belgrade, and it was agreed that he would encourage the Germans in their aspirations. At the Germans' behest he came to England on 20.12.40., was established successfully as a double agent and thereafter organised an espionage network of his own on behalf of the Allies.

The obvious question suggests itself, whether the Germans swallowed whole everything produced by the B.I.A. team of agents? This question presented itself constantly in the early stages when it could not be answered, but the answer was found eventually in ISOS which provided evidence that the messages of all our controlled agents were transmitted over the Abwehr network, and also that many of the most important deception plans were successful in the sense that the Abwehr officers concerned attached importance to them and treated them as reliable intelligence. (This does not mean that all the messages of all our controlled agents were always reflected on ISOS. All of the agents appeared some time in some form or other and we could, therefore, be reasonably certain that because no others appeared as operating in the United Kingdom, none existed or would come into existence without being known to us). In a number of instances - some of them of the first importance - evidence has been obtained from captured German documents that this intelligence was accepted and acted on by the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht and its subordinate formations in the field and at sea. ISOS thus provided negative evidence in the sense that it was a legitimate inference that any agents not under our control would sooner or later be reflected on ISOS; and apart from the very small number of doubtful cases mentioned under sub-heading (1) ISOS above, no such case ever occurred. There was a further check in that R.S.S. watched receiving stations on the Continent and would have obtained indications if any had been receiving wireless messages in Abwehr or SD procedure from this country. This check again was double-banked by the co-operation between R.S.S. and voluntary interceptors watching for messages emanating from this country. (These checks, of course, would not apply when an agent was replying by methods other than wireless; but even in such cases it was to be expected that his reporting would be reflected in internal messages between Abwehr stations). Additional assurance that there was no German agent in the United Kingdom unknown to us was found in the fact that whenever a new agent came over here he was invariably given a life-line in case of a crisis in the shape of one of the existing agents already under control. Usually money was the difficulty, and there were frequent cases in which the Germans made use of controlled agents as a last resort for the provision of money to any new agent in the event of difficulties.

It must be emphasised that the claim that there were no uncontrolled agents in this country can only be made for the period between the fall of France in 1940 and its liberation in 1944, and it was only towards the end of 1941 that we could feel even a partial assurance that this was the case. Before and after this period there was considerable traffic between Great Britain and the Continent, and under those circumstances no security system, however elaborate, could claim to stop all the holes. During the period 1941-44, however, when the S.C.O.s and the L.R.C. were functioning at their fullest effectiveness in the circumstances created by the German

/occupation

occupation of Western Europe, it was reasonable to assume that German agents were not getting through undetected; and, as already mentioned, there is the ISOS confirmation of this fact.

This being the position with regard to B.l.A.'s relations with the enemy, it remains to mention their relations with our own authorities, for which purpose the Twenty Committee was the channel.

The Twenty Committee was technically a sub-committee of the W Board, which originally consisted of the three Directors of Intelligence, C.S.S. and Captain Liddell as representative of the Security Service. To these were added Sir Findlater Stewart of the Home Defence Executive and Colonel Bevan of the London Controlling Section (operational cover plans). The W Board was created to co-ordinate the dissemination of false information, but in practice it undertook the responsibility for the control of double agents, exercising that responsibility through the Twenty Committee. The Twenty Committee in turn acted as a clearing ground for information about the agents, approved traffic for them, discussed the policy adopted by B.l.A. in individual cases, passed on intelligence information gained from double agents to the proper quarters and indicated how the agents could best be used for the benefit of the departments concerned.

A cardinal principle never lost sight of by the Security Service was that no information of any kind was ever passed to the Germans by wireless or by letter unless it had the written approval of a competent authority, i.e. of the Intelligence or Operational Staffs of the Services, of the Home Defence Executive or of the Foreign Office. At the same time B.l.A. always maintained the right to veto any information which the Services wished to put over if it was considered by B.l.A. that it might jeopardise the agent concerned.

The position in regard to the civil authorities was particularly difficult, as it was important that the work of the double agents should be known to as few persons as possible. Reference has already been made to Sir Findlater Stewart's acceptance of responsibility in such matters as the reports of the effects of enemy bombing. As early as February 1941 he arranged a meeting of the W Board with the Lord President of the Council, at which the difficulty was discussed. The outcome of this meeting was that the Lord President discussed the matter on the highest level and Sir Findlater Stewart became the authority to whom B.l.A. applied for approval in the same way as they did to the Directors of Intelligence in questions affecting the fighting Services.

/The crown

The crown of the work of B.l.A. in connection with operational planning is to be found in the part played in supporting the military cover plan (Plan Fortitude) which misled the Germans in connection with the operations in France in 1944. Over a considerable period the ISOS traffic had shown that the Abwehr attached the greatest importance to information received from the double agents, especially GARBO and BRUTUS, whose reports were designed to supplement the military deception plans intended to mislead the Germans.

BRUTUS was a Pole who had been head of a secret organisation in France, had been arrested by the Germans, converted by them - as they thought - and allowed to "escape" to England in July 1942. His case presented considerable difficulty on account of the fact that he was a Polish officer and also, among other reasons, because Russo-Polish tension was such that the Foreign Office could not allow us to develop the political side of BRUTUS' mission to this country for fear of awkward repercussions. His circumstances made it difficult to build up a network of sub-agents which the Germans wanted. As a Polish officer holding military appointments he was, however, admirably placed for the transmission of military information and eventually he played an important part in building up our imaginary Order of Battle as part of the grand deception plan for the "Overlord" operation.

An even larger part was played by GARBO, see footnote on page 231. After overcoming the preliminary difficulties, in the course of which he pretended to the Germans that he was in England when he was still in Lisbon, he succeeded in getting himself brought to this country in April 1942. After his arrival here his case was handled by Mr. Harris of B.l.G. under the direction of B.l.A. with whose general policy it had to conform. GARBO is described as working with passionate and quixotic zeal for many hours a day to produce voluminous reports from a network of imaginary or "notional" agents which was eventually composed of no less than twenty-eight members, covering a considerable part of the British Isles with out-stations in North Africa, Canada and Ceylon. The transmission of the numerous reports which resulted involved immense labour to GARBO himself and Mr. Harris. The case was worked out by both of them with extraordinary devotion and skill over a long period. GARBO's reports in his own peculiar style had to be approved by the deception staff, made to conform to the requirements of B.l.A., then rewritten by GARBO and often altered a second time by all three participants before the final form for transmission was agreed upon. Further complications arose from the fact that, because the Germans broke the fundamental rules of the game and put one agent in touch with another, there was always a risk that if they learnt that one of their agents was under our control they might realise that this was the case with all of them and thus the whole B.l.A. network would be lost. Major Masterman has said in the B.l.A. sectional history that the system which was designed to play a part in the grand deception

/plan

plan for "Overlord" only went through by a narrow margin. In spite of the dangers that the betrayal of one agent would betray the rest, it held together long enough to play its part by contributing to the strategic deception of the enemy on a crucial issue.

In February 1943, acting on a general directive from L.C.S. (London Controlling Section), the staff responsible for deception plans, Home Forces, had begun to construct a false Order of Battle. It was agreed that the deception plan must combine the reports of our double agents, the necessary W/T traffic purporting to emanate from and concern the bogus formations as well as camouflage and dummies which would deceive the enemy's aerial reconnaissance. By the winter of 1943-1944 this W/T cover was available and the creation of the false Order of Battle began to develop. In broad outline the plan was to create through the medium of the agents two Army Groups, one real (the 21st Army Group) and one notional (the 1st U.S. Army Group or FUSAG). When the 21st Army Group went overseas FUSAG would be left consisting of the U.S. 3rd Army (a real one) and the British 4th Army (a notional one). In the final stage when the U.S. 3rd Army had gone overseas on about D+3, FUSAG would be left with only notional formations, these being eventually the 14th U.S. Army and the 4th British Army. The object of this plan was to induce in the German General Staff the belief that the invasion of Normandy was a diversionary move and that the real attack was to come in the Pas de Calais area. A great mass of detailed information was built up to support this deception plan and it was transmitted to the Germans mainly through BRUTUS and GARBO. A German map of the British Order of Battle as on the 15th May 1944, which was later captured in Italy, showed how completely our imaginary Order of Battle had been accepted. It was largely based on the information supplied by these agents. A recognition booklet captured in France, which had been issued to German field commanders included drawings of our notional divisional signs.

There is an immense documentation to support this thesis in Major Masterman's B.L.A. report and that of Mr. Harris on the GARBO case (vide S.F.50-24-44(23A) and S.F.50-24-44(23B)). An important light was thrown on the whole situation by the Japanese diplomatic messages which came into our hands in great volume. One, dated 9th June, from the Japanese military attache in Berlin to Tokyo said ".....but because one separate Army Group is stationed on the South East coast of Britain, it is expected that plans will be made for this to land in the Calais and Dunkirk areas". The Japanese military attache was kept closely informed of the information available in the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht.

On D+3 GARBO, after a conference with all his agents, sent over a full report which, he requested, might be submitted urgently to the OKW. In this he set out in a concentrated form the Order of Battle in this country, claimed that seventy-five instead of about

fifty divisions were in being on D Day and pointed out that no FUSAG formation was taking part in the attack which, he deduced, was a diversionary one to be followed by the real assault in the Pas de Calais area. ISOS messages showed that this, like all the rest of GARBO's reports, was regarded by the Abwehr as of the greatest importance.

Subsequent information, mainly based on captured German documents, has shown that GARBO's information unquestionably influenced the strategy of the German High Command at the time of the landing in Normandy. The evidence shows that Plan Fortitude, the cover operation for the invasion, owed the greater part of its success to the work of BRUTUS and GARBO. The verbatim messages of these two agents, who were "controlled" respectively from Paris and Madrid, were sent on immediately to the RSHA who, in turn, gave them a wide distribution, including the OKW, OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres) and the C. in C. West (Rundstedt). The information in these messages is reflected in the Daily Situation Report of the OKH, a complete set of which for the year 1944 has come into British hands. An examination of this material confirms the opinion that the success of the cover plan was due to the Germans' acceptance of the reports of the controlled agents rather than to the other means of deception which were the complementary part of the grand plan. For instance, the wireless traffic of FUSAG, which was built up alongside that of the 21st Army Group with the object of inducing the Germans to believe in the threat to the Pas de Calais, first came on the air on the 24th April 1944. The agents reported the identity and grouping of these imaginary formations over an extended period continuing well into June. Had the enemy Y Service been responsible for supplying the details about FUSAG, the information about them would normally be expected to follow soon after the opening of this wireless deception network on the 24th April. In fact in most cases reports of the notional divisions appeared in the German Daily Situation Report a few days after they were first mentioned in one of the agents' reports.

GARBO's report on D+3, i.e. the night of 8/9th June above mentioned, was seen and initialled by Jodl on the following morning. Certain passages were underlined by him and it was submitted to Hitler. Lt. Colonel Fleetwood-Hesketh, who is examining the German material and has supplied the details here mentioned, has suggested that, in his opinion, these events may not be wholly unconnected with the fact that Rundstedt, who had ordered the movement of large and powerful formations from the north towards Normandy on the 8th morning, cancelled this order so as to retain them in the Pas de Calais area on the 10th as a result of "information received", i.e. after GARBO's message had been despatched. Direct evidence is not at present available to justify a statement that Rundstedt's cancellation was propter GARBO, as well as post GARBO, but there are strong grounds for this assumption in view of the circumstantial evidence as outlined above. (Rundstedt, in an interview on the 26th March 1946, placed the responsibility for the

/decision

decision of the 10th June 1944 on the OKW and the part played by GARBO in influencing this decision has not been finally assessed).

Lt.Colonel Fleetwood Hesketh adds that by various means the notional threat to the Pas de Calais was maintained until about the 10th August and that the strength of the German 15th Army in the north was only diminished by two divisions between D Day and that date. He adds that under interrogation Jodl has stated that he believed in the threat to the Pas de Calais area until the 3rd American Army appeared in the bridge-head, but that the retention of the German 15th Army after that date was due to Hitler's decision. Jodl has described the German strategy which retained these forces in the Pas de Calais area as fatal, although he appears to have no suspicion of the means by which it was induced - the creation through BRUTUS and GARBO of direct and positive intelligence - which the OKH accepted as reliable - of a notional Army Group in the South East of England. It is understood that the Allied Chiefs of Staff also took the view that the German retention of these forces in the north was decisive. Keitel has virtually admitted that the retention in the Pas de Calais area was the result - after a difference of opinion - of the importance attached to Abwehr, i.e. GARBO's information.

After this important success contributing to the defeat of German strategy the B.I.A. network of controlled agents played an important part by misleading the Germans in regard to the targets hit by V.1 and V.2. As in the case of the strategic deception B.I.A. were not responsible for the policy or details, but provided the channels through which the desired misinformation could be sent to the enemy. In a complicated situation great skill was employed to induce the enemy to alter the range of these missiles so as to minimise the damage done by them.

One further success was achieved mainly through the veteran agent, TATE, who reported to Hamburg and had been transmitting since October 1940. Towards the end of 1944 the U-boat menace had become more serious. A new invention, the "Schnorkel", enabled U-boats to recharge their batteries without coming to the surface and the only effective counter-stroke was the laying of deep minefields. An old "minelaying friend" of TATE's was revived and became the source of information which led the Germans to close thirty-six thousand square miles of the Western Approaches to U-boats. The exact credit balance of this deception cannot be assessed, but on a modest estimate it must have ensured the safety of many of our vessels which would otherwise have run considerable risks in that area, and it is not impossible that it led U-boats into dangerous areas. The Admiralty attached importance to these results.

7. The co-ordination by the Director of B Division of the intelligence and security work leading to the successful countering of the enemy Secret Services.

As mentioned at the beginning of the above account of them, these six sections (part of B.I.B., D.4., B.I.D., Camp 020, B.I.C., and B.I.A.) came to constitute a central organ capable of countering the German Secret Service - as part of the executive machinery of the Crown - by detecting enemy spies and saboteurs, by obtaining intelligence about them and the organisation behind them and by deceiving the German General Staff in regard to strategical plans.

These six sections dealt with different aspects of the general subject, with the cases of individual agents and with the evidence linking the agents with the organisation - the Abwehr and behind it the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. They were concerned with the investigation of a conspiracy in which the organisation and its agents played their parts; they performed their functions under the law and they sub-served the purposes of the great operations of the Fighting Services.

The work of this central organ was supplemented by that of other sections of B Division which played an auxiliary part in obtaining intelligence and to some extent in deception, but mainly in general preventive measures as part of the grand design of denying intelligence to the enemy. The most important of these auxiliary sections were those which were concerned with neutral territories; B.I.B., the Middle East; B.I.C., Spain, Portugal and South America; and B.I.H., Ireland. (The other neutral countries, the most important of which were Switzerland and Sweden, attracted less attention. The sections concerned were in E Division). The remaining sections of B Division also played an important auxiliary part, mainly on the preventive side of the machinery.

C and D Divisions, E Division, the section of F Division which dealt with the Fascist movements and pro-Germans (F.3.), and the D.G.'s staff all played their part mainly on the preventive side (except in the case of the Operations Section, whose functions were connected with the co-ordination of intelligence, minor operations (including Secret Service operations) and deception plans). In view of his position as the head of B Division and its system of intelligence, it fell to Captain Liddell to co-ordinate the work of B Division with that of all the others, subject to the control of the Director General. The co-ordination of the intelligence work of B Division combined with the discharge of its executive responsibilities and the preventive work of the whole organisation led up to a culmination of effort at the critical point in the security arrangements made in connection with the Normandy landing. These

/arrangements

arrangements covered the widest possible field and were carefully reviewed and considerably strengthened by Sir Pindlater Stewart's Committee which worked out the details for a Cabinet Committee specially set up by the Prime Minister. The most important measure which resulted - the ban on diplomatic communications - is described under B.1.B. below.

All this work which was co-ordinated with the operations of the central organ in B Division was concerned with countering the enemy Secret Services with special reference to the United Kingdom as a potential field of enemy operations and the Allied military, naval and air operations based on it. It was also concerned, less directly, with the same kind of counter-measures in the Middle East, Africa, the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Americas; and still less directly with the Far East - mainly, as already mentioned, by furnishing advice and a small number of its trained staff. At the time of, and after, the landing in Normandy the Security Service was in a position to supply personnel - partly derived from B and partly from other divisions - for the staffs employed on counter intelligence and security duties at SHAEF and the headquarters of the Army Groups, and Armies under its control and direction. This became manifestly desirable because officers trained in the Security Service stood out as qualified for the I(B) (or counter intelligence) work in virtue of their thorough grounding and special knowledge. It was recognised as necessary because the I(B) staff could not function with anything like the same degree of efficiency without them. These facts demonstrated - as will appear more clearly from the account of the working of the "War Room" and the G-2 CI staff under SHAEF recorded below - that the work of counter espionage (or counter intelligence) is essentially indivisible and that the staff in the field and the staff at headquarters in London must work in the closest collaboration and that their work must depend - both in its joint and in its several aspects - on the records of the Security Service and on the joint use of intelligence derived from records based on the interrogation of captured agents and on the intercepted communications of the enemy Secret Services. These aspects of the organisational problem were brought to a head by the formation of the War Room and will be further discussed under that heading.

The low quality of the effort made by the Abwehr does not detract from the triumphant success with which B Division built up this system from the chaos of 1940 until it was completely master of the situation at the time of the Normandy landing.

(B) Auxiliary Sections of B Division.

The auxiliary sections of B Division included sections dealing with subjects, neutral territories, liaison security, research and shadowing.

1. Subject Sections
 - Neutral and Allied diplomatic representatives (part of B.1.B. Major Blunt)
 - Finance and currency enquiries (part of B.1.B. Sir Edward Reid)
 - Seamen and the personnel of air lines (B.1.L. Mr. Stopford)
 - Industry and Commerce (B.4.B. Mr. Craufurd)
 - Special Cases (B.1.C. Lord Rothschild and Mr. Hill)
2. Neutral Territories' Sections
 - Middle East (part of B.1.B. Mr. Kellar)
 - Spain, Portugal and South America (B.1.G. Lt. Colonel Broome-White)
 - Ireland (B.1.H. Mr. C. Liddell)
3. Liaison Security Sections
 - Liaison with Censorship (B.3.A. Mr. Bird and B.3.D. Mr. Grogan)
 - Liaison with R.S.S. and with the B.B.C. (B.3.B. Mr. Hughes)
4. Security Sections
 - Lights and Pigeons (B.3.C. Fl. Lt. Walker)
 - Signals Security (B.3.E. Lt. Colonel Sclater)
5. Research Section
 - Information Section (B.1. Information Captain Gwyer and Mr. Bird)
6. Shadowing Staff (B.6. Mr. Hunter).

1. Subject Sections.

Neutral and Allied diplomatic representatives (part of B.1.B.). It had long been realised that some of the neutral and Allied diplomatic missions in London were possible sources of leakage to the enemy about important political and military matters and an even more serious danger arose from the possibility that a German agent might be employed in one of these missions; and the event proved that this apprehension was well founded in that the Germans employed agents in the Spanish and Portuguese Embassies during the war. In the early stages the responsibility for dealing with this problem had rested with each country section, but under the re-organisation scheme of 1941 most of the country sections were transferred from B to the newly created E Division. One of the more important country sections remained in B Division, i.e. that dealing with Spain and Portugal and South America. The Czechoslovak country section was in E, but B Division maintained special relations with the officers of the Czech Security Service in London. The Japanese section also remained in B Division and had a special problem to deal with prior to December 1941.

B Division officers felt that it was necessary that the problem of diplomatic missions should be studied as a whole and in March 1941 a special section was established for the purpose. Under the re-organisation it became one of the B.I.B. sub-sections under Major Blunt.

The problem of the sub-section originally presented itself as being:-

- (a) to collect material which was already available in other places, principally in S.I.S., but which was not reaching us;
- (b) to study diplomatic communications to and from London;
- (c) to evolve means of controlling neutral and Allied diplomats in this country so that they should be prevented from obtaining and transmitting information likely to be of value to the enemy;
- (d) to obtain the fullest possible information about the activities of diplomats by the placing of agents and by other special means.

One of the first results of this undertaking was to emphasise what had long been known, i.e. that there was voluminous material in the possession of S.I.S. which was of great interest to the Security Service but was not being passed to us. The reasons for this were that our interests and responsibilities were not fully understood or appreciated in S.I.S., and that because of its highly secret nature it was wrapped in complicated prohibitions. This material was of three kinds:-

- (i) B.J.s, i.e. deciphered diplomatic cables and telegrams;
- (ii) Special Material, i.e. the recorded telephone conversations of diplomats in London;

All three of these sources involved complex and delicate problems which are discussed in the sectional report.

In addition to these various methods of intercepting diplomatic communications steps were taken to obtain agents of the Security Service inside various diplomatic missions. These agents fell under four classes: diplomats, the personal contacts of diplomats, secretaries in missions and servants. During the war certain neutral diplomats were found who were so strongly anti-Fascist and anti-German that they were prepared to work as far as it lay in their

/power

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power to help the Allied cause. One of the useful functions served by diplomats and their contacts was to assist us in clearing up problems by obtaining information about individuals who for various reasons fell under suspicion.

they were able to furnish not only filled in gaps in our information but served as a check on possibly inaccurate information from other sources. The employment of servants was the work of a sub-section of M.S. which is described below.

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Some months before D Day when restrictions of all kinds were being imposed on the British public and on foreigners in this country it was realised that the most serious danger of leakage about the intended invasion was through diplomatic channels. By this time B Division were virtually satisfied that the German Secret Service had no serious agents at large in this country, but it was thought quite possible that ambassadors or service attaches might obtain information of vital importance and send it out of this country without our knowledge. Various suggestions were made to minimise these risks by delaying telegrams or holding up diplomatic bags. It was finally realised that none of these methods would cover more than a small part of the danger and finally on the representations of the Security Service, strongly supported by Sir Findlater Stewart, the Cabinet agreed to a total ban on diplomatic communications of all types from March 15th onwards. After this date no missions in this country, except the American and the Russian, were allowed to send cipher telegrams or uncensored diplomatic bags. These measures, which were effective, were justified not only on the principle that the use of diplomatic cipher was a concession and not a privilege, but from the security point of view by the information which had previously been obtained to show that some of the diplomatic missions constituted a real danger in this sense.

Finance and currency enquiries (part of B.1.B.). This section originated in 1940 as part of B.15, when its function was to provide information about financial and commercial matters generally, and in particular to examine and report on the papers of various suspect internees. When the office was re-organised in 1941 the section developed in a new direction and its functions were as follows:-

(a) the study of the methods by which enemy agents were paid and the carrying out of investigations arising out of such study;

(c) the provision to B.4.B. of information on banking and commercial matters.

/The first

The first of these functions developed as B.I.A. and other B sections obtained an insight into the work and methods of the Abwehr and its agents, particularly through the running of double agents which brought to light the German methods of financing them. The knowledge thus acquired has led to the conclusion that the Germans have used two methods -

(i) the making of remittances through neutral banks and -

(ii) the supply of currency to their agents.

Consequently two methods of routine investigation have been adopted.

Payments made to individuals in this country by order of neutral banks known or believed to be used by the enemy have been investigated. The result has shown that Portuguese banks have been used and arrangements were made to receive periodical lists of remittances after it had been ascertained which of the accounts were actively used by the enemy. Most of the remittances were, as might be expected, of an innocent character. Enquiries disclosed payments made by the Abwehr to B.I.A. double agents, and with possibly one exception (a case which has not been cleared up) the enquiries have in no case led to the detection of a hitherto unknown agent.

Bank of England notes brought into this country by enemy agents have been traced backwards with the result that certain series of notes issued before the war have been discovered to be suspect. For instance, notes drawn from a certain block of a thousand £5 notes at the time of the Munich crisis by a German controlled Dutch bank were traced with certainty to five known German agents, and possibly two others. With the help of the Bank of England a watch was therefore kept for the return to this country of other notes from this block in case other agents might have received them in payment. This process was repeated with numerous other groups of notes. Here again no hitherto unknown enemy agents were detected.

These investigations could have had more positive value if B.I.A. had not in fact controlled the German espionage system in this country. As it was, the negative effect of the evidence tends to confirm the inferences, examined above, as to the completeness of the B.I.A. control.

The enquiries made by the section suggest that particulars of recent remittances of Bank of England notes to banks known to have acted for the German Secret Service should have been obtained at, or even before, the outbreak of war, and that a watch for the return of these notes to this country should have been kept.

/Other activities

Other activities of the section supplemented the work of other sections in a valuable way.

His knowledge of banking enabled Sir Edward Reid to render valuable service in the investigation of a variety of problems not only in the positive sense indicated above but also owing to the fact that his expert advice and understanding of the subject enabled the officers of other sections to grasp what could or could not be done in particular cases and to comprehend the size of problems which presented themselves for consideration over a wide and varied field.

Seamen and the personnel of air-lines (B.I.L.). The work of this section was largely of a security nature; its other function being to employ agents among seamen. Its history, which began in 1941 at the suggestion of the Security Executive, makes confusing reading on account of this duality of functions and the uncertainty of aim at different times. The section was never part of the machinery for investigating the activities of the German Secret Service in any concrete form, but it was intended that it should run double agents under the general direction of B.I.A. This was done, however, not by controlling agents of the enemy but by attempting to induce the enemy to recruit the section's own agents.

The section was first started by Lieutenant Jones of the Security Intelligence Centre who reported in April 1941 that at that time nine separate bodies in this country were recruiting seamen agents independently. Mr. Stopford, who took over the section in August 1942, was of opinion that the failure to take account of the implication of the differences between the two types of agent was the cause of many of the section's difficulties.

When Mr. Stopford took over the charter of the section was extended to deal with the personnel of air-lines. He disagreed with the policy followed by his predecessor, under which some three hundred and fifty seamen were at one time employed as agents, and decided to concentrate on a small number.

In so far as the section was responsible for passing deception material to the enemy it was obvious that this side of the work had to be co-ordinated by B.I.A.

In November 1942 the D.N.I. brought the question of the section's functions to a head on account of his misgivings as to the desirability of supplying traffic to the intended double agents who would be in indirect touch with the enemy. As a result three reasons were given for the maintenance of a system of seamen agents by the Security Service:-

/(a)

- (a) to watch other seamen who were exposed to German influence;
- (b) to check special sources of information where it concerned the enemy's work among seamen;
- (c) to provide a counter espionage network in case special sources, i.e. the interception of the Abwehr wireless, broke down.

It was pointed out that a B.I.L. agent at Lourenco Marques had unearthed an important enemy agent and had been responsible for his arrest. Further, letter smuggling to and from Eire had been largely suppressed as a result of the section's work and a probable enemy agent mentioned on the Abwehr wireless had been apprehended through a B.I.L. agent. The final result of the discussions was that the D.M.I. informed the Director General that he felt that in general the dangers of running seamen agents could be accepted in view of the advantages.

The section also attempted to deal with a variety of problems which included letter smuggling centring round the B.O.A.C. air-lines in Cairo and Lagos which led to improved arrangements for censoring legitimate correspondence; contact with the Japanese in Lisbon; the German use of Spaniards on their lines of communication between the Iberian Peninsula and the Argentine; and suspicious characters and haunts in the Irish Channel and on Irish ships which plied regularly between Eire and Lisbon and only passed through a somewhat perfunctory British control.

Industry and Commerce (B.4.B.). Soon after the first world war the Security Service recognised the potentialities of industry and commerce as channels for intelligence under the conditions of a modern war in which the effort of the whole nation is engaged. This was brought out by the results of Lt.Colonel Holt-Wilson's visit to Germany as embodied in his book on the German Police System as applied to Military Security in War (vide Bibliography No. 36). It was further emphasised by the information already mentioned in Chapter III above regarding the employment of German Intelligence officers in the Deutsche Ueberseedienst and similar measures designed to overcome the disabilities imposed on German Intelligence officers by the Treaty of Versailles.

By the time when the outbreak of war occurred in 1939 enquiries had provided good ground for the belief that a mass of detailed information, much of it of military value, was reaching the German Government in Berlin as a result of the ramifications of German industry and commerce throughout the world.

This was effected in three ways:-

- (a) Germany's big industrialists, their cartels and other combinations employed their own economic intelligence departments, conspicuous among them

/being

being the Reichsbank, the I.G. Farben Industrie A.G. and A.E.G. The wide field covered by these economic intelligence departments involved much that was of interest to the German General Staff which, under the Nazis, developed close co-ordination with the organs of the German Government concerned with trade and industry.

(b) The Abwehr and the RSHA developed the practice of securing the inclusion of their own confidential agents in the foreign organisations of German industrial companies. The companies were forced by the German Government to co-operate in this way, but they did so unwillingly because the exposure of an agent who might not be fully qualified commercially would be liable to prejudice the companies' business. From the point of view of obtaining secret military intelligence it also had a drawback in that foreign representatives of German business were in themselves the objects of some suspicion in other countries.

(c) Agents were recruited locally from the foreign branches of German industrial undertakings through the Foreign Organisation of the NSDAP or otherwise. An important organ of the NSDAP in London before the war was the German Chamber of Commerce which was established by the Party as part of the process of the nazification of Germans abroad and was regarded by them as "a bulwark of the Party".

Counter-measures in time of peace presented virtually insoluble problems in the absence of good information from inside the German organisations. Special difficulties arose from the fact that an agent might be unaware that he was obtaining intelligence for other than commercial purposes. Again, information was not necessarily acquired by German businesses directly from this country. It might be acquired by the German firm through an associated company in a neutral country.

For these reasons the Security Service had felt impelled to attempt to cover as much of the ground as possible before the war; and under the very different conditions of war-time it was necessary to keep the whole field under close and constant review.

B.4.B. (originally B.15) was charged with the duty of dealing with enemy espionage through industry and commerce. The section's duties were defined in Director General's Circular No. D.G.27/41 of 22.9.41. which ran as follows:-

The function of B.4.B. is the detection and prevention of espionage through industry and commerce and it is particularly concerned with the possibility of espionage through firms who have access, for the purpose of supplying or servicing their goods, to Government Departments, Naval, Military or Air establishments and factories engaged on Government work.

/Any case

Any case where the possibility of espionage through industrial and commercial concerns is suspected should be referred to B.4.B.

B.4.B. is also available for advice in cases where the commercial and industrial element may be only incidental, and also for purposes of liaison with M.E.W., T.E.D., the Board of Trade and other departments dealing with industrial and commercial matters.

Certain cases where industry and commerce are concerned have been specifically assigned to B.1.C., who will continue to deal with them and matters arising out of them.

This section was in charge of Mr. Craufurd, who was assisted by Mr. Noble and Mr. Hill. By a peculiar but successful arrangement Mr. Hill was responsible in some cases to Mr. Craufurd and in others to Lord Rothschild, who eventually delegated to Mr. Hill the cases which had been assigned to him.

In view of the especial nature of the problems with which they had to cope, the activities of B.4.B. covered a large field and were very largely preventive. They acted on the possibility or suspicion of espionage and did not often obtain conclusive proof of it.

The outbreak of war severed the usual direct lines of communication between this country and Germany. The invasion and occupation of various countries by Germany and the declaration of war on Germany by others diminished the number of indirect lines of communication. It was, however, considered desirable throughout the war to maintain the activities of B.4.B. in view of the indirect lines of communication which remained.

B.4.B. maintained special contacts and exchanged information with the following departments:-

(a) Board of Trade, Companies Department (subsequently merged in the Trading with the Enemy Department). This department inspected companies under the Trading with the Enemy Act, a process whereby the connections of a company from the security point of view could be investigated, under the cover of an enquiry as to trading, more effectively than by the police. B.4.B. would suggest inspections and the Companies Department would usually comply with their request.

The Companies Department, where the controlling interest in the share capital of a company was vested in enemies, made orders vesting this interest in the Custodian of Enemy Property, thus bringing the company under his control. This process extended over the first years of the war and, when necessary, B.4.B. would suggest that vesting orders should be made.

/(b)

(b) The Custodian of Enemy Property. This liaison was used for obtaining information as to controlled companies and pointing out where the control should be strengthened.

(c) The Trading with the Enemy Branch, later Trading with the Enemy Department, which dealt with the administration of the Trading with the Enemy Act.

(d) The Ministry of Economic Warfare which dealt with the enforcement of the blockade of enemy countries.

(e) The Department of Overseas Trade, the liaison with which enabled B.4.B., apart from obtaining information, to discharge that department from supporting suspects and undesirables on commercial grounds.

There were two cases during the war in which B.4.B. made enquiries regarding known German agents. One was Hans ARNHEIM, a German Jew, who came to this country as a financial expert advising the subsidiaries of the Wodan Handel Maatschappij, a merchant banking house of Rotterdam. ARNHEIM made a number of contacts with British officers and sent reports to H.W.K.R. von GOERSCHEN, a member of the Abwehr organisation established in Holland in the autumn of 1938. He had been arrested by the French in Tunis and condemned to death in January 1940, but the circumstances necessitated elaborate enquiries into his connections in this country and enquiries about von GOERSCHEN and his contacts here.

The other was Ludwig WARSCHAUER, a German Jew who was interned in 1940 under the general internment order before the true facts about him had been discovered. He was trained by the Germans for economic espionage in Poland and was provided by them with an agency for a German company in London. He denied having worked against this country and there is no evidence to implicate him in doing so.

B.4.B. was concerned with the following:-

(i) Cases concerning the internment of aliens where the interest in the case arose from the individual's business position or connections.

(ii) Advice to D.1, D.2, and D.3 and other sections of the Security Service in questions arising out of the business interests of British firms.

(iii) Advice to C Division in connection with the vetting of candidates from industry and commerce for official posts.

(iv) Advice to D.4 in similar circumstances in connection with exit permits and visas on account of the obvious possibility of leakage from this country to the enemy.

/Enquiries

Enquiries over this wide field involved a large volume of work. After they had attained considerable experience of the intricacies of this very large subject, the officers of this section were able to render useful advice to other sections in the Security Service.

Special Cases (B.I.C.). As mentioned in Chapter IV, Part I (iii), Mr. Curry arranged early in 1940 for a certain number of special cases to be undertaken by B.I.C. mainly, but not always, on account of Lord Rothschild's technical knowledge and his contacts in scientific circles. The most important of these was the enquiry into the Machine Tool Industry which arose from the initiative taken by Wing Commander Archer in bringing its significance to notice. The enquiries made before and after the outbreak of war into the case of C.W. KUCHENMEISTER, whose internment early in the war was only secured with the greatest difficulty, had made it clear that through him, and possibly others like him, the German authorities had access to a wide field of intelligence about our rearmament. The circumstances were such that KUCHENMEISTER was in a position to inform the German authorities in a great variety of detail of the progress made in rearmament in the period immediately preceding the war; and probably to forecast developments over almost the whole field - aeroplanes, ships, guns, tanks and other weapons and equipment - for the next twelve months or more. He was able to obtain this information not by the employment of secret agents but by the methods of more or less open commercial intelligence; and it was always possible that he might have used his position to suborn British subjects or by underground means to obtain details of secret processes. In any case it was necessary to deny all this open intelligence to the enemy and the need for this became acute when, after the outbreak of war, he attempted to establish a chain of communication by setting up a representative in Dublin as an intermediary for ordinary business correspondence in connection with machine tools between Dublin and this country on the one hand and Dublin and Copenhagen on the other. This attempt was nearly successful because, as already mentioned in Chapter III, he was supported by influential British interests - with an eye only on production - and the Advisory Committee was unwilling to keep him in internment. He was kept in internment and eventually sent to Australia on the basis of the circumstantial evidence of his connection with German authorities, including representatives of the Reichskriegsministerium, the Reichswirtschaftsministerium as well as the local German Consul.

Some of Mr. Craufurd's enquiries had indicated that other firms connected with the machine tool industry offered similar opportunities to the enemy as they contained strong German elements. It was also apparent that an even more doubtful situation existed in the case of German interests in the U.S.A. in connection with the armament industry and firms which were supplying the British Services with munitions of war.

/When

When Captain Liddell, Wing Commander Archer and Mr. Curry saw Lt. General Sir Maurice Taylor and Sir Harold Brown at the Ministry of Supply on this subject early in June, the latter adopted the attitude that the needs of production came before everything else and that if the Security Service could not arrange for the internment of Germans and ex-Germans in the industry whom they suspected, the Ministry of Supply would feel free to do business with them. On the 6th June 1940 Mr. Curry thereupon drew up instructions for B.I.C. to examine the whole position and to aim at -

- (a) getting the matter into proper perspective so that it might be dealt with on a high level;
- (b) giving a concise and fairly comprehensive picture to the Americans so that they could put Mr. Hoover and the F.B.I. on to it.

An important question was whether the elimination of all the Germans and ex-Germans in the machine tool industry in this country would have the effect of seriously impeding our war effort, and it was argued that it was not a question of production versus security, but of production versus production, because of the risk that the German penetration of the industry might facilitate sabotage and aerial bombing.

The whole question was vigorously taken up and examined by Lord Rothschild and Mr. Hill in the course of a long drawn-out and detailed enquiry. In the first place the distinction has to be drawn between "general purpose" and "special purpose" tools, the former being of no interest from the security point of view. A "special purpose" tool is one constructed to do a particular job, e.g. to make a small component of a plane or a gun. These special purpose tools were very numerous and varied and it was possible by collating the information about a number of them to obtain very varied and comprehensive details about processes, quantities, plans and programmes in regard to an immense variety of instruments and weapons of war. The enquiries showed that members of the office staff of a machine tool firm, service engineers and demonstrators, representatives in contact with customers or with ministries and draughtsmen, provided they possessed technical qualifications, all fell into the category of potentially dangerous persons from the point of view of intelligence and espionage.

Prior to the outbreak of war a very high percentage of the machines needed for the progressive rearmament of that time had to be imported - very few of these from America and reputedly ninety percent from Germany. The German machine tool industry was then being subsidised by its government with the effect that their prices bore no relation to costs, while this in turn prevented the development of the British machine tool industry by undercutting, prevented American competition and gave Germany a stranglehold through which she had access to information of the greatest importance. (The fact that an important, perhaps the chief, German motive was to obtain foreign exchange is not to be overlooked).

/After

After KUCHENMEISTER had been safely interned the question remained whether the Germans had any other similar channel for obtaining this type of information. The question presented difficulty and uncertainty in this country and even more so in the U.S.A. and Canada, both of which were playing an important part in supplying instruments of war. The outbreak of war had cut off the chief source of supply to the United Kingdom, i.e. that from Germany, and the production capacity of American manufacturers thereupon increased enormously. It was, therefore, not improbable that the German authorities would arrange to obtain intelligence about this country through the trade in the U.S.A. On the 4th July 1940 we sent a memorandum to the Americans embodying our conclusions on the subject. That these apprehensions were not groundless was shown by a letter written by a German representative of "Eildienst" in New York to a colleague in Lisbon, which gave information partly based on American trade journals but apparently supplemented by details about the machine tool industry, which could only have been obtained through inside contacts in the trade. "Eildienst" was directly connected with the Reichswirtschaftsministerium, but there was nothing to indicate any connection with the Abwehr or the Wehrwirtschaftsstab. Their representatives in Lisbon were, however, believed to be connected with the Abwehr, although this was not clearly established.

In the period between the summer of 1940 and the passing of the Lease Lend Act the following steps were taken by Mr. Hill's sub-section of B.I.C., in conjunction with the Controller of Machine Tools at the Ministry of Supply and with Censorship, to prevent information useful to the enemy reaching the U.S.A.:-

(i) A close scrutiny of letters and cables showed that the orders given by machine tool importers to their American manufacturers could furnish a fairly detailed and accurate picture of the manufacturing programme of this country as well as the chief centres of production. Action was, therefore, taken to prohibit orders from being placed direct by British importers and to provide that they should be placed through the British Purchasing Commission in New York and by an order of 21.12.40. British importers were prevented from disclosing the names and addresses of their customers in the United Kingdom, subject to sufficient detail being given to avoid unnecessary shipping diversions.

(ii) At the time of the severe bombing raids in the autumn and winter of 1940 the Machine Tool Control realised that arrangements made on the original basis for the repair of machine tools damaged by enemy action might involve a risk of the leakage of information of great interest to Germany and special censorship arrangements were made accordingly.

(iii) Arrangements were made to censor the correspondence of aliens in America who were acting as buying representatives of firms in this

/country

country. Several of these aliens were Germans and, while they were believed to be refugees, could not always be accepted as above suspicion.

(iv) The technical terms used in cables in connection with machine tools were tested in case they might contain plain language codes, but with negative results.

(v) Eight machine tool companies, in addition to that of KUCHENMEISTER, were placed under the control, under Defence Regulation 54(C), of the Machine Tool Companies' Direction Board and steps were taken to exclude undesirable aliens from the industry. An examination was made into the circumstances of most of the more important companies in this country with negative results.

After the passing of the Lease Lend Act machine tools were obtained through the British Purchasing Commission in New York. An enquiry made by S.I.S. in the U.S.A. showed that the industry in that country had suffered considerable German infiltration, which suggested that this was a possible source of some of the information obtained, as mentioned above, by "Eildienst". During the period between the passing of the Lease Lend Act and the entry of the U.S.A. into the war, it was noticed that machine tool firms in Switzerland were making enquiries for catalogues and descriptive matter from American manufacturers, much of which would be of value to the enemy. Enquiry by the Ministry of Economic Warfare showed that there was no legitimate trade in machine tools between the U.S.A. and Switzerland and very little trade of any kind. Arrangements were, therefore, made for all such letters to be stopped. According to information from British sources German infiltration into the Swiss industry had been effected to a large extent and German agents had been placed in firms whose principals were known to be pro-British.

As soon as America became a belligerent, the more rigid censorship which was enforced greatly diminished the risk of a leakage of information from these sources. Special arrangements were also made for the vetting of American machine tool experts who were then visiting this country on war work.

The result of these elaborate and varied enquiries into the whole of this large subject was to lead to the development of all possible measures to prevent leakage on the lines described above, and the general conclusion suggested by the results was that what had been an open book to the Germans before the war was, to a great extent, closed to them by the internment of KUCHENMEISTER and by the subsequent preventive measures, these measures being more effective after the American entry into the war. While no direct and positive evidence of espionage through these channels was obtained, the necessity for all preventive measures, which could be adopted without an adverse influence on other important interests, especially that of production, was self-evident; and so far as humanly possible that was achieved.

/Numerous

Numerous other enquiries of a miscellaneous nature were made by B.I.C., or by Mr. Hill acting in conjunction with B.I.C. and B.4.B., in a wide variety of cases, into some of which technical or scientific questions entered, while others were purely cases of firms, occupations or trades which appeared to offer facilities to the enemy for obtaining information. Many of them led to preventive measures after the pattern of the machine tool enquiry, but all were on a smaller scale.

Similar matters dealt with by Lord Rothschild included enquiries into circumstances connected with the security of important secrets such as Radar, and scientific investigations generally.

2. Neutral Territories' Sections.

Middle East (part of B.I.B.). Prior to the re-organisation of 1941 the Middle East had been primarily of interest to B Division in connection with Communist intrigues and it followed that Mr. Kellar, the officer dealing with this area, was in B.4.B., one of the Communist sections; and after the re-organisation he remained attached to the same section, which became F.2.B. Both the Director of B Division, Captain Kiddell, and the Deputy Director of F Division, Mr. Curry, felt that this position was anomalous as our main Middle East interest arose out of the fact that it was an important centre of military operations and that in connection with those operations the Abwehr was concentrating its attention on the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East generally. In the first instance the Director General decided that the specialised section should be transferred from F to E Division where, still under Mr. Kellar, it became a sub-section of E.2.B. Later in the light of further experience he gave instructions that it should be moved to B Division. The reasons for this change were that important information regarding Axis intelligence and Axis intrigues in the Middle East continued to reach B Division and information in the same connection was coming in through the interception of their wireless, but as this was treated as "Most Secret Material" which E Division was not allowed to see, the section was seriously handicapped in its attempt at specialising in current intelligence about Middle Eastern affairs; and B Division continued to be handicapped in dealing with matters in this area and in its relations with the counter espionage and security organisations there by the lack of a section forming part of its own organisation to deal with its most important counter espionage material.

In the meanwhile the counter espionage and security organisations in the Middle East had naturally developed from the small pre-war organisation under which a Defence Security officer as the representative of the Security Service in Cairo sought to fulfil all the functions of the Security Service in Egypt; and maintained relations with the parent body in London and with the British Embassy in Cairo as well

/as with

as with the various military, naval and air authorities. While the Security organisations in the Middle East had expanded enormously they had to a great extent lost touch with developments in London and during 1940 and 1941 had received little benefit from London's developing experience and knowledge of the Abwehr and its ramifications. There had been no direct personal contact. The general confusion in the Security Service in London during the early stages of the war in part accounts for the failure to provide for close co-operation with Security Intelligence Middle East (S.I.M.E.) which had developed out of the position of D.S.O. when Brigadier Maunsell, the former D.S.O., had taken over the position of head of S.I.M.E. as a section of the Middle East Intelligence (M.E.I.C.) in the summer of 1939. Another reason for the failure to keep the security organisations in the Middle East and other important centres abreast of our increasing knowledge is to be found in the fact that no part of the organisation in B Division had been made specifically responsible for doing so.

It is not possible to describe here the numerous permutations which took place in the course of the development of S.I.M.E. and the other security organisation known as Combined Intelligence Centre Iraq and Persia (C.I.C.I.). The latter was organisationally a separate body and the definition of the relations between them has always presented difficulty. Their separate existence arose from the fact that during the greater part of the war there have been two commands in the Middle East: Middle East (M.E.F.) in Cairo and Persia and Iraq (P.A.I.C.) with headquarters at Baghdad. C.I.C.I. directed and controlled all the counter espionage and security work in the Persian and Iraq command.

The position inside the Security Service was further complicated by the fact that a section known as Overseas Control in A Division has exercised its normal functions in regard to all overseas security organisations with somewhat loosely defined responsibility mainly concerned with the functions of A Division and D Division, i.e. the organisational and preventive sides of the work.

Various attempts to arrange for Brigadier Maunsell to visit London with a view to associating S.I.M.E. more closely with the counter espionage work of B Division having failed, owing to the constant need for his presence in the Middle East in connection with developments in the military situation, Lt. Colonel Robertson of B.I.A. visited Cairo during March and April 1942. On his return he made a number of recommendations which closely agreed with similar recommendations made nearly a year later by Brigadier White after a visit to Cairo in the beginning of 1943. The difficulties in adopting the recommendations as put forward in 1942 arose largely from the complicated position of S.I.M.E. as part of the military staff of the command in the Middle East and its relations with naval security officers and with the Egyptian authorities, including the Egyptian police. Brigadier White, in his report, pointed out that its work was considerably

/hampered

hampered by dependence upon military procedure and, in particular, by War Office establishment committees which prevented developments involving an increase of staff even though that increase appeared essential if certain badly needed improvements were to be made in the scope and quality of their work. For this reason Brigadier White recommended that S.I.M.E. should be amalgamated with the Security Service. The Director General, however, decided that in view of the difficulties the decision should be postponed until after the conclusion of hostilities. The difficulties which he foresaw arose out of the assumption of responsibilities outside the three mile limit and outside British territory which would involve adjustment with higher military authorities and with S.I.S.; and out of the fact that amalgamation would involve a substantial addition to the budget of the Security Service.

In spite of these difficulties Brigadier White's visit resulted in substantial improvement as a result of the development, inside the S.I.M.E. organisation, of machinery based on the experience of B Division in this country. Provision for this machinery was partly made by lending officers from B Division and secretarial and registry staff to work in S.I.M.E. In particular arrangements were made to set up a centre on the lines of the L.R.C. to deal with arrivals from enemy occupied territory by deputing Major Haylor, the head of the L.R.C., to Cairo to help in establishing what was known as the Travellers Examination Centre in Aleppo and at other points. Major Stephenson was appointed as a full-time officer to deal with the analysis, checking and use of the ISOS material, the importance of which had already been stressed by Lt. Colonel Robertson. An important reason for this appointment arose from the fact that Section V had been communicating the contents of the ISOS material to S.I.M.E. through their representative in the Middle East in a form in which it was so disguised that it could not be adequately understood. The circumstances were even considered by B Division officers to constitute a danger of misdirection as well as of causing S.I.M.E. to be badly informed about this important source of intelligence directly bearing on their responsibilities. Brigadier White also recommended that an establishment on the lines of Camp 020 should be set up and that all these developments should be centrally co-ordinated by a new group at S.I.M.E. headquarters to be known as B Division as its work was to follow the lines which experience had led B Division to develop in London.

As a result of these recommendations which were adopted S.I.M.E. and later C.I.C.I. were more closely associated with B Division to whom they henceforth looked for expert guidance and assistance.

At the same time, i.e. in March 1943, Mr. Kellar's section was transferred from E Division to B Division and, as part of B.I.B. with access to all the most secret sources of information, his section became qualified to perform the necessary functions of a "country" or "area" section dealing with all aspects of B Division work.

/Subsequently

Subsequently visits to Cairo were paid by Lord Rothschild (to instruct S.I.M.E. and C.I.C.I. in counter sabotage technique and recent developments), by Major Cayzer (to inspect and advise on port control), by Mr. Clayton (to report on Middle East controls and security measures) and by Mr. Kellar (three visits during the war to deal with B Division interests).

Mr. Kellar's sub-section of B.I.B., being now established on a suitable functional basis, proceeded to develop rapidly in several directions. It established liaison with various government departments, especially the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office; with Section V and Section IX of S.I.S.; arranged for liaison visits to this country by the officers on the staff of S.I.M.E. and C.I.C.I.; and dealt with the numerous internal security problems of the Middle East countries, especially Palestine and the problem created by Jewish-Arab relations. In regard to these internal problems the section did more than establish liaison with the Foreign and Colonial Offices. It came to be recognised not only as the channel for obtaining information from reliable sources but also of being capable of rendering assistance in formulating an appreciation of its significance.

An important consequence of Lt. Colonel Robertson's visit had been the development of arrangements for double-agent and deception work on the lines practised by B.I.A. in London. The scope and the extent of the major double-agent work in the Middle East has been governed largely by the operational situation in the Mediterranean theatre of war. This most important task, which has involved co-operation between Section V, Mr. Kellar's section and S.I.M.E., has meant developing and maintaining a number of channels for the purpose of deceiving the enemy in conformity with the plans of "A" Force which was responsible for operational planning to deceive the enemy by a variety of measures, including the notional movement of armoured divisions in the desert war. A number of secondary double-agent channels were also developed with the object of penetrating enemy intelligence organisations operating against the Middle East, including Iraq and Persia from Turkey.

The foundation for the work in Turkey had been laid in January 1941 when S.I.M.E. posted an officer to Istanbul for liaison with the Turkish Secret Service, who received instructions to co-operate from the President of Turkey himself. Other representatives of S.I.M.E. were posted to Izmir, Adana and Iskenderum and similar co-operation was developed in Syria and with the French Intelligence Service in the Middle East. In December 1941 S.I.M.E. posted a representative as Defence Security Officer, Syria, who, by confining himself strictly to counter espionage against the enemy, was able to do much to allay French suspicions and to establish friendlier relations with the local Sureté. Since 1942 the Defence Security Officer, Aden, has come directly under S.I.M.E. control as did the D.S.O. Palestine and Transjordan. The geographical area of S.I.M.E.'s territorial expansion

/was completed

was completed by the appointment of D.S.O.s in Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Eritrea. As these territories were taken over from the enemy, Defence Security Officers, who had been trained in advance, took over as soon as active operations gave way to more settled conditions.

Information coming in from all the sources thus established was canalised through Mr. Kellar's section as an "area" section of B Division specialising in all intelligence relating to this important group of Allied and neutral territories.

At the time of writing this report no final summary of the work of the Abwehr and of the Sipo und SD has been prepared. The cases of a number of espionage and sabotage agents in this area have been described in the section dealing with the Abwehr in the Balkans, the Middle East and North Africa, and the SD in Turkey and the Middle East in Part 3.A and Part 3.B of the report on these organisations prepared in this office in 1944 (vide Bibliography No. 34). Briefly this information shows how the elaborate German network in Italy, North Africa, the Balkans and South Russia was responsible for despatching and controlling a number of agents and enterprises intended to penetrate our organisations in the Middle East or to commit sabotage. These enterprises included the Sondervverband Felmy which was intended to function as a large-scale independent fighting group capable of operating ahead of the main German armies and in collaboration with dissident minorities in the Middle East. Other important enterprises included the Franz MAYER mission which was established in Persia with a view to developing a fifth column in that country; and the Mammut expedition, a party of three Germans and an Iraqi who were dropped by parachute near Mosul in June 1943 with the object of inciting the Kurdish tribes to active rebellion as well as engaging in espionage and preparing for a second expedition, Mammut II, which was intended to engage in sabotage on a considerable scale. These and numerous individual agents were dealt with by S.I.M.E. and C.I.C.I.

Spain, Portugal and South America (B.I.G.).
The section dealing with Spain, Portugal and South America known as B.I.G. first came into existence as a separate section when the Low Countries were overrun in 1940 and it became apparent that enemy intelligence operations against this country were canalised through the Iberian Peninsula to an important extent. The information available in the office on this subject was extremely limited and little had been done before the war apart from a number of enquiries about Spanish Falangists in this country as part of the general "Right Wing" problem. Some aspects of this had come to notice through contacts between B.U.F. officials and Spanish Falangists, but in 1940 the question became more acute in view of the possibility that Spain and Spanish officials would adopt a more or less hostile attitude even if Spain did not come into the war against us.

/It was

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It was found that S.I.S. was not in a position to render any useful assistance as their knowledge of the Spanish situation and of the organs of the German intelligence which had been established in Spain and Portugal was deficient. One of the first activities of the section was to assist in obtaining particulars of escape routes through Spain and full details of the system of documentation and control in force in the Peninsula with a view to helping to check the stories of individuals escaping from enemy occupied territory and Spanish seamen arriving here. Close attention was also devoted to the Falange organisation and other Spanish institutions in this country. The preparation of lists of Spaniards to be interned in the event of war with Spain which occupied a great deal of time in 1941 and early 1942 was both an end in itself and a means of developing intelligence.

The outstanding development in this section arose from the enquiry into the case of Miguel Piernavieja del Pozo, who proved to be a Spanish Secret Service agent working for the German Abwehr organisation in the Peninsula. He arrived on the 27th September 1940 and brought £3,500 in notes to be handed to a British subject who was acting as a double agent. This individual was a sub-agent of the agent already mentioned. POZO gave this sub-agent, who was posing to the Germans as a Welsh nationalist, a number of questions covering a wide field and extending far beyond Wales. POZO was kept under observation by B.6., the shadowing staff; H.O.W.s and telephone checks were imposed; contact was established with him in the Athenaeum Court where he was living and in the night club world which he frequented; and events proved that this network covered him very thoroughly. In January 1941 one Alcazar de VELASCO arrived in London with the title of Press Attache and he proved to be POZO's superior who was himself working for Serrano Suner, the Spanish Foreign Minister. The latter, as we knew from Japanese B.J.s, had promised to pass on to the Japanese Minister in Madrid reports received from Spanish diplomatic representatives abroad. Eventually it was proved that Alcazar was the source of intelligence reports sent by the Japanese Minister in Madrid to Tokyo and that much of it was invented while some of it was based on the reports of another member of the Spanish Embassy who was in fact a double agent controlled by us. These beginnings led to the development of an elaborate counter-espionage network which was very competently and successfully handled by Lt. Colonel Broome White and the other officers of B.I.G. and afforded good grounds for assurance that the German efforts to obtain intelligence through officials of the Spanish Embassy in London were well covered. Among other consequences of the elaborate Spanish intrigues on behalf of the enemy was the arrest on the 12th February 1942 of a Spanish journalist named Luis CALVO on his arrival at Whitchurch aerodrome from Spain. He was immediately sent to Camp 020, but the delicacy of the sources (the double agent already mentioned, B.J.s, material

and our agents in the Embassy) made interrogation difficult. One outcome of this arrest was an incident at the Spanish Embassy when the Duke of Alba examined the contents of all letters received, and this in turn led to difficulties in communication between the German

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agents among the Spanish officials and Alcazar in Madrid, all the details of which reached B.I.G. through their network of agents.

B.I.G. learnt that the Germans recruited at least five journalists and a press attaché for espionage purposes through Alcazar.

B.I.G. also covered the Portuguese Embassy in London which proved of little interest except for two cases. One of these, de Menezes, came to our knowledge through the intercepted Abwehr wireless messages. He was eventually arrested and confessed, was tried under the Treachery Act and sentenced to death, but the sentence was commuted at the request of the Portuguese Government. At the same time Sir Alexander Cadogan presented to the Portuguese Ambassador a detailed account of the German espionage network operating against this country from Portugal. Faced with the scandal of a German agent employed in their own Embassy the Portuguese Government took action and arrested seventeen German agents, a result out of all proportion to the intrinsic importance of the case of Menezes, whose mission in this country was of a very low grade.

The other case, that of Ernesto Simoes, is an interesting example of the methods developed by the Security Service in the identification and apprehension of enemy agents. The first information about him was also received from the German wireless and he was deliberately allowed to pass through the controls as a test case without informing the S.C.O.s or the L.R.C. examiners. He was employed at an aircraft factory and kept under close observation by putting agents in touch with him. This proved instructive as it illustrated the fact that the routine machinery of the controls could not be a complete safeguard if not aided by inside information and could not be relied upon to disclose the presence of an enemy agent. It also showed, as the result of experiment, the limitations of our own agents when placed in touch with an enemy spy. Simoes was eventually arrested and examined at Camp 020 and supplied information about the German organisation which employed him.

The circumstances of the summer of 1940 had brought to notice the fact that among the staffs of the South American Embassies and Legations in London there were a certain number of individuals who were either Fascist-minded or were inclined to count on a German victory, but it was not until March 1941 that systematic work in enquiring into South Americans in this country was undertaken by B.I.G. as the section responsible for this area. One of the first results was to show that, while the number of South Americans living or carrying on business here was very small, most of these countries were furnished with lavish diplomatic and consular representation. The diplomatic and consular representatives accordingly provided the main interest for B.I.G. in South American affairs. It may be mentioned incidentally that the Foreign Office records of South American Consuls were found to be several years out of date and it was some time before the confusion was cleared up in correspondence with R.S.L.O.s.

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Enquiries were mainly concerned with individuals suspected of sympathies with the enemy and enemy nationals or suspects in different parts of the world. Other enquiries led to the discovery of irregular transactions in connection with Bank of England notes which received attention on account of the possibility of their being connected with payments to enemy agents. It was proved, however, that this was not the case. Members of the Chilean and Argentine Embassies who were chiefly involved were engaged in smuggling and black bourse transactions.

The strong position of the German industrial connections in many South American countries was one of the principal causes for our interest in that part of the world and, as has been shown in the reports on the Nazi Party in South America (1941) and on the Abwehr organisation (1942 and 1944) (vide Bibliography Nos. 33 and 34), branches of the Abwehr organisation were very active in those countries. The circumstances suggested the possibility that German firms in South America constituted a medium for the development of German industrial intelligence after the war and that this in turn might furnish opportunities for maintaining some part of the German Military Intelligence Service in a covert form.

The employment by the M.S. Section (first in B Division and later on the Director General's staff) of servants as agents in embassies is described under the heading "Director General's Staff" below. An important part of this work concerned the Spanish, Portuguese and South American Embassies and the results were achieved by close co-operation between B.I.G. and Mr. Dickson and Mrs. Gladstone of the M.S. Section. Between June 1941 and June 1944 twenty-six servants were employed as agents in this manner either in the embassies or in the private houses of diplomatic representatives.

Some of these were employed for a few weeks and some held their positions for a few months.

Ireland (B.I.H. Mr. G. Liddell). The work of the section was dominated by the political relationship between the British and Eire Governments and the geographical position with special reference to the problem of the border between Eire and Northern Ireland. This border was purely administrative and political. There were no physical barriers and as far as freedom of movement was concerned Ireland was in fact one country. Important factors in the political situation arose from the Agreement of 1938, which terminated the economic war and brought about the withdrawal of British garrisons from Eire ports and then, in virtue of the improved relations, led to an exchange of information on defence plans between the British Government and that of Mr. de Valera. These in turn led, inter alia, to the establishment of the Security Service contact with Colonel Liam Archer. Perhaps the most important political factor

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was the policy of neutrality qualified by Mr. de Valera's guarantee that his Government would not allow Eire to be used as a base for operations against this country. This guarantee was the only safeguard against a potentially dangerous consequence of the neutrality policy, namely that it might provide the enemy Intelligence Services with a very favourable situation for operating against us on ground which they had had many years to prepare with many facilities for doing so (vide Chapters III and IV above). At the time the guarantee was given it appeared to relate only to military operations, but in practice it was given a wider interpretation which included the possible activities of hostile Intelligence Services. The onus was thus placed on the Eire Government of satisfying the British Government that Eire was not being so used and provided the political justification for the development of the Dublin link (with Colonel Archer) and the putting into force by the Eireann authorities of various security measures which operated in favour of the British. These measures, however, always stopped short of endangering neutrality by the internment of enemy nationals. The Eireann civil and military authorities, hampered as they often were by their political superiors, lack of experience and inadequate means, did try, to the best of their ability, to watch and control the activities of enemy agents and their Eireann sympathisers.

In Northern Ireland the Royal Ulster Constabulary dealt with all enemy aliens without any reference to the Security Service apart from the fact that after 1938 they reported the presence and activities of certain Germans.

At the outbreak of war various controls were gradually established both here and in Eire. It was not until the early summer of 1940 that a trial scrutiny of Irish mail was authorised by the Cabinet Committee on leakage of information, although the Security Service had asked for censorship in September 1939. The Eireann coast-watching service and their service for the interception of illicit wireless, which had been discussed before the war, also did not come into full operation until the summer of 1940, the delay being largely due, as indicated above, to the Irish attitude of self-sufficiency, their desire to act independently and their lack of means, experienced personnel and equipment.

While most of the members of the NSDAP in Dublin, like those in England, left for Germany on the outbreak of war, a small number of Germans from England moved over to Eire a few days before that date. One of these, Werner UNLAND, carried on correspondence in plain language code with an address in Denmark. The Irish section and the Eire Intelligence therefore co-operated in keeping a watch on him until April 1941 when, as a result of his photograph being found in the possession of a German agent named Gunther SCHUTZ who arrived in Eire by parachute, he was interned. Early in 1940 a German, named Ernst Weber DROHL, came to the notice of the Eireann authorities. It transpired

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much later that his mission was to hand over a sum of money to the I.R.A. and he is believed to have accomplished it. At the time the Eireann authorities were suspicious of his story but could not convict him of anything more serious than "an illegal landing". These cases illustrate the general attitude in Irish political and official circles which rendered the task of the Eireann Military Intelligence and our liaison with Colonel Archer more difficult.

Two events led to a great change in this attitude. The invasion of the Low Countries and the fall of France induced a sudden realisation by the people and Government of Eire that their country might be invaded; and in May 1940 a German agent named Hermann GOERTZ arrived by parachute with a mission to the I.R.A., a W/T set and 20,000 American dollars, which later were found in the house of an Irish accomplice, named Stephen Carol HELD. The most important single item of this discovery, made on the 23rd May, was that of the papers connected with GOERTZ's mission, which involved plans for a joint German-I.R.A. attack on Northern Ireland and arrangements for establishing secret wireless transmitters. HELD was tried and sentenced to five years' penal servitude, but GOERTZ remained in hiding until November 1941.

On the 15th May 1940 Captain Liddell and Mr. Liddell of the Irish section had a meeting with Colonel Archer, the original purpose being to effect an improvement in the arrangements for the interception of illicit wireless in Eire. Colonel Archer, however, at once stressed the danger of a German airborne landing in Eire to which, he said, very little resistance could be offered. He guaranteed that the "Fifth Column" in Eire would be dealt with, but could give no assurance that all enemy aliens would be interned. He urged that contracts for arms and equipment for Eire placed in this country should be fulfilled and the possibility of Staff talks was discussed. The Security Service officers returned to London and gave an account of this meeting to Lord Hankey, Lord President of the Council. At a further meeting the next day with the Secretary of State for the Dominions, Sir John Maffey, who was present, stated that Mr. de Valera had expressed the same views as had Colonel Archer and that he had brought with him a list of Eire's unfulfilled contracts.

All these circumstances showed the menace to the safety of this country of an Eire incapable of defending her own neutrality and obstinately refusing - until a German invasion should actually take place - to afford to the British forces the facilities necessary to ensure her defences. On the other hand they also showed the value of the good personal relations which had been established between Captain Liddell and Colonel Archer. At the most critical moment these relations provided a friendly and unofficial channel for co-operation between the two countries and were largely responsible for the subsequent despatch of a British Military Mission to Dublin, through which the G.O.C. British Troops in Northern Ireland was able to

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concert with the Eire Military Command joint plans for defence in the event of a German invasion.

The arrival of five other German agents, in addition to GOERTZ, which was mentioned in Chapter IV above, furnished indications of the Abwehr's pre-invasion plans for espionage, sabotage and for co-operation with the I.R.A. In the summer of 1939 the Eire Government had declared the I.R.A. to be "an unlawful organisation" and at that time and again later in June 1940 had introduced legislation to enable action to be taken against it. The Emergency Powers (Amendment) Act of June 1940 was due to the fear of "Fifth Column" activities and to the discovery of the GOERTZ and HELD (German-I.R.A.) conspiracy. Arrests and internments of I.R.A. leaders and members followed and led to a close and valuable understanding between the Eireann Civic Guard and the Royal Ulster Constabulary, which continued throughout the war and led to the breaking up of the I.R.A. organisation; and thus played an important part in removing the menace of German-I.R.A. collaboration.

During the late summer and autumn of 1940 indications were obtained through Censorship, particularly that of prisoners-of-war mail, that the Germans were attempting to form from prisoners of war an Irish Brigade which, as far as could be learnt, was to accompany the German forces invading Eire and to co-operate with the I.R.A. Collaboration was arranged with S.I.S., M.I.9. and the Censorship; and it was decided that as the information related to possible operations in Ireland its collection and collation was an S.I.S. responsibility in which, however, the Irish section was interested and was able to assist. It proved possible to piece together a fairly complete picture of the extent and development of the German plan.

In March 1941 Captain Liddell arranged for the appointment of an additional officer (Captain Caroe) of the Irish section to act as liaison between the Security Service and the G.O.C., B.T.N.I. in connection with the previously mentioned arrangements for the British Military Mission in Dublin and the Staff talks between the Eireann and British Commands. It was also arranged that he should represent S.I.S. at H.Q., B.T.N.I.

In July 1941 an Eire Luft agent, that is an agent employed to obtain intelligence for the German Air Force, was dropped by parachute in Eire with a mission to make weather reports by wireless and to report on troops and shipping in Northern Ireland. He was an Irish agricultural labourer named Joseph LENIHAN who had escaped from the Channel Islands and after being captured by the Germans had agreed to work as an agent (as an ultimate means of escape). The aircraft which brought him was not detected either over Eire or Northern Ireland and as an Irishman with a simple story of having been at sea,

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he aroused no suspicion. After a short time he gave himself up. His case indicated the nature of the existing dangers and led the Irish section to arrange for a special watch by Censorship on the correspondence of all Irishmen on the Continent and in the Channel Islands. Detailed information thus obtained was passed to and circulated by the Eire Intelligence. As a result information was obtained about three Irishmen who were trained by the Germans as agents. This information could not have been obtained in any other way and the cases illustrated the advantages to be gained by the intelligent application of Censorship controls.

In December 1940 the J.I.C. had drawn attention to the dangers of a leakage through the German Legation in Dublin and a special watch was put on to D/F all the out-stations on the wireless network of the German Foreign Office. In May 1941 Mr. Liddell met Colonel Archer in Dublin and discussed the question of wireless transmissions from the German Legation in view of the technical and other difficulties which prevented a satisfactory solution of the problem of picking up and monitoring them. Mr. Liddell has suggested that there was a failure to visualise the problem as a whole. If so responsibility for it must be shared by everyone concerned, i.e. all those concerned with intelligence and the monitoring of enemy wireless transmissions. It was not until the beginning of 1942, when R.S.S. took over the problem from the Y Unit concerned that a satisfactory solution of the monitoring side of the problem was reached.

(An incidental result of great importance arose from the above-mentioned meeting of May 1941 when Colonel Archer expressed his anxiety about the proposal to apply conscription to Northern Ireland. Captain Liddell brought the facts to the notice of Sir John Anderson, Lord President of the Council, who discussed the matter at a meeting of the Cabinet, after which the proposal for conscription was dropped. Thus at a moment of great political tension the personal link between Captain Liddell and Colonel Archer again provided a friendly and unofficial channel for the transmission of information on a political matter which went far beyond the normal scope of an intelligence liaison).

The problem of the German Legation wireless was a constant source of anxiety and attempts to cope with it were proceeded with during 1941 and 1942. In February 1942 the German battle-ships "Gneisenau" and "Scharnhorst" and the cruiser "Prinz Eugen" escaped up the Channel. Advance weather information was vital to this enterprise and it was said in the Press and elsewhere that this had been transmitted by W/T from the German Legation in Dublin. It is probable that the German admiral acted on information given by aircraft but, as a result of the incident, the Eire Government warned the German Minister that it was known that messages had been sent by W/T from the Legation and that further transmissions would lead to the set being confiscated and might result in the breaking off of

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diplomatic relations. After this no message was sent by the Legation W/T until the set was finally handed over on Christmas Eve 1943 at the request of the Eire Government. The German Foreign Office continued throughout the war to communicate with the Minister by wireless and, although he was most urgently requested to reply by wireless, he never did so. There was, however, always the danger that the German Minister would risk the consequences for the sake of passing on vital operational information in a crisis. The fact that the transmission had been made would be known to us, but it could neither be read nor stopped. This question assumed importance at the time of the Allied landing in Morocco in November 1942 and gave rise to the most anxious consideration of all the relevant problems created by the presence of German, Italian and Japanese diplomatic representatives in Eire, including the question of the effect of stopping and dealing with communications by cable from Eire. In point of fact the German Legation had obtained information about the movements of shipping from Belfast shortly before the landing in North Africa and the information was accurate as far as it went. It related to the Allied operations, but it had been obtained third hand and was not very clear. It was sent to Germany by cable and the German Foreign Office repeatedly asked for further particulars. The Minister, however, was apparently unable to supplement or amplify his original information.

From the beginning of 1943 onwards the contents of the German Foreign Office wireless messages to their Legation in Dublin became known to us and it was clear that so long as the W/T set remained in Dublin, it represented a grave threat to the security of future operations based on this country. The question was the subject of frequent consultation between the Irish section, Captain Liddell, S.I.S., the Foreign Office, the Dominions Office and Sir John Maffey. Early in May 1943 a note on the subject was handed by the Dominions Secretary to the Prime Minister, who directed that the situation should be kept under continuous review, but that a request should not be made to the Irish for the removal of the W/T set at that time. In October 1943, when the Security Executive was given the task of examining the whole security position in the light of "Overlord" - the plans for the invasion of the Continent - the Irish section put forward their view that steps should be taken to obtain its removal apart from any request for the expulsion of the Legation itself. Sir John Maffey thought it probable that the Irish would agree to the suggestion, but that it must be made with the full intention of carrying it through. A refusal by the Irish or by the German Minister might raise the question of Eire's neutrality which it had been British policy not to raise as a direct issue. In November 1943 Mr. Liddell visited Colonel Bryan who had succeeded Colonel Liam Archer in Dublin. During his visit he was invited to stay the night with Lt. General McKenna, the Eire Chief-of-Staff, who, during a long talk, elicited the fact that the W/T set in the German Legation was a source of grave anxiety, because it could give vital information about the generally expected

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landing on the Continent. General McKenna, who had established the most friendly relations with General Franklyn, G.O.C., B.T.N.I., also valued the good relations which had been established through Captain Liddell and Colonel Archer. Mr. Liddell considered that, though strictly loyal to the interests and policies of his political chiefs, General McKenna was sympathetic to the Allied cause. The General realised that if vital information reached the Germans through the Legation W/T set, it might mean the loss of thousands of lives and that if there should ever be a suspicion that a leakage of information had occurred in this way, the relations between Eire and Britain would, as he said, be put back a hundred years. From information subsequently obtained from the German Foreign Office communications it appeared that shortly after this interview General McKenna must have suggested to Mr. de Valera that he should take action by demanding that all foreign representatives in Dublin should surrender their wireless transmitting sets and thus prevent the undesirable consequences which, he had learnt, the British authorities were anxious to forestall. In any case Mr. de Valera informed the German Minister that he contemplated making this demand. The whole question was again considered at a meeting at the Dominions Office on the 15th December 1943 when it was learnt that the situation had been complicated by the intervention of the American Minister in Dublin.

While the matter was under discussion in all the interested quarters, two German parachute agents were dropped in Eire on the 19th December and on the 21st Mr. Walshe, Secretary of External Affairs - again the fact was learnt from the German communications - sent for the German Minister, informed him that the British and Americans had learnt of the agents' arrival and that the British representative had seen Mr. de Valera and demanded that the German Legation W/T set should be removed. The two parachutists were Eireann nationals, John Francis O'REILLY and John KENNY, who had been trained by the Sicherheitsdienst of the RSHA. The German Minister complained bitterly to the German Foreign Office about this and begged that no further agents should be sent. The capture of the agents was materially assisted by the Eire Air Observer Corps and by an interesting arrangement, by which the British authorities, without being informed, were put in a position to learn the facts (it was tacitly accepted that they would read the Eire Air Observer Corps wireless); and this arrangement provided a convenient means for Mr. de Valera to implement his promise that he would not allow Eire to be used as a base for operations against the British and, at the same time, enabled him to deny that he was infringing Eireann neutrality by passing information to them.

The removal of the German Legation W/T set was of outstanding importance because it was the most dangerous channel of leakage and the circumstances in which it came about showed the very great value of the Security Service contact with the Eire authorities.

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There were other directions in which the Irish section took steps to improve security. Throughout the war large numbers of Irish labourers were employed in the United Kingdom in a variety of works connected with the war effort such as at aerodromes and war factories and sometimes in connection with projects of great secrecy. Among the latter were the component parts of "Mulberry" - the now well-known cover name for the artificial harbours intended for use on D Day - on which thousands of Irish workers were employed over a long period. Similarly large numbers of Eireann workers were employed in the dockyards of Londonderry and Belfast on the building and repair of men-of-war. Large numbers of these workers returned frequently and sometimes even daily to their homes in Eire. While it is known that leakages did occur in consequence of this situation, it is also known that for the most part the information obtained by the enemy was of little value and was more often than not incorrect. The situation obviously offered great opportunities to the enemy Intelligence Service had it been efficiently organised in Eire. If they had not found it worth while to collate the mass of casual information available through Irish workers, they could have made use of the opportunity to infiltrate trained agents.

Again Irish merchant ships trading with the Continent provided a potential source of leakage of information and one which it was extremely difficult to control. In March 1941 it was learnt that Irish merchant ships were trading direct to the Iberian Peninsula and Colonel Archer's attention was drawn to the security risk involved especially in view of the fact that Spain and Portugal were important centres of the German espionage organisation, and although he did not reply it was learnt that Irish controls of these ships had been tightened. Information from ISOS showed that in July 1941 the Abwehr were interested in this question and in the possibility of getting a passenger on board one of the ships and steps were taken accordingly. Another potential channel of leakage through Eire arose early in 1941 from the use of Foynes as a port of call for sea and land aircraft then operating between England and Lisbon. As far as possible security measures were taken by arranging for security controls of passengers and mail, and in spite of various complications arrangements for censorship were eventually worked out as well as arrangements for a British visa from the Passport Control Officer in Dublin who was thus able to refer applications to the Irish section of the Security Service. Arrangements were also made for a Security Control Officer to be appointed at Foynes under the immediate direction of the Passport Control Officer at Dublin.

In February 1943 ISOS showed that the Abwehr in Lisbon had received a cypher message by the hand of a member of the crew of one of the Irish ships. Enquiries showed that the sender was an Irishman who had been associated with the German agent GOERTZ and wished to profit by his knowledge of the cypher to work for the Germans. S.I.S. succeeded in recruiting

/the Portuguese

the Portuguese intermediary in Lisbon, but this was discovered by the Germans. The whole episode therefore came to nothing, but it illustrated the difficulties of controlling communications between Eire and Lisbon. It also furnished yet another instance of the co-operation of the Irish when Mr. Liddell went to Dublin with an officer of G.C. & C.S. Not only did the Irish render effective and indispensable assistance in reading the cypher, but they voluntarily agreed to allow the messages to run on to enable the British to read them without knowing what they might reveal or what Irish nationals might be compromised. As it turned out the messages did, in fact, indicate that the G.O.C. of the Second Division of the Eire Army, who was well-known to be anti-British and pro-German, had been in touch with GOERTZ before his arrest. It need hardly be said that no allusion was ever made to this by either side. There is no doubt that this co-operation was partly due to Colonel Bryan's enthusiasm as an Intelligence officer and to the Irish cryptographer's zeal; and little doubt that it would not have been countenanced by their political superiors.

The preparations for the landing on the Continent, i.e. the planning of the "Overlord" operation, naturally led to an intensification of all security measures. On the 2nd February 1944 the Prime Minister asked for the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff on the dangers of leakage of information about "Overlord" through the German and Japanese representatives in Dublin, and stated that in his view a demand should be made by the United States and the British separately that "the German and enemy Embassies should be sent away forthwith". He added that "we ought not to be behind when the United States themselves were pressing in a matter of this kind against the hostile gang in Dublin". It is believed that this minute by the Prime Minister was due to a letter from the American Minister in Dublin to his Government, asking for permission to request the Eire Government to expel the German Legation, having been forwarded by Washington for consideration in London.

The J.I.C. submitted a report on the dangers of leakage through the Axis Legations in Eire and on the pros and cons for expulsion. This was entirely based on a note prepared by Captain Liddell setting out these pros and cons, but clearly indicating that in the view of the Security Service there would be very little, if any, security advantage in the removal of the German Legation whose communications we then controlled. If it were removed it might be replaced at the most critical period by enemy agents with means of communication which it would take time to discover, all the more so as our relations with Eire would be so strained that it was at least doubtful whether we should continue to enjoy the assistance we had hitherto received in matters of this kind. It was eventually decided that an American Note should be presented to the Eire Government and that Sir John Maffey was to inform Mr. de Valera verbally that the British Government had been consulted and concurred. The American Note was presented on the 21st February, and on the 7th March the Eire Minister in Washington replied that it was impossible for the Irish Government to comply with this request.

The presentation of the American Note was regarded with great misgivings by the Security Service, who feared that at a most critical period the intelligence co-operation with the Irish might be seriously prejudiced. Fortunately this did not occur. It is believed that the Irish realised that the move was inspired by the Americans, although it had British support.

On the 9th February 1944 the War Cabinet called for a report on the measures to be adopted to prevent any information about the preparations for "Overlord" passing out of the British Isles. As far as the interests of the Irish section were concerned, this involved measures for the more stringent surveillance of ships and aircraft leaving Great Britain and Ireland and the complete prevention of all Irish contacts with neutral countries. The necessary preparations for the suspension of travel between Great Britain and Ireland were also made. The suspension of travel came into effect on the 15th March 1944, but the effectiveness of this measure was largely stultified by the Service Departments at whose request it had been imposed. They continued to send men on leave to Eire, even when they belonged to well-known units of the Eighth Army which had been brought home to take part in the "Overlord" operation. In view of this the Home Office refused to cancel compassionate leave for civilians to Ireland, with the result that large numbers of persons, some of whom were well-informed, were able to avoid the travel ban. An attempt was made by the Irish section to have this situation reviewed by the Home Defence Executive, but with no success owing to the lack of support by the Service Departments.

On the 15th March the Prime Minister called for proposals for action in connection with the answer he had given in Parliament on the previous day about isolating Southern Ireland from the outer world. Sir Findlater Stewart of the Home Defence Executive was asked to prepare a report on the isolation of Eire, and at his request the Security Service prepared a note in which they pointed out their concern lest drastic measures might antagonise the Irish and terminate their co-operation on intelligence matters at the very time when it was most needed. The report was submitted to the Chiefs of Staff on the 18th March and instructions were given to the Dominions Office to implement the recommendations which included arrangements to charter the nine Irish ships plying between Eire and the Iberian Peninsula, the suspension of the Irish civil air service between Speke and Dublin and the suspension of the right of the Eire Government to send official bags and passengers to Lisbon. After meetings with the representatives of the Eire Government it was agreed that further measures should be taken affecting Ireland. These included the suspension of all public telephone services between Great Britain and Ireland.

/Mr. Walshe

Mr. Walshe, Secretary of External Affairs, visited London in connection with these discussions on security measures, and suggested a conference of British, American and Eire security officers for further discussion and to suggest further action where necessary. This meeting took place in Dublin and the discussions covered the whole field, including the supervising of Axis Legations and Axis nationals and persons of pro-Axis sympathies in Eire; German airmen and seamen interned in Eire; neutral legations; watch at the Irish end of Eire/U.K. traffic; Eire censorship; the problem of the leakage of information from Northern Ireland and the intensification of the police watch on the Eire side of the border; the coast-watching service and the Eire Observer Corps; the detection of illicit wireless and the control of authorised Eire Government wireless services.

Close co-operation ensued between the Irish section and the representative of O.S.S. dealing with Irish intelligence. O.S.S. were, not unnaturally, almost entirely dependent on the Security Service for guidance and information about Ireland, and they very readily accepted this position. The British and American officers reported the results of the conference in Dublin to their superiors and to Sir Findlater Stewart of the Home Defence Executive. The result of all these efforts was the most effective and comprehensive series of security measures which could be attained. The details will be found in the section report (vide S.F.50-24-44(36)).

The problems of the Irish section were more self-contained than those of most other parts of the Security Service. They were not only concerned with liaison with the Eire authorities in matters relating to the investigation of the cases of enemy secret agents and therefore of the enemy organisation behind them, but also with enquiries into all kinds of circumstances which gave opportunity to the enemy for obtaining intelligence - through the position of Eire as a neutral country - either in Northern Ireland or in the United Kingdom. It fell to them to suggest, and as far as possible provide for, all the necessary preventive security arrangements. They enjoyed the closest possible collaboration with their opposite number in S.I.S., which enabled both parties to see the problem as a whole. Above all they were in direct contact with the whole machinery of government which was concerned with the questions arising from the fundamentals of the problem, that is to say the geographical position and the neutrality of Eire. This included contact with those responsible for decisions on the highest level of policy. All these factors offered great advantages to officers who were capable of rising to the occasion, of accepting responsibility and of dealing with their problems with imagination tempered by restraint, knowledge and a sense of what was practicable.

3. Liaison Security Sections.

Liaison with Censorship (B.3.A. and B.3.D.). When the Postal and Telegraph Censorship was instituted at the beginning of the war a section in B Division was created to act as a liaison section and to deal with all problems affecting the Security Service in relation to censorship on both the investigation and security sides. This arrangement did not prove satisfactory as the section had no direct contact with the Censorship but worked through M.I.12, and this faulty arrangement was not corrected until April 1941. As already mentioned, during the last war Censorship had proved a fruitful source in the detection of enemy agents by intercepting their communications, but no such case occurred in the second war except the insignificant cases of LAUREYSSSENS, described below, and Werner UNLAND in Eire, mentioned elsewhere, and certain important cases of microphotography after America came into the war which will be dealt with later.

Censorship interceptions gave rise, however, to a considerable number of enquiries regarding persons who were brought under suspicion by this means and a certain number of cases of the use of secret ink, not by enemy agents but by persons who for various reasons wished to avoid censorship in their private correspondence. In the early stages, therefore, while censorship was of little direct help in the investigation of the enemy espionage organisation it was yet another factor in the overburdening of the investigation sections and the Registry as a result of the large number of look-ups and miscellaneous enquiries which it necessitated.

The only case of an enemy agent in the United Kingdom detected as a result of Censorship was that of Josef August LAUREYSSSENS, a Belgian seaman who wrote letters about shipping to a cover address in Lisbon. The secret ink which he used was detected by Censorship and, according to his own account, he had succeeded in writing seventeen letters in secret ink during the two months he was at large in this country before he was captured.

The Censorship in the Caribbean area played an important part in the detection of German espionage by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the U.S.A. during the period 1940-1943. The means of communication were by secret ink and by micro-photography, the latter of which included a number of reports on economic matters and the American war potential obtained from open publications as well as other sources. Censorship was also successful in disclosing a number of spies in South America.

The Anglo-Soviet-Persian Censorship, which was established in the Middle East, offered facilities - advantage of which was taken by the local Defence Security Officer - to obtain information about couriers crossing the Persian frontier. These couriers were employed by the Abwehr in Turkey to maintain contact with the agents whom they employed in Persia

/for

for subversive purposes. The Anglo-Iraqi Censorship also played a part in the uncovering of Iraqi organisations which during 1942/1943 worked for the Germans.

Apart from the individual cases of this kind Censorship played a useful part in complementing the counter espionage work of B Division in that it had a negative value for the purpose of assessing the position as a whole. It also played a positive part by furnishing information about leakages. As in the case of all similar measures its preventive or deterrent effect was obviously of the greatest importance.

Liaison with R.S.S. (B.3.B.). This section, while primarily concerned with liaison with R.S.S., also had other important functions of a security nature. It derived from the section under Captain, later Lt. Colonel Robertson and Lt. Colonel Simpson which, before and soon after the beginning of the war, was concerned with the arrangements for developing the R.S.S. organisation and for maintaining liaison with it as described in Chapters III and IV.

After the decision of the 7th March 1941 by which R.S.S. was placed under the administrative and technical control of S.I.S., B.3.B. was responsible for liaison with R.S.S. in such matters as -

(i) the investigation of reports alleging the existence of illicit wireless transmitters in the United Kingdom whether received from R.S.S. or from other intelligence sources;

(ii) the investigation of cases in which a leakage of information had occurred and the channel of communication with the enemy appeared to be by wireless. These cases frequently arose from statements in B.J.s or the ISOS material and came from various sections of the office as well as from the three Services;

(iii) supplying information to R.S.S. resulting from a study based on information from all available sources of the corresponding German methods of performing the same functions as R.S.S.; and

(iv) furnishing R.S.S. with information obtained by building up a card index of wireless transmitting stations used by S.I.S., S.O.E., B.I.A. and the Allied Governments.

In addition to these the section performed general liaison duties between B Division, especially B.I.A., and R.S.S. as well as between R.S.S. and S.O.E.

The staff of B.3.B. included that of a technical sub-section with wide commitments covering all the directions in which electrical communications affected security work. Experience early in the war brought the realisation that certain cases, which, when dealt with by non-technical personnel, might involve long and expensive investigations, could be

/almost

almost immediately resolved by officers with technical knowledge. Cases of this type comprised the greater part of the section's work in assisting to cope with the vast number of reports of suspected illicit wireless transmission.

In 1940 Lt. Colonel Simpson produced "Notes on the Detection of Illicit Wireless 1940" (vide Bibliography No. 58) with a view to assisting such enquiries. He explained the problems connected with Ionosphere or Reflected Ray communication and ground rays; and suggested that secret agents would be able to avoid bulky or intricate apparatus and that only low-power would be employed. He said that, assuming an efficient receiving station in Germany, it would be possible to select a suitable wave-length, having regard to range and seasonal conditions, which would give a regular, reliable service. If such a station were to be established in a carefully chosen locality in this country it would very likely not be heard at all at our permanent interception and D/F stations. Such a station could be situated in the centre of a densely populated area or alternatively installed in a small car. He set out detailed instructions for procedure in dealing with investigations in these circumstances.

The technical sub-section was started in 1941 by the appointment of one officer to assist in investigation and to act as a technical adviser to the section. The number of these advisers was eventually increased to four and as time went on the work of the sub-section became more varied and equipment and facilities were added until a great variety of technical work could be undertaken. A laboratory and workshop was set up which enabled a higher standard of technical service to be provided. Besides assisting in the investigation of suspect cases of illicit wireless transmission and assisting in the liaison with R.S.S. for the purpose of directing mobile D/F stations, the technical sub-section had the following duties -

- (a) as advisers to other sections on technical matters arising out of their cases;
- (b) as experts in the technical examination and testing of captured enemy equipment and -
- (c) liaison with other government departments and organisations in security matters in which electrical communications were involved.

It also engaged in research on a limited scale in new types of apparatus and maintained a reserve of specialised equipment.

The function of liaison with R.S.S. impinged on questions of policy which transcended the work of B.3.B. and were the direct concern of the Director and Deputy Director of B Division as playing a vital part in the direction of all the work of the

/Division

Division in -

(a) obtaining intelligence about the enemy organisation and its agents and -

(b) developing preventive measures.

B.3.B., as the section formally responsible for liaison with R.S.S. and as one of the instruments for the discharge of B Division functions, was concerned in every aspect of the work of R.S.S. and was thus placed in a functionally difficult position. To understand this it is necessary to examine the manner in which R.S.S. functioned.

Reference has been made in Part 1, (iv), A.1. of this chapter in connection with the sub-section of B.1.B. dealing with the ISOS material, to the committee which, after the beginning of 1943, met under the name of the Radio Security Intelligence Conference under the chairmanship of Mr. White, who has recorded the following remarks about it:-

"The R.S.I.C. was brought into being for the purpose of co-ordinating the somewhat illogical organisation of radio intercept work. Owing to the fact that the Radio Security Section was administered by Section VIII of S.I.S. and that consumers of its product were Section V of S.I.S., B Division of M.I.5. and the Intelligence Section of the R.S.S. itself, the points of view of these three departments were apt to be divergent and it was therefore necessary to agree between them an order of traffic priorities. Besides this it was felt that some formal and regular meetings were required for the purpose of pooling expertise on the subject of the R.S.S. product, and the R.S.I.C. came to be in addition to a "fair-play" committee, a forum for discussion and for planning. For example, at the time of the operation HUSKY, plans were drawn up under the auspices of the R.S.I.C. for traffic priorities in connection with the campaign and movement of equipment etc.

There can be no doubt that the R.S.I.C. proved a very useful safety valve, preventing friction between the technical administrators of the R.S.S. and the several consumer interests. The fact that M.I.5. furnished the Chairman (Mr. White and subsequently Lt. Colonel Robertson) somewhat restored their sense of loss over the fact that the R.S.S., which began the war under M.I.5.'s technical direction, was subsequently handed over to S.I.S. Moreover, the slight rivalry which had developed between the R.I.S. interpretations of the product and those of Section V were able to be ironed out."

From the point of view of B.3.B., which was also that of the Director of B Division, it was maintained that R.S.S. did not take adequate steps to provide security against the establishment of

/illicit

illicit transmitters in this country. Against this point of view R.S.S. maintained that, while they acknowledged the commitment of searching for illicit transmitters in this country, it was virtually impossible to ensure security by elaborating preventive measures in the shape of a watch for all possible transmitters. Their experience proved, however, that more positive results could be obtained by watching the known enemy transmitting stations and picking up any transmitters which answered their calls or communicated with them.

This subject was discussed in a paper prepared by Major Morton Evans of R.S.S. in April 1942 (vide 45a in S.F.50-30-36(I)) in which he explained the organisation of R.S.S. and the technique which enabled it to achieve the great success which made it possible to build up a very full picture of the organisation, firstly of the Abwehr and, secondly, of the Sipo und SD under the RSHA.

In the process of achieving this success R.S.S. had departed from its original charter which was confined to the detection of illicit wireless transmissions within Great Britain. At the time the paper was written R.S.S. had five intercept stations at Barnet, St. Erth, Gilnahirk, Thurso and Hanslope, which provided between them sixty-nine receiving positions. It also had two active overseas units, one at Gibraltar and one in the Middle East. Gibraltar had six receiving positions and the Middle East fifteen, but some of the latter had to be diverted to local requirements involving investigation by mobile units. In addition to the full-time interceptors at these stations there were, in the United Kingdom, one thousand three hundred voluntary interceptors - in place of the fifty or sixty originally contemplated before the war - a large number of them being highly skilled. The voluntary interceptors were grouped in nine regions, each under a regional officer and about one thousand reports were received from them daily.

Seven Direction-Finding (D/F-ing) stations were available and were situated at St. Erth, Cupar, Thurso, Gilnahirk, Bridgewater, Sandridge and Wymondham and there was a mobile unit section with vans fitted with D/F-ing apparatus for locating more exactly suspect transmitters proved to be in this country by the fixed D/F-ing stations.

In the internal working of R.S.S. a most important part was played by the "Discrimination Section" which was responsible for "the allotment of tasks, the feed-back of general information about time-tables to interceptors and for the general direction of interception". In the case of overseas units directives were sent by the Discrimination Section by telegram to Gibraltar and the Middle East and there was also a liaison with the Royal Canadian Signals and with the U.S. Coastguards and the Federal Bureau of Investigation through an R.S.S. representative in Canada.

/Without

Without going into technical details it may be said that R.S.S. was able to eliminate - for the purpose of watching for secret agents' transmitters and those of the enemy organisations - all but a certain range of frequencies, but within this range an enormous number of transmissions were taking place daily, the number being probably of the order of a hundred thousand or more. In order to prove that a transmitter was located in this country, the quickest way was to take bearings with radio D/F apparatus and, with the system available, the number of reliable sets of bearings which could be obtained throughout the twenty-four hours was of the order of a hundred. The purpose of the Discrimination Section was to provide for the necessary process of elimination. Having eliminated the unwanted transmitters (such as those of known and authorised or friendly undercover signals) the wanted transmitters were classified and the details were circulated in the form of R.S.S. schedules. These R.S.S. schedules contained the call signs, frequencies, times and other data useful to an interceptor of the transmissions of the enemy organisations.

Further assistance for these purposes was given by Section V.W., afterwards R.I.S. under Major Trevor Roper. This section had access to other sources of intelligence as well as to de-cyphers of R.S.S. traffic and one of its functions was to feed-back to the Discrimination Section all information which had any bearing on the problem of interception as well as being in daily touch with discriminators and receiving details about interception from them. The fusion of these two sources had often produced knowledge which could not have been obtained from either source alone.

R.S.S. had a dual function: firstly, to watch and record the traffic of the enemy organisations, and secondly, to search over a wide field for previously unidentified undercover transmissions with a view to identifying new systems of enemy communications if any such existed and also to uncovering his wireless agents in this country if any were transmitting. This latter was known as "General Search". In the exercise of this dual function they were subject to pressure from those who desired all available resources to be placed on the first objective and those who were interested in the detection of illicit wireless in Great Britain, i.e. those who looked at the matter from the preventive point of view. Major Morton Evans considered that the two functions were complementary and that in practice a fair balance between them was maintained. He based himself on the facts that if all the sets employed on watching the enemy traffic were transferred to "General Search" this would only provide an additional coverage of thirty percent at the cost of losing all the enemy traffic; and that on the other hand, if all the "General Search" receivers were transferred to the watch on traffic, the additional intake would not appreciably add to the efficiency of the services rendered.

/He argued

He argued that the abandonment of "General Search" would mean that "new wanted transmissions and the many changes which take place daily in the known time-tables could no longer be observed" and in that case the watch on traffic would suffer as well as the interception for preventive purposes. He considered that the only possibility of increasing the preventive measures would be by an increase in the overall size of R.S.S.

It is obvious that this is a point of the highest importance from the point of view of the policy of the Security Service in its attempt at obtaining the fullest possible information about the organisations which it is its function to combat. The machinery however was not under its control and it was not responsible for the necessary financial arrangements for enlarging R.S.S. as these were in the hands of Section VIII of S.I.S. and subject to the general influence of Section V under the control of C.S.S. Ultimately the questions at issue are twofold:

- (a) whether to enable it to discharge its responsibilities for counter espionage the Security Service ought to have financial and administrative control over the development of R.S.S. as a most important instrument for the purpose and -
- (b) whether, at any given point of time, it is justifiable to develop the preventive side of this work.

Looked at in retrospect it is clear that the general picture of the Abwehr and Sipo und SD organisations obtained through the operations of R.S.S. was sufficiently complete to have rendered any large-scale increase in expenditure on "General Search" unnecessary, but in the earlier stages of the war and in the period before "Overlord" it would always have been difficult to maintain this position or to argue that it was unnecessary to provide for R.S.S. methods of search for unknown enemy wireless agents in this country on a scale more nearly complete than a coverage of a hundred in a hundred thousand.

Posed in this form this question may seem more acute than some others, but it is typical of all the problems of the preventive aspect of the work of the Security Service. Moreover, the difficulties of the subject do not end here as there are other issues than those which directly concerned B Division after 1941. These include, for instance, the coverage by R.S.S. of other than enemy organisations including clandestine Soviet Secret Service and Comintern transmissions. The latter were the concern of Section IX of S.I.S. and F Division and were not dealt with by B.3.B.

This is not the place to discuss possible lines of creative action to find a remedy for these functional maladjustments. It must suffice to record the fact of their existence.

/Liaison

Liaison with the B.B.C. A sub-section of B.3.B. was responsible for liaison with the B.B.C. for security purposes. This involved the vetting of personnel, contact with questions of censorship and with those relating to leakages of information and contact with the B.B.C. monitoring service in connection with the "Haw-Haw" broadcasts and the activities of British renegades. One reason for maintaining this close contact was that it was considered that, while the B.B.C. was not an ideal channel for espionage, it presented certain advantages as a cover for these purposes. It would provide status and a reasonable explanation for what might appear to be an unorthodox mode of life and exceptional opportunities for meeting people "in the know" and for contact with foreign embassies and other official bodies as a means of obtaining accurate and up-to-date information on current events.

The B.B.C., like the Press, accepted the principle of voluntary censorship and responsible members of the British staff were accepted by the Ministry of Information as delegate censors.

In June 1940 Lord Swinton set up a sub-committee of the Security Intelligence Committee to study possible methods of communication between the enemy and his agents in this country through broadcasting by the B.B.C. and the Reichsrundfunkgesellschaft. There was no positive indication that the B.B.C. was ever used in this way.

Verbatim reports and in some cases recordings were made by the B.B.C. monitoring service of broadcasts by persons believed to be British subjects from enemy controlled stations and these were made available for the purposes of investigation and prosecution in cases dealt with by section F.3. and section S.L.B.3.

4. Security Sections.

Lights and Pigeons (B.3.C.). After W Branch was included in the reorganised B Division in 1941 the functions of the former W sections continued to be discharged under Major Frost as A.D.B.3. Apart from the liaison with Censorship and with R.S.S. the other subjects were concentrated in B.3.C. under Flight Lt. Walker. His functions extended beyond "Lights and Pigeons", by which B.3.C. is described in the office organisation chart, and included measures of a preventive kind in connection with suspected codes, the landing of enemy agents by parachute or from the sea as well as a general survey of suspected fifth column activities in the shape of markings on the ground, suspicious pieces of paper and messages, marked maps and markings on telegraph poles.

The need for this work was most acute from the summer of 1940 until about the end of 1941; but much of it continued until the end of the war.

/It was

It was in fact developed in many respects and systematised by Flight Lt. Walker under the guidance of the Director of B Division. It was however essentially work of a preventive type and did not involve investigation into the cases of enemy agents or enemy organisations. In brief, B.3.C. inherited from W.7. the function of watching for all forms of communication between the enemy organisations abroad and their agents in this country other than wireless, as well as communications which might have been made between agents landed here for "fifth column" purposes and the invading German forces. This process of watching involved not only elaborate precautionary measures but also detailed enquiries into a large variety of facts and circumstances as they came to notice from time to time. For instance the facts, including data dealing with signs and signals, regarding the working of the "fifth column" were collected from high and responsible Dutch, Polish, Belgian and French officers. (Vide S.F.50-24-44(400)).

The results of nearly all the work of B.3.C. were entirely negative, but it was none the less essential work and it was essential for two important reasons. Firstly, in the early stages of the war the Security Service had not sufficient positive knowledge of the Abwehr and its agents to be able to ignore numerous suspicious stories as they were reported. Secondly, it was necessary that these stories should be thoroughly tested and examined in order to satisfy not only the Security Service itself but the officers of the fighting services and members of the public who reported them. The volume of these reports was very large and, as Flight Lt. Walker has graphically put it, a certain portion of them (those concerning lights only) filled files five feet high. The amount of labour involved in sifting this material was enormous and the work of this kind which fell on B.3.C. as well as on other sections of B Division in the early stages of the war played a large part in producing chaos in that Division and in the Registry. This was an inevitable effect of the circumstances when England was awaiting invasion. Something similar had occurred under the far less acute circumstances of the last war; and the second war therefore reinforced the lesson that steps ought always to be taken beforehand to provide machinery to cope with a flood of reports and other material of this kind.

Ultimately the problem became more manageable as the danger of invasion diminished and each aspect of the problem was systematically examined.

Although the Germans and Italians both used pigeons for the purposes of communication and the British services used them for espionage, there is no known case of a pigeon being used by an enemy secret agent in this country. The evidence points to the conclusion that none were in fact used. The possibilities of their use were however carefully examined. These included an examination of the possibility of smuggling birds in through neutral ships, of the possibility of their use in Eire and a study of all the technicalities of the

/subject

subject, including the use of trained falcons for the interception of enemy pigeons. Reports were received from the Royal Observer Corps of pigeons seen flying out to sea and were examined in detail, a map of England marking each significant report of this kind being maintained.

Although they did not use them in this country the Germans used pigeons for secret intelligence work in France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Spain, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria and in Germany itself. This included their use by stay-behind agents after the Allied landing on the Continent (vide S.F.50-24-44(40A)).

Of all the hundreds of reports about suspected signalling by lights which were examined, none led to any positive result in the shape of the detection of an enemy agent. Numerous cases of this kind were reported by the public to the police, who made enquiries and reported the result to us through the R.S.L.O. when its significance was estimated by B.J.C. Numerous other cases were reported direct to us and the reverse process took place. Some of the reports were very circumstantial, including those from responsible senior officers in the armed forces. Notable among these was the case of the Admiral at Yarmouth in 1941. Elaborate tests which were made by the Security Service gave convincing proof of the extreme fallibility of the judgement of observers when Verrey lights and other lights were exhibited to test them. There was no known case of an enemy agent signalling by lights throughout the war (vide S.F.50-24-44(40B)).

Reports regarding the suspected use of codes which reached the Security Service filled six thick files. None of them had anything to do with the enemy Secret Service and most were attributed to cranks, lunatics or hoaxers (vide S.F.50-24-44(40D)).

B.J.C. was also responsible for systematic examination of the circumstances connected with the landing of enemy agents by parachute or from the sea and of all suspicious incidents which might indicate such landings.

In connection with airborne landings of parachute agents close liaison was maintained with Fighter Command and the Royal Observer Corps. This involved the study of any suspicious tracks which might suggest the landing of an enemy agent and the study of day and night "recce" flights which might suggest enemy observation over areas mentioned in deception material.

The duty officer at Fighter Command, on seeing what he considered a suspicious track, at once telephoned the officer of B.J.C., by day or by night, giving the facts and his views on the degree of suspicion. This officer in turn communicated with the R.S.L.O., who arranged for police action according to the circumstances. If the suspicion were red-hot, for instance if squadrons of the German Air Force known to have been connected with agent-dropping were reported,

/arrangements

arrangements would be made to check identity cards for a few days, if necessary with the co-operation of the Home Guard and the military authorities.

In nearly every case in which enemy agents arrived by parachute they either gave themselves up on landing or were detected and arrested within a few hours (vide S.F.50-24-44(4OE)).

In the same way that this section relied on the Royal Observer Corps in the case of the air they relied on the coastguards for reporting any indications of an agent having been landed by sea. Naval patrol vessels and military units and the Home Guard co-operated. In the months before D Day, when the arrival of enemy agents could be expected, liaison with all these became tighter and excellent co-operation was maintained, especially with the Chief Inspector of Coastguards.

The enemy only used seaborne agents against this country in the early days of the war. There were landings at Rymchurch, Kent on September 2nd 1940 from two French fishing smacks; at Buckie, Banffshire on September 30th 1940 from a German seaplane and a rubber dinghy; on the Mairnshire coast on September 25th 1940 from a seaplane and a rubber dinghy; and at Gardenstown, Banffshire on April 7th 1941 from a seaplane and a rubber dinghy. All aroused the suspicions of the public or the police and were caught almost at once, except the last two who gave themselves up. There is no known case of a landing from a submarine except in Eire and Iceland. Agents are known to have been landed in the U.S.A. from submarines (vide S.F.50-24-44(4OF)).

The work of the section was essentially that of the preventive side of the Security Service. If its enquiries had brought an enemy agent to light, the case would have automatically come within the orbit of B.I.B., Camp 020 or B.I.A.

Signals Security (B.3.E.). After the re-organisation of 1941 Signals Security was handled by Major Frost, A.D.B.3., and when he left in January 1943 this part of his work was taken over by Lt. Colonel Selater and B.3.E. was formed for the purpose.

Experience early in the war showed that important information could be obtained by listening to the enemy's radio communications, even if their cypher was unreadable, but this lesson was not applied to the security of signals organisations of our own services and of certain civil departments and organisations, many of which often carried information of value to the enemy. While R.S.S. and "Y" units had been established to intercept the enemy's naval, military and air communications, as well as those of interest to the Foreign Office, no steps had been taken in the early stages of the war to complete the watch on the air by setting up an organisation to monitor signals made by British stations or those of our Allies. General instructions and warnings of the danger that their signals might be overheard had no doubt been given, but it appears that the majority of army operators, for instance, having been informed

/that

that their sets were for limited communication over short distances, failed to realise and were not taught that reception of the sky-wave might be possible hundreds of miles away in enemy territory.

Early in 1942 a note on the subject was prepared in the Security Service as a result of which the question was taken up in the War Office.

It transpired that there were a number of British organisations using radio transmitters of which the Security Service had no official knowledge as, for example, experimental establishments of the Ministry of Supply, Ministry of Aircraft Production, Police, Fire Brigade, Railways, in addition to all the G.P.O. and Cable and Wireless stations. It was estimated that, excluding the Supply Ministries and the Services, there were about a thousand transmitters operating in this country.

The serious nature of the danger caused by the lack of wireless security is illustrated by an incident at an R.A.F. station on the South coast where it was reported that our fighter aircraft always found enemy fighters coming up to meet them over the Channel soon after they started an operation. The interest of the Security Service was emphasised by the fact that the R.A.F. reported that there must be an enemy agent with a radio transmitter near the airfield. An investigation by the mobile units of R.S.S. proved that there was no evidence of an enemy agent but that our fighter pilots gave the facts away by chatting to one another over the radio while they were forming up before taking off; and it was concluded that the enemy interception service listened in and was able to anticipate that a sortie was about to take place.

The Security Service made large-scale investigations into the whole subject and found that intelligence of value to the enemy was endangered by a deplorable lack of a sense of security. In particular, the wireless networks of the Home Office, Police, Railways, National Fire Service, the Home Guard, the Air Training Corps, the Merchant Navy and other civilian wireless operators, as well as the armed forces, were liable to give away military secrets, and steps were taken to provide for this by making it a responsibility of the Security Service assisted by R.S.S. for monitoring purposes.

The Security Service was brought to attach importance to the long-term value of much of this intelligence. With the approach of D Day, as a result of breaches of security revealed by monitoring and in conformity with decisions made by the Sir Findlater Stewart Committee, the Home Office found it necessary to restrict still further the matter transmitted by radio by the Police and National Fire Service. The growing realisation by the Ministries concerned that guidance in such matters could be obtained from the Security Service led to a large number of reports. The existence of unofficial radio

/communication

communication systems sometimes involving complete networks operated by unauthorised personnel in a quasi-official capacity was disclosed. An important instance was a large network established by important firms in the Midlands under the aegis of the Air Ministry to communicate information of damage by bombing to essential war plant. The information thus broadcast could only be presumed to reach the enemy, thus frustrating the efforts by the Ministry of Home Security to conceal such damage. Numerous other cases included the unwitting betrayal of the exact course, time and height of a bomber raid on Germany through the indiscretions of a Searchlight Unit.

The Security Service received the most ready and willing assistance and co-operation from everyone concerned, the offenders being generally horrified to learn the risks they had taken through lack of knowledge.

The signals security of the Fighting Services is the direct responsibility of the Service concerned, but the Security Service is often directly affected. On numerous occasions reports from Service Departments have indicated that the enemy possessed information with the implication that it must have been obtained from an enemy agent. One such report concerned the Airborne Divisions which had operated in France on D Day and had returned to England in preparation for further operations. The Security Service were able to show that this information could easily have reached the enemy through their wireless interception services. Other similar instances concerned the embarkation of an important contingent of troops in Southern England on December 2nd 1944, when two ships of the convoy were sunk between Southampton and Cherbourg with heavy loss of life.

The whole question was examined by the J.I.C., which on the 20th March 1945 endorsed the following recommendations:-

(i) That the Services should remain responsible for their own security and monitoring their own traffic.

(ii) That R.S.S. should be asked to allocate six monitoring sets from existing resources to cover such Civil or Service traffic as shall appear to the Security Service desirable.

(iii) That since the Security Service have a special interest in the security of all radio channels in or from the United Kingdom an officer should be nominated from each Service to work with the Security Service. The officers so nominated by the Services should meet ad hoc with the Security Service when the occasion required.

(iv) That indiscretions on Service channels should be brought to the notice of the Service concerned while Civil indiscretions should be dealt with by the Security Service.

(v) That the J.I.C. should approach SHAEF to nominate an officer to represent them in

connection with the scheme.

(vi) That the Services and SHAEF should make available such full information regarding all radio channels from the United Kingdom as the Security Service might require.

5. Research Section.

B.I. Information. Research work of various kinds and in different degrees was carried out from 1940 and 1941 onwards in B.I.A., B.I.B., B.I.C., B.I.D. and B.I. Registry separately for the purposes of each section. In June 1942 the B.I. Information Section with rather wider functions came into existence, although it was not officially recognised. It consisted of Captain Gwyer of B.I.A. and Miss Hall of B.I.B., who, while remaining in their sections, were instructed to devote as much time as possible to the following:-

(a) the general study of the German Intelligence in order to draw attention to any development or discoveries in its technique or organisation;

(b) the compilation of a Who's Who of those officials of the German Intelligence Service whose names occurred most frequently in cases handled by this office;

(c) the preparation of Intelligence Notes on various aspects of the German Service as these might be required.

By this time, i.e. in the middle of 1942, it had become apparent that a great deal of material about the Abwehr and the Sipo und SD had been accumulated, mainly through the interception of the enemy wireless; the interrogation of captured agents at Camp 020 and of persons passing through the L.R.C. with some knowledge of their operations in occupied territories; and through the operations of B.I.A. Some information, not comparable in bulk to that obtained from these main sources, was also available in the form of reports from Section V and Allied Intelligence Services. Section V.W. (later R.I.S.) and Mr. Palmer of the Intelligence branch of G.C. & C.S. had also done important research work and had produced useful papers based on it, but they were in the main confined to material derived from ISOS and other intercepted enemy communications. There was, however, no officer or section whose business it was to study the material, to collate it and to produce suitable reports and papers to enable B Division to obtain an accurate and detailed picture of the enemy services as a whole or of each of its parts. Comprehensive and detailed compilations of this kind were required in order to furnish a thorough knowledge of the objectives, methods and organisation of the enemy service and thus to facilitate the investigation of captured agents and their precise mission and exact status in the enemy organisation. Without such a

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knowledge of the enemy service it was not possible to run a double agent system with any assurance. It is indeed obvious that the more comprehensive this knowledge is, the greater will be the margin of safety in the conduct of any individual double agent case and in the manipulation of the system as a whole with all its inherent dangers.

From the outset the position in this respect was complicated by the attitude and position of Section V and by their claim to be the only students or authorities on the subject of the enemy organisation and its operations outside the three-mile limit. By the middle of 1942 Section V had produced no full assembly of the known facts relevant to the organisation and methods of the Abwehr and still less of the Sipo und SD, the latter of which they had failed to recognise although they had been receiving their traffic for nearly two years. They were in fact not organised to perform research work of this kind, their only attempt in this direction having been to produce "purple primers", a type of compilation not generally adequate for the purposes of the Security Service and in any case never up-to-date nor available for all the territories in question.

The purpose of B.I. Information was to fill all the gaps and to collaborate with all the research workers - the compilers of facts - in the different organisations which were disjointedly dealing with different aspects of the same problem. In the process of serving these purposes the section grew in numbers - to eight in September 1942 until it reached its peak in the summer of 1943 with a total strength of twenty-one.

The method adopted was to assemble in an orderly and accessible form information already on the files but scattered over a large number of interrogation reports and otherwise unassembled. When this was done it was found that the total of information had increased because many of the facts which, by themselves, meant little or nothing and had at first been ignored, took on a new significance when fitted into a logical framework; and other facts, apparently unconnected with a subject under enquiry, were gradually brought, as the enquiry proceeded, into a proper relation with it. Before this work was undertaken the only means of tapping the resources of the Registry, where the bulk of the required information was in the files, was to "look-up" in each individual case the various names and addresses referred to in the papers. As the knowledge of the enemy service increased, this method became increasingly cumbersome. It was not uncommon for the look-up on a single interrogation report of a captured agent, even if restricted to the main registries (B.I. Registry, Central Registry, S.I.S. Registry, L.R.C. Index and later the Ryder Street ISOS Index) to produce traces of ten or fifteen addresses and twenty or thirty names. The case officer was, therefore, often faced with a mass of information, much of which was contradictory or undigested. Moreover Abwehr officers were often referred to by various aliases and in many cases no systematic attempt

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had been made to identify the individual behind the alias. The resultant difficulties were cumulative. They could only be remedied by research; and a purely mechanical registry process was proved to be inadequate and insufficient for this purpose. For instance, sometimes an Abwehr officer's name was not known, but research made identification possible through a personal description, an association or the general circumstances of the case.

The information about each part of the enemy services was being added to from day to day and it was, therefore, an advantage to keep the information up to date. For instance, if traces of an individual showed that he was connected with I TL/W of Eins Paris, it was important to have accessible all the available information about this section which was responsible for the collection of technical information for Air Force (Luftwaffe) purposes, in order to understand the part which individuals connected with him were playing. This information was not available from the files but it was compiled by the Information Section in its study of the enemy organisation as a whole; in the shape of the Intelligence Notes on its various parts and of the "Who's Who" of its officials. The material, which was derived from all relevant sources, secret and open both inside and outside the Security Service, was analysed on a basis partly geographical and partly dictated by the structure of the German organisation.

At its maximum development the Information Section was divided into seven sub-sections, of which six were concerned with a geographical area and the seventh, consisting of Captain Gwyer and one or two assistants, co-ordinated the whole and made a special study of the more general aspects of the German organisations.

Eventually more than twenty volumes of the "Who's Who" were completed. They covered the greater part of Western Europe, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Spain and Portugal. The "Who's Who" for France was started in 1944, but only the volumes relating to Paris were completed. The "Who's Who" for Germany was projected but was never carried very far. Two volumes on a slightly modified plan dealt with the German organisation in South America which, by the end of 1943, had become of considerable interest on account of the active work of the German agents there and the number of them who were intercepted in the Caribbean or on the high seas and brought to this country.

Each volume of the "Who's Who" was in five parts: a general account of the organisation in the country concerned with particular reference to its work against England; a short classified list of known enemy officials; addresses and cover addresses connected with the German organisation; history sheets of the German officials; and history sheets of local agents, recruiters, hangers-on and other suspects, many of whom figured frequently in espionage cases.

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The primary object of all this work was to assist case officers by presenting the facts; not to draw conclusions. The value of the presentment of the facts depended on a complete documentation, the source from which each item came being fully noted - a point of cardinal importance in this type of work.

This object was successfully achieved and the work of B Information was regarded by the Director, B Division, as being a valuable contribution both in this country and later in the field after D Day.

Similar or parallel work was done by R.I.S., G.C. & C.S., the sub-sections of Section V, M.I.14(D) as well as by B.I.B. and B.I.C. The ideal arrangement would have been for all these resources, in so far as they were available purely for research purposes, to have been concentrated in a single section and so designed as to meet the needs of all the departments concerned, i.e. of Section V for the purpose of enabling them to penetrate enemy organisations abroad; of G.C. & C.S. for the purpose of reading the material fully and accurately; and of R.S.S. to facilitate their measures for the comprehensive interception of the enemy Secret Service wireless communications; all of which subserved the general purpose of enabling the Security Service to discharge its responsibilities for denying intelligence to the enemy and misleading him.

Co-operation was satisfactory with all the British authorities concerned, including the Services, and with the Allied Intelligence representatives in London, in spite of the difficulties which might have been caused by the number of unco-ordinated pieces of machinery dealing with the same general subject. The only exception to this was Section V of S.I.S., who resented what they regarded as an intrusion by the Security Service into their own sphere but, even in this case, the difficulty arose only on a level of policy while day-to-day relations with the officers in the sub-sections of Section V were generally good. The difficulties in policy arose from the fact that Section V regarded themselves as the prime authorities on the German Secret Services. They did not realise that by the greatly retarded development of the ISOS Index they had failed in discharging the functions of research for the purpose of the Security Service, whose requirements they did not always fully understand and were inclined to regard as exaggerated and over-meticulous. On the contrary they held an entirely different view of their functions based on the idea that the relevant intelligence work could be divided into compartments, their sphere being abroad and that of the Security Service within the three-mile limit of British territory. Having no responsibility for dealing with the interrogation or prosecution of arrested enemy agents they seemed unable to appreciate the need for research work and the fact that - if such work is done at all - it must be done as comprehensively as possible. Moreover they tended to ignore the fact that one of the most important sources for obtaining information about the German organisation abroad was the interrogation of enemy agents and other

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persons arriving from occupied territory. In the case of the latter they had provided a small staff of three or four interrogators at the L.R.C. who were completely inadequate to deal with all the cases and were restricted to a limited questionnaire which left insufficient initiative to the interrogator and thus prevented him from taking a fully intelligent interest in his work and extracting the information required. Proof of their failure to realise the manner in which records must be compiled for research purposes was given by the fact that these interrogators had no access to the L.R.C. Information Index or any comparable records and their interrogations were, therefore, of very little, if any, value. Section V based themselves mainly on the ISOS material combined with reports from their representatives abroad, but these representatives were mostly ill-informed and never fully acquainted with the available information on the subject as a whole. Finally, while Lt. Colonel Cowgill of Section V never succeeded in discharging, to any great purpose, his primary function, that of penetrating the enemy organisations, he based himself largely on an incomplete study of ISOS because he failed to understand the need for comprehensive research and the nature of the work required of his section if his interpretation of its sphere and its functions held the field. He did not recognise this even after pressure by Mr. Hart and others had led him eventually to improve the standard of work on the ISOS Index. These were the most important of the facts relevant to the circumstances in which he objected to the preparation of the "Who's Who" by B.I. Information. Unfortunately he was able to obtain the approval of his superiors to the course he adopted.

It was obvious that the results of the research done by B.I. Information would be valuable not only for the purpose of dealing with agents sent by the enemy to this country but also for the purpose of guiding and assisting the I(B) staff of the armies after they had succeeded in invading the continent. Under a directive from the J.I.C., Section V was responsible for supplying the I(B) staffs with all the information necessary for their work which was available from sources in London. For the reasons outlined above the results were never wholly satisfactory. Moreover Section V normally confined itself to questions of counter espionage whereas the I(B) staff had wider responsibilities for every aspect of security. Again, Section V did not possess the trained personnel with the experience of Security Service officers. Eventually it was decided that the I(B) staff under SHAEF (or their American equivalent the G-2 CI Staff) should deal direct not only with Section V but with the other departments able to assist. These were listed as follows:- M.I.5., M.I.6(V), M.I.6(R.I.S.), M.I.9., M.I.14(D), S.O.E., P.W.E., T.I.S.+, O.S.S. and later the Norwegian, French, Belgian and Dutch Security Services.

* The Theatre Intelligence Section at SHAEF which undertook certain I(B) work, e.g. the production of target-lists.

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Captain (now Major) Gwyer was appointed at the end of August 1943 to assist the I(B) staffs in preparing their plans and in making arrangements for the provision of the requisite material and for this purpose he drew on the Information Section which also contributed by lending nine of its staff to assist Section V in the preparation of their own material.

On the 1st March 1945 Major Gwyer handed over the section to Mr. Bird. By this time the new War Room had come into effective existence and the section, whose numbers had been greatly depleted, had a different role to play. It served as a liaison section between the Security Service and the War Room. In practice this meant that it received from the War Room any information which was of interest to the Security Service in so far as it was a matter of counter espionage inside the United Kingdom. The fact that no enemy agents had been sent to this country by Abwehr or SD officers for several months and that none was sent during the period of the War Room's existence had the effect that the Information Section, in its liaison capacity, had no material to pass to the War Room. All the relevant ISOS material was dealt with directly by the War Room and the enemy officers and agents, who were sent to Camp 020 for interrogation, were handled not by the Security Service but by the War Room section concerned, i.e. W.R.-C.

B.I. Information continued to prepare the "Who's Who" for Paris as part of the projected "Who's Who" for France, but it was not circulated in the field, the reason for this being that it had been decided by Brigadier White and Mr. that the preparation of the "Who's Who" series should be discontinued and that they should not be circulated in the field; but that the SHAEF pink cards were to be the sole form in which relevant information about enemy Secret Service officers and agents was communicated to G-2 CI or the formations under SHAEF, including those of the Army Groups or Armies. The machinery which was eventually developed in the War Room for these purposes will be described under (ix) War Room, below.

6. Shadowing Staff.

Although the shadowing staff was included in the B sections after the re-organisation of 1941 it played little part in the detection of enemy agents during this war. This was due to the fact that these agents were not at any time at large in this country and there was, therefore, no occasion to shadow them. The shadowing staff was employed in connection with investigations about all kinds of suspects for B, E and F Divisions.

The history of the section refers to its origin in 1903, i.e. before the formation of M.I.5., and mentions a number of cases in which successful work was done as well as the various difficulties in obtaining, training and keeping suitable staff for

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this very difficult and usually very dull work. The numerous cases in which remarkable success has been obtained in the past prove the need for special steps to ensure that the right type of man is recruited and of measures to retain his services by offering sufficient inducement. The spectacular successes are few and far between, but especially in the conditions of peace-time the shadowing staff can play a very important part in securing results in combination with other methods, including the employment of agents and the interception of communications. Some of the most important cases in which the shadowing staff has played a crucial part have been mentioned in previous chapters, but it is not only in connection with the more outstanding cases that this staff has proved its worth. Throughout the history of the Security Service it has constantly helped by bridging gaps, by filling in details and by clearing up difficulties and obscurities encountered in the course of enquiries by other sections.

(v) E Division 1941-1945.

E Division was formed at the time of the re-organisation in the middle of 1941. It was entitled E Division (Aliens Control), but for future readers it should be made clear that the word "control" is here somewhat loosely used and does not imply any direct control by E Division. Control was exercised by the Home Secretary under the Aliens Order, 1920 and by orders for internment or various forms of restriction issued under the Defence Regulations. Aliens were also subject to restrictions under the Aliens Movement Restriction Order of May 28th 1940 and by a series of orders issued during 1940 and 1941 declaring certain areas in Great Britain and Northern Ireland to be aliens protected areas, i.e. areas from which enemy and non-enemy aliens were removed in the case of the more vital areas including coasts, and enemy aliens were removed in the case of certain other areas. When the immediate danger of invasion diminished these restrictions were gradually relaxed. By an authority conferred on him by the Home Secretary on the 12th August 1940 the Assistant Director of E Division was empowered to grant exemption from the Aliens Order, 1920 and from various other restrictions under subsidiary orders and regulations. Many of these exemptions were granted on grounds of employment in protected places by aliens working for British Government Departments and in war factories.

The Division dealt with a variety of matters concerning three classes of aliens, namely, enemy aliens, neutrals and Allied subjects, and its functions were therefore varied accordingly. It did not deal with aliens of Spanish, Portuguese, South American or Japanese nationality. These subjects remained with B Division at the time of the re-organisation.

/The history

The history of measures regarding the internment and release of enemy aliens is dealt with in Mr. Aiken-Sneath's Memorandum (Bibliography No. 24) and this has been elaborated in the E Division report (vide S.F.50-24-44(60)). Questions relating to the administration of internment camps from the intelligence point of view are dealt with in S.F.50-24-44(70). The actual administration of the camps was under the control of a Commandant responsible to the War Office in matters of discipline and to the Home Office in every other respect. The camps were situated in the Isle of Man, where a Chief Intelligence Officer was established with headquarters in Douglas, one or more Intelligence Officers being appointed to each camp. The work of these officers was supervised by the section E.5. of E Division.

A case of considerable importance illustrated the need for close supervision over arrangements for the internment of individuals who had been used as double agents. At one time it transpired that certain persons who had been connected with the working of B.L.A.'s double agents were confined in a camp in close proximity to one in which there were aliens who were being released. Clandestine communications took place between the two camps and as a result information about the fact that certain agents were operating under control leaked out and became known to the enemy. (For details see L.305/Gen/2).

In the case of neutral and Allied subjects in the United Kingdom E Division was responsible for dealing with all matters of a security interest; and in the case of suspects detained under Article 12(5A) of the Aliens Order for dealing with cases which came before the Home Office Advisory Committee known as the Lindley Committee, but this work was subsequently handed over to S.L.A. (on the D.C.'s staff).

Apart from its responsibility for investigating the cases of aliens suspected of subversive or "fifth column" activities, the most important function of the Division was liaison with the Allied Security Services after these were established in London in the case of the Norwegian, Dutch, Belgian, Free French, Polish and Czech.

The American section (E.L.A.) was naturally in a class by itself in view of the special relations with the Americans. There was never any serious security problem in the sense of "Alien Control". The relations between the various branches of the British and American intelligence organisations - the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Strategic Services, the Office of Naval Intelligence and G.2., the Intelligence Branch of the Army, on the one hand and the Security Service and S.I.S. on the other, with special reference to Security Co-ordination in New York - were extremely complicated. Some details are furnished in the sectional report, but in so far as these particular relations are concerned it is hardly possible that history will ever repeat itself or that the tangled record could have any value in the

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future. It illustrates the difficulty of maintaining relations with the counter espionage services of an Allied power through S.I.S. under conditions where co-operation between the various components of the British machinery is not on a satisfactory footing. The circumstances induced the Director of B Division to maintain that it was necessary for the Security Service to be in direct contact with its American counter-part. This direct contact was effected when the F.B.I. established its representatives in the American Embassy in London. The circumstances of this double liaison gave rise to considerable controversy and difference of opinion which, as is usual in such cases, were partly a matter of organisation and partly one of personalities, but fortunately the relations between the Security Service and the F.B.I. were maintained on a very satisfactory footing.

The Yugoslavs, Greeks and Danes had no Security Service in this country but liaison was established with official representatives.

The E Division enquiries and their liaison were mainly concerned with matters of preventive interest as all cases of actual espionage were dealt with by B Division. In 1943 parts of the section dealing with the Greeks and Middle East nationalities were transferred to B Division in view of the fact that Greece and the Middle East had become centres of interest from the point of view of espionage and closer co-operation with S.I.M.E. was considered necessary. E Division, however, continued to exercise its normal functions in regard to subjects of these countries in the United Kingdom.

In May 1942 - nearly a year after the first formation of E Division - Mr. Horrocks, the Deputy Director of Organisation, and Mr. Turner, the Deputy Director of E Division, came to the conclusion that in the interests of efficiency it was necessary to make extensive changes in the organisation of the Division. Mr. Turner pointed out that for two years the sections now included in E Division had been fighting a very necessary defensive action in connection with the internment of aliens in the United Kingdom; and that the enormous number of internments, searches and investigations had not brought to light any organisation of enemy aliens among the population settled here. They had found nothing which looked like a "fifth column" or a skeleton of a hostile organisation. (He might have added that the result of B Division enquiries into the cases of enemy agents who had arrived in this country during the war had the complementary tendency of showing that there was a high degree of probability that the enemy had not established any such organisation).

Mr. Turner also mentioned that whenever a case appeared to be becoming interesting it was liable to be taken from the E Division officer and transferred to B Division. He had found that the general result of these and other factors was a tendency on the part of the more efficient officers to feel frustrated and on the part of the less efficient, either consciously or

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unconsciously, to devote less interest and energy to the work; and that the work in E Division was rarely such as to entice a good man or to hold his interest. He accordingly recommended that Mr. Horrocks' proposal should be accepted that the sections dealing with Allied and neutral nationals should be transferred to B Division while E should be left to deal with enemy aliens in internment and at large and matters connected with Aliens War Service Permits.

The Director General did not accept these proposals and maintained that B Division was an extremely heavy and steadily growing charge and that it must on no account be further loaded with things that did not properly pertain to it. He held that it was necessary to keep up the general observation which E Division was designed to provide (vide S.F.50/50/Misc/2 Y.B.2090).

Shortly afterwards Mr. Turner resigned his appointment in the Security Service and his place as the head of E Division was taken by Major Younger.

In the summer of 1942 the military situation led B Division officers to suggest that the "fifth column" problem should be examined anew and a paper was prepared in "Research" with the assistance of B Division.

In August 1942 the Director of B Division, when discussing this paper, expressed the view that the whole problem of the so-called "fifth column" should be considered on the basis of the worst disasters that could befall: a Russian defeat while we were driven out of the Middle East and faced with a concentration of anything up to two hundred German divisions in the West. What action, he asked, would we consider necessary to deal with the possible "fifth column" in this country? He pointed out that responsibility for a "fifth column" was split up between various sections. E.7. (Mr. Aiken-Sneath and Mr. Robson-Scott) were dealing with the various German, Austrian and Czechoslovak political groups in this country; E.5. were reviewing the cases of internees and former internees of German or Austrian origin; B.4.A. and B.4.B. were investigating the cases of all suspect Germans, Austrians and also British subjects; E.6. were dealing with the Italian enemy alien and dual national problem. None of these sections, as far as he knew, were tackling the problem on the lines of a case which was being handled by B.1.C. which, to his mind, was the only method of approach (this method was the use of agents to get in touch with disloyal elements in the population). He also made the point that there was no co-ordinating policy with regard to internment on the basis of B Division's knowledge of the German Intelligence system. He did not mention the point which was made in the research paper that F.3. was dealing with cases of British Fascists and pro-Nazis. He concluded that an enquiry should be made as to how the work of all the sections concerned could be better co-ordinated and how they could receive such

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knowledge of the German Intelligence system as was necessary to promote a policy of more active investigation; as there appeared to be a divided responsibility so that each section was inclined to think that the pursuit of this subject was somebody else's business.

After the Allied victories at El Alamein and Stalingrad and the successful landings in North Africa the possibility of invasion again receded and the "fifth column" question therefore again lost its actuality. The question of a policy making for freer release of internees was even considered, but it was decided that the defensive attitude of E.6. and F.3. should be continued as a measure of security in view of future major operations and landings on the Continent.

A further factor which is reported to have influenced the morale of E Division officers is that after the formation of the Division and its separation from B its officers had less access to most secret sources of information and were largely kept in ignorance of the knowledge acquired by B Division regarding the working of the German Secret Services. The officers in the nationality sections who were in liaison with the security officers of Allied Governments also found that their official (Allied) contacts were more fully informed than they were on important cases. The Allied officers sometimes referred E Division officers to cases of which they had not even heard, leaving them with the choice of two alternatives: losing face through admitting ignorance or bluffing - either of which made it difficult for them to retain the confidence of our Allied Staff Officers with whom they were in contact (vide S.F.50-24-44(66)).

Major Younger left E Division in February 1943 and his place was taken by Captain Brooke-Booth who again left in December 1944 and was succeeded by Mr. Hale who carried on the duty of head of E Division in addition to his duties in S.L.A. In 1944 and 1945 the importance of the work of E Division continuously declined.

Nevertheless the enquiries made by E Division sections were an essential part of the preventive machinery of the Security Service, although it may be questionable whether some of it could have been reduced if the Division as a whole had had a better comprehension of the real potentialities and methods of the enemy Secret Service. One of the sections (E.1.B.) was responsible for preventive work of this kind in connection with alien seamen and the necessity for care in this field was proved by the number of cases in which seamen were found to be acting as Abwehr agents. In one of these cases E.1.B. contributed to the identification of the seaman in question, J.A. LAUREYSSENS (vide page 81 Appendix G in Bibliography No. 33). Elaborate records were established for the purpose of tracing alien seamen, details of which are given in the sectional report (vide S.F.50-24-44(65)). The index of alien seamen prepared by the

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section eventually included about seventy-two thousand names. It also built up a record of ships' movements from the daily list of shipping movements published by Lloyds and valuable series of crew lists and Allied ships provided by S.C.O.s at the ports. Experience showed that the seamen's section filled a gap in the structure of the Security Service. The work was mainly preventive, but the records also proved of assistance for the purpose of investigation.

E Division has been able to claim with reason that it established very satisfactory relations with the Allied Security Services; and this in spite of the difficulties created by the fact that the Allies were simultaneously in contact with the nationality sections at the L.R.C. and with those of Section V of S.I.S. The principal Allied officers concerned expressed a desire that liaison with E Division sections should continue after the war. The liaison covered the work of the Security Service except the L.R.C., and in the case of the Czechs a special direct liaison was maintained by the Director and the Assistant Director of B Division (one of the many anomalies in detail).

The Aliens War Service Department, E.4., although included in the Division worked as an independent unit with its own methods and its own problems. These are dealt with at length in the sectional report (S.F.50-24-44(69)). Lt. Colonel Ryder, who was in charge of the section throughout, draws attention to the more important points which arose in the course of the war in his minute in the front of volume 2. The basis of the work was the granting of permits for the employment of aliens in the principal categories of protected places according to a Schedule. Lt. Colonel Ryder raises the question (at page 108 of his report) whether the wide casting of the net may have given those responsible for the Schedule a comfortable feeling that security had been fully safeguarded while, in fact, it entailed on those engaged on its administration a dispersal of effort which in many directions was unnecessary. Mr. Osborne in a note after page 112 suggests that in a future war the Schedule might be abolished and an order might be made directing the Secretary of State or some other appropriate officer to make, and to revise from time to time, a list of employments, occupations, workshops, factories or other premises or places in which no alien might be employed without the permission of the Secretary of State. This would seem to merit consideration in connection with the preparation of legislation and orders for the future.

To sum up, the most important function of E Division was of a preventive nature: to secure the internment of, or other restrictions on, aliens within the United Kingdom - whether enemy, neutral or Allied - who were potentially dangerous as likely to assist the enemy in case of invasion or by acting as spies. It inherited this responsibility for countering the foreign elements in a possible "fifth column" from B Division which had dealt with it in the more critical

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and difficult phases in 1939 to 1941. (It was, in fact, mainly staffed by the same personnel as had composed the previous B sections). B Division in the earlier period and later E Division were in the position of fighting, as Mr. Turner puts it, "a defensive action" against a Home Office and its Advisory Committees with a strong inclination to release individual enemy aliens against whom nothing concrete was known while generally refusing to accept any a priori assumption that Germans and Italians would engage in subversive activities in the interests of their own country. E Division was therefore constrained in virtue of its responsibility for security to make painstaking enquiries into a very large number of cases, and in the course of doing so established and maintained good relations with the Home Office.

This responsibility for obtaining intelligence about and countering a "fifth column" was shared with B.I.C. and F.3., the former being directly concerned with the enemy and his communications and both with the potential British quislings.

While it is impossible to be certain on the basis of evidence which is partly negative, the grounds are now (in 1945) almost overwhelming in favour of the inference drawn from intercepted enemy wireless, the interrogation of his agents and the examination of his documents that - at any rate after the internment of the leading members of the N.S.D.A.P. in 1939 and the Fascio and the British Union of Fascists in 1940 - there was no body with a plan or an organisation to assist the invader in conjunction with the Abwehr or the Sipo und SD or any other enemy organisation. In the summer of 1940, however, this was far from being established and even in 1942 there was serious room for doubt. The resources at the disposal of E Division and the type of enquiry they could make were not such as to induce full confidence that negative results would provide a working basis of assuming that no such organisation existed or that some of the released internees might not be concerned in promoting it.

The fact that the enemy obtained no information about major operations launched from this country in 1942-1944 proves, however, when read with the information relevant to the work of B.I.A., that they were unable to establish contact with such persons for this purpose.

The important function of maintaining a good liaison with the Allied representatives in this country was discharged with conspicuous success. This and all the other duties of E Division involved the disposal of a great volume of often dull routine correspondence.

(vi) Section F.3. 1940-1945. Fascist, Right Wing, Pacifist and Nationalist Movements; Pro-Germans and Defeatists.

The section which dealt with the British Union of Fascists was known as B.7. before the re-organisation of 1941 when it became F.3. and its charter was extended to cover Fascist, Right Wing, Pacifist and Nationalist Movements, Pro-Germans and Defeatists. The effect of this was to include within its scope enquiries about a variety of British subjects who were either definitely pro-Nazi or belonged to movements which it was thought might lend themselves to German penetration. Pro-Nazi or pro-German movements included besides the British Union of Fascists, the Imperial Fascist League, the National Socialist League, the Nordic League and the Right Club. There was good reason to expect that many of their members would be likely to assist the enemy in the event of invasion and subsequent enquiries have left no room for doubt that this danger was a real one. A considerable number of individuals of this kind were interned, one of the most important being Captain Ramsay, M.P. of the Right Club.

The detentions were followed in almost every case by an appeal on the part of the person interned to an Advisory Committee appointed by the Home Office to review all such cases. From the second half of 1940 onwards the major task of the section was to examine the documents connected with the cases, including transcripts of long and patient hearings given to the detainees by the Committee. (Incidentally this work in connection with the detentions necessitated an important change in the records. Prior to the war, owing to shortage of staff, personal files had not as a rule been prepared for individual Fascists and such records of individuals as existed were distributed over a number of volumes connected with the organisation and cognate subjects. The necessity of dealing with individual cases for the purpose of the Home Office or Home Office Advisory Committee necessitated the preparation of a large number of personal files).

The Home Office Advisory Committee and the Security Service held views on the subject of the release of internees which were often irreconcilable and involved a fundamental difference of principle. The Committee maintained that its duty was to decide, firstly, whether a detainee had been an active member of the British Union and, secondly, whether it was necessary to exercise control over him by means of detention. The Security Service maintained that when active membership of the British Union was established it was automatically necessary to continue detention. Sir Norman Birkett, the Chairman of the Committee, expressed the opinion that members who had been active up to the time of their detention, save in exceptional cases, should be kept in internment, but those who had dissociated themselves before or after the outbreak of war should be judged on their merits. The Security Service urged that it was necessary to be cautious in

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making classifications because they had information that officials of the British Union had been supplied with faked resignations for this very contingency. This and ancillary differences of opinion involved lengthy three-cornered correspondence between the Home Office, the Advisory Committee and the Security Service, represented by Mr. Pilcher of S.L.A., and the section F.5. (then B.7.). The Security Service continued to maintain that because the action against British Union officials had been taken against them as such and not as individuals it was a reversal of Home Office policy for the Committee to judge individual cases on their merits. In brief, the Security Service regarded the whole question as a factor in the military situation. The Advisory Committee regarded each individual with a judicial eye as a matter of equity and the Home Office was influenced by considerations of the liberty of the subject and the political aspect in so far as it was or might be reflected in questions in the House. The Committee endeavoured to judge whether each individual who appeared before it was, on the evidence, the kind of person who was likely to be a danger to the State. If the appellant appeared to the Committee to be honest, reliable and patriotic they felt impelled to recommend his release, whether or not he had been an active Fascist up to the time of his arrest. The Security Service believed that it was impossible to attach much weight to the impression made on the Committee by the personality of an appellant; and they were induced to this belief by evidence of a general nature relating to the Fascist movement associated as it was with National Socialism in Germany and Fascism in Italy and other countries. British Fascists were, as a general rule, sincere idealists and regarded themselves as true patriots but, believing as they did that Britain was controlled by Jewish financiers who had plunged half the world into war for their private gain, many Fascists were profoundly convinced that the best interests of their country required its liberation by any means and at all costs from its Jew masters. If, they argued, collaboration with Nazi Germany was the quickest and best method of establishing National Socialism in Britain, then it was the duty of every patriot to collaborate with the Nazis who would free Britain from her alien chains (vide S.F.50-24-44(70) and S.F.91-2-6 volume 1).

By the end of September 1940 the Advisory Committee had recommended release in some hundred and ten cases and continued detention in fifty-three. The section (B.7.) had opposed the Committee's recommendations for release in fifty-nine cases. It became necessary to resolve the deadlock between the Security Service and the Committee because it was causing delay and mutual recriminations. The problem was discussed at a meeting of the Home Defence Security Executive in November 1940. As a result it was decided that cases in which it was established that there were reasons for detention other than office in, or membership of, the British Union, the Home Secretary should decide the case on its merits; and the Security Service was therefore compelled to abandon the principle which they had

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tried to maintain. Disagreement with the recommendations of the Advisory Committee continued to occur, but the Home Secretary, Mr. Morrison, not infrequently found himself on the side of the Security Service. He maintained the Order of Detention in about eight percent of cases in which the Committee recommended release.

The importance of these disagreements diminished as the danger of invasion receded, but in the early stages at the time of the invasion of Denmark and Norway and, later, of Belgium and Holland, Quisling of the National Socialist party in Norway and Mussert in Holland seemed to justify the words Hitler was alleged to have used in 1932 "we shall have friends who will help us in all the enemy countries". It seemed obvious that if there were any party designed to play this part in the United Kingdom it was Mosley's British Union. Urgent representations by the Security Service, therefore, led to the action already described against Mosley and his leading officials on the basis of a new regulation D.R.18B(1A) which came into force on the 22nd May 1940. Again, as already mentioned, the circumstances after the German attack on Russia diminished the importance of this question which came to the fore again, only temporarily, in the summer of 1942 when it seemed possible that the German armies might achieve outstanding success in Southern Russia and the Middle East.

In September 1940 the Home Office had empowered Regional Commissioners to detain certain classes of British subjects and non-enemy aliens in the event of invasion. For this purpose a suspect list was prepared, and it fell to B.7. (F.3.) to prepare their part of it, i.e. that part dealing with British subjects who came within the scope of the charter of the section. The Suspect Lists were submitted by R.S.L.O.s to their respective Regional Commissioners and this work was substantially completed by the summer of 1941. These lists did not include the names of all persons released from detention. In many cases the information obtained about an individual during his detention and his replies to the questions of the Home Office Advisory Committee were sufficient to convince the section that there was no further danger of his rendering active assistance to the enemy. The Suspect List also included persons of German origin or associations, even if unconcerned with Fascist or Right Wing politics, as it was felt that in the event of invasion they were liable to be influenced by German national feeling to assist the invader. The whole question of the Suspect List formed the subject of consultation and correspondence between the section on the one hand and R.S.L.O.s and Special Branch on the other. Although this work was done in view of a contingency which never arose and therefore it never served its primary purpose, it achieved the important secondary purpose of promoting a feeling of additional security against the event of invasion. It also had the effect of keeping a large number of doubtful cases constantly before the police and the Security

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Service. The Security Service was empowered by arrangements with the military authorities to exclude from call-up for H.M. Forces persons appearing on the Suspect List. The Suspect List was finally abolished in September 1944. In November 1943 F.3. took over from F.1. their duties in respect of Fascists, Anarchists and miscellaneous cases of cognate interest in H.M. Forces. (For fuller details regarding the change in functions of F.1. see Chapter V part 2.).

The banning of the British Union under D.R.18AA on the 10th July 1940 combined with the arrest of the leaders brought the Fascist organisation in this country to an end and attempts to revive it in an underground form proved abortive. Other organisations, some of them of a semi-Fascist kind, attracted people with this attitude of mind. These organisations, mostly unimportant in themselves, therefore became the subject of enquiry by F.3. They included the Liberty Restoration League (1940 onwards), the Constitutional Research Association (August 1941 onwards), the People's Common Law Parliament (1941 onwards), the British National Party (May 1942 to May 1943) and the English National Association (June 1943 until its virtual disappearance in the spring of 1944).

In the Research paper on the "fifth column" mentioned above, it had been suggested that a method of obtaining intelligence about elements of the "fifth column" was by a few good and carefully selected penetrative agents, and the Director of B Division had supported this view and had instanced the enquiry which B.1.C. was then making through a well-trying pre-war agent who had for many years given good inside information about the British Union and was in touch with a number of people of British and German origin who held Fascist views. The Director General had, however, decided at that time (in 1942) that he was unwilling to encourage the employment of agents for this purpose on any considerable scale. Experience proved, however, that good information could be obtained in this way and that it was necessary as a complementary measure to the interception of correspondence under Home Office Warrants. Section F.3. was successful in obtaining a small number of good agents who kept them informed of the developments in connection with the various small leagues and associations mentioned above. The most important of these proved to be the Constitutional Research Association in which the leading spirit was one Major Harry Edmonds (vide S.F.50-24-44(79) and S.F.91-1-5(4) Y.B. 4301). The enquiry into these cases proved the nebulous character of much of the Fascist mentality and the vagueness of the programmes which were designed to attract sympathy on the basis of such a wide variety of subjects as anti-semitism and a dislike of the "money-power" and even of opposition to an extension of bureaucracy.

/The results

The results of the B.L.C. case already mentioned were placed at the disposal of P.3. because they covered ground which was primarily P.3.'s concern. This case was originally started in 1940 when Mr. Curry, who had been kept in close touch with the M.S. agent for some years, arranged with Major Maxwell Knight for him to be placed at the disposal of Lord Rothschild in order to attempt to penetrate "fifth column" circles in this country as part of the counter-sabotage work of B.L.C. (then B.18). In the first place the penetration of a group of individuals connected with the German firm of Siemens as a potential field of this kind was attempted. During the next four or five years the enquiry gradually spread until the agent was directly or indirectly in contact with some five hundred Fascist-minded people - not all of British origin - through a number of unconscious sub-agents. The details of the case were very skilfully worked out and are too long to summarise here. The importance of the case arises from the fact that it showed that there was a considerable number of people in London alone - and no similar enquiries have been made to cover the whole of the country - who were ready and willing to help the enemy. Many of them supplied information of military value to our agent in the belief that he was in a position to communicate it to the German Secret Service. His contacts covered such a wide field that it was possible to argue with good reason that if the Germans had had any organisation in touch with such elements in this country they would inevitably have been in touch with some of the wide circle embraced by this enquiry. The argument that they had no such organisation was therefore held to be strongly supported by the circumstances of this enquiry. (Vide P.F.64307 Y.B. 912 held B.L.C.).

The idea of developing the case on these lines was conceived by Lord Rothschild and it was put into effect by the combined efforts of himself, Miss Clay and the agent who proved that he had unusual ability in this direction. The object was to obtain information which should be used only in the crisis of an invasion and not for the purposes of a prosecution. All possible steps were taken to avoid provocation, but the circumstances under which pro-Germans were induced to believe that they were dealing with a secret German agent made it difficult to avoid the appearance of it. At any rate in the event of a prosecution the defence would almost certainly use the argument of the "agent provocateur". It was always intended, however, that no prosecution should ensue, but only preventive action in the event of the supreme crisis of invasion. The result was to furnish valuable information to enable the Security Service to assess the situation without admitting of action against individuals on the basis of this information.

The enquiries made by P.3. during the war, especially those concerned with the new Fascism as it developed during its later stages, showed that it cannot be regarded as a transient phenomenon. It goes back, for instance, to Hobbes and in its modern form it has not been killed by the circumstances of the war. At the end

/of the war

of the war there were still British people of Fascist - or National Socialist - mentality who looked upon Adolf Hitler as a great and inspiring leader. They looked on the defeat of Germany as the defeat of all their hopes.

The problem of Fascism is therefore one which, as far as can be foreseen, seems likely to engage the attention of the Security Service in the coming peace as it did in the inter-war period, but in very different circumstances. It must nevertheless be expected that the parties in various countries which were associated with National Socialism in Germany - such as the Quisling, Mussert or French Fascist Parties - will continue to exist and that, as happened before the war, there will be continued association between them and people of a similar mentality in this country.

(vii) C and D Divisions.

C and D Divisions were together responsible for the preventive work of the Security Service, except in so far as certain aspects of it were dealt with by B Division. They were nominally separate divisions, but they were under an Assistant Director from January 1939 and have had a common Director throughout the period 1941-1945 in the person of Brigadier Allen. C Division, which was responsible for the examination of credentials or vetting, had existed in the period between the wars as C Branch under Captain (afterwards Lt. Colonel) Bacon. D Division as constituted at the time of the re-organisation in 1941 had come into existence gradually as a result of the creation from time to time of sections to deal with specific subjects. Of these sections D.1, 2 and 3 came into existence during the period before the war when British rearmament was being started, their function being to offer advice regarding security measures in factories making equipment for the Armed Forces. D.4, which administered and directed the work of S.C.O.s at sea and airports, came into existence on the outbreak of war; but Colonel Adam, who was in charge of it throughout the period, had been engaged in preparatory work for about a year prior to the outbreak. D.5, which dealt with administrative questions connected with the employment of military personnel in the Security Service, also came into existence at the outbreak of war and D.6, dealing with protected places and areas, the control of photography, identity documents and permits and other matters concerning the War Office, inherited these functions from Lt. Colonel Holt Wilson, who had been engaged on them and on preparations to bring the necessary arrangements into force in the event of war while he held the appointment of Deputy to the Director of the Security Service during the period 1918-1940. Brigadier Allen joined the Security Service in November 1938 and became Assistant Director of C and D Divisions in January 1939 and finally Director of those Divisions in April 1941.

/The process

The process by which the preventive side of the Security Service was formed to meet the exigencies of the second world war makes it difficult to give a clear and coherent account of its development. It may be a little easier to understand if we refer back to the history of M.I.5. in the war of 1914-1918 when the preventive side was known as F Branch, a short reference to which is contained in Chapter III, Part 2 (iii). At that time the principle underlying the organisation of this side of the work was clearly recognised. It was to establish controls which would facilitate the work of detection and in this and other ways frustrate the enemy Secret Intelligence Service. The problem in that war was relatively simple. It was one of preventing first Germans and later persons of other nationalities employed by the Germans as spies from remaining at large in or securing entry to this country and from communicating with the German Secret Service by letter or telegram or by messages delivered personally through travel to neutral countries. As these various aspects of the problem became manifest as a result of M.I.5. investigations, steps were taken to improve the preventive arrangements. The problems created by the "total" organisation for war by the Nazi Party and by the existence of ideological sympathisers in the shape of British Fascists and other pro-Nazis - people of similar mentality to Joyce, Amery or Mrs. Eekersley - did not exist in any comparable form.

In the period between the wars there was virtually no preventive machinery and over a very large field matters of military importance appeared to be an open book for any German to read, especially when their Service Attaches in London and the Nazi Party organisation were in close touch with Germans in a large variety of trades and industries with access to the Services and other Government Departments and a large range of factories engaged in making aircraft and many types of military equipment.

An outstanding case was that of a German, Dr. LACHMANN, who, as chief designer for Handley Page since 1934, was in a position to obtain detailed technical information over the whole field of the British aircraft industry, including military aircraft. He was admittedly loyal to Germany and visited his own country frequently in circumstances which can leave no doubt that he was willing to place his knowledge and ability at its disposal. Equally there was no doubt that the Nazi authorities were aware of the position. He was on very friendly terms with the German Air Attache in London. Handley Page, with an eye to their own profits, resisted security objections to his employment, but in 1936 at the request of the Air Ministry arranged to keep him away from their main works where he would have unlimited access to the firm's secret work for the R.A.F. After Munich the Air Minister personally intervened and informed Handley Page that they must dispense with his services. None the less he was still employed by Handley Page at the outbreak of war and was interned. D.3 maintained that

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even if there were no evidence against him, information about our aircraft reached him legitimately in virtue of the position he held in our aircraft industry and that this position made counter espionage and security measures ineffective. There was no need for Germany to employ spies in the aircraft industry so long as he held this employment. IACHMANN has been released from internment and (in 1946) his future is still under discussion.

As a result of enquiries made during the period 1936-1939 by B Branch and D.1, 2 and 3 attempts were made to narrow the field open to the German Intelligence Services, but the effect was similar to an attempt to block half-a-dozen holes in a sieve containing hundreds.

The conflicting interests of production and security are one of the perennial difficulties of all aspects of security. These difficulties were accentuated before the war and after the beginning of the war by the fact that the major Government Departments had little appreciation of the problems of security and as a rule had no specialised staff of their own with any direct security responsibilities. The result was that in the Services and in other Government Departments responsibility for security was not felt in any real sense. Referring to the War Office, for instance, Brigadier Allen remarks that it was fairly safe to say that before the war broke out in 1939 general defensive security measures were not being considered except in M.I.5. (and in the "Control of Aliens in War" Committee) where Lt. Colonel Holt Wilson was engaged in the preliminary work connected with Defence Regulations, Passes, Permits, DR Forms and the control of entry to protected areas, but no one else in the War Office had any knowledge of what was being done, while M.I.5. had no executive authority to enable it to bring the necessary measures into force.

D.1, D.2 and D.3. The development of arrangements to control access to protected places - to places of military importance including war factories - by the construction of physical and the provision of human obstacles has been the subject of elaborate study and has produced a large volume of D Division literature on the subject which is contained in divisional reports (vide S.F.50-24-44 (50) to (59)).

"Notes on Munitions Security", of which the fourth revised edition appeared in August 1942, supplies detailed advice for the benefit of factory managements and staff on a great volume of details under headings dealing with enemy agents and methods of munitions espionage, methods of munitions security, passes, credentials, employment of aliens, secret documents and their custody, disposal of waste-paper, precautions against sabotage, various forms of sabotage and the control of photography among numerous other details. "The Notes for the Guidance of the Approved Authority in Charge of a Protected Place" is another example of detailed instructions which have been prepared and issued.

/The subjects

The subjects which are common to D.1, 2 and 3 include the detailed consideration of the layout of factories from the security point of view with special reference to problems of fencing, the layout of factory entrances, the "lane" system of entry for employees, problems concerning factory Home Guards, air-raid precautions, the employment of aliens and the assessment of risks in employing aliens. In fact there is almost no limit to the detail with which security problems relating to factories have been examined.

The employment of aliens has involved a close liaison between A.W.S. Department and the D sections, the latter, in view of local knowledge of individual factories, having been in a position to weigh up facts which could not be known to the A.W.S. Department. The nature and the variety of the problems is illustrated by the considerations involved in the employment of neutral aliens in view of the existence of channels of communication between England and neutral countries such as the transit of documents by diplomatic bag or by individual travellers.

A subject which received attention from D sections was the possibility of leakage through insurance policies taken out by factories. Enquiries into this subject were made by B Division. Insurance is essentially world-wide and international; and in connection with re-insurances information about the industry of one country is passed to insurance companies in another. Discussions were accordingly opened with the insurance market about the steps which could be taken to safeguard information in their possession. The problem was found to present considerable difficulties which led to the conclusion that a scheme to solve them should be considered in the event of another major war.

These few instances which have been selected almost at random will serve to illustrate the amount of specialised study which has been given to the subject and the extent to which security measures can be elaborated.

D.1 besides dealing with the Ministry of Supply was concerned with the Ministry of Food, the Ministry of Health, Railway Companies and Public Utility Companies.

D.2 was mainly concerned with the liaison with the Admiralty to cover the security of secret contracts and with security advice to civil engineering and contractors' firms handling Admiralty contracts. They were also concerned with special measures to cover radar training, special measures preceding D Day and shipping security.

D.3 was concerned with security problems affecting the Air Ministry, the Ministry of Aircraft Production, aircraft factories and the companies responsible for the storage and distribution of petroleum products.

/While

While D.1 was limited in scope to the subjects mentioned above, D.2 and D.3 had wider functions. They were in a sense representatives of the Director of Naval Intelligence and of the Director of Intelligence, Air Ministry respectively; and they played an important part as liaison officers between sections of all Divisions in the Security Service and different parts of the Admiralty or Air Ministry. Various problems arose from time to time in which officers of B sections, for instance, found it necessary to make enquiries affecting various aspects of the administration of the Services. D.2 and D.3 were in a position to arrange the necessary contacts and furnish advice and guidance to the parties concerned. The move to Blenheim at the end of 1940 made it difficult for these sections to maintain satisfactory contact in many cases and after a time either the heads of sections or a representative was moved back to London.

D.6, G.1 and G.2/C & D. Similar functions in relation to the War Office were discharged by the Director C & D assisted by D.6 and by G.1 and G.2/C & D. The latter dealt with matters of interest to the War Office both in policy and in detail and also with other departments when the subject matter was of interest to them. Military security cases which necessitated a personal interview with officers at the War Office were handled in London by G.1 or G.2/C & D. D.1 and D.2 worked at country headquarters, D.3 partly in London and partly in the country after the move to Blenheim and subjects of common interest to these three sections were co-ordinated by D.6 in the country and by G.1 or G.2/C & D in London.

From the end of January 1941 onwards a weekly meeting of representatives of D.1, D.2 and D.3 was held under the chairmanship of Lt. Colonel Norman who was then Deputy D. When he retired in April 1944 D.6 supplied the chairman and the secretary for this meeting, the object of which was to exchange ideas and discuss points of mutual interest so that all the three sections should work on a common security plan and furnish their views as might be desirable to the Director C & D.

D.6 dealt with questions which affected the War Office in connection with -

- (a) the declaration of protected places;
- (b) "controlled areas";
- (c) general permits, passes and identity documents;
- (d) military security and -
- (e) control of photography and sketching.

The detailed work connected with the issue of individual permits in connection with the control of photography, protected places, protected and regulated areas and the declaration and cancellation

/of protected

of protected places was dealt with by D.6; while questions of policy which required consideration by the Security Executive or consultation with Services or other Departments were handled in London by G.1 or G.2/C & D who also dealt with a variety of subjects, including the use of Defence Regulations for the protection of secret trials and tests, measures to safeguard the security of operations, policy regarding the enlistment and employment of aliens in the Forces, travel to operational areas, security matters affecting Allied contingents in the United Kingdom, liaison with the United States Forces, security questions concerning prisoners of war, general policy and liaison with supply departments on matters of common interest to D.1, D.2 and D.3 and matters raised at the monthly D meetings.

Monthly D meetings were inaugurated by the Director C & D in May 1943. The object was to extend the purposes served by the weekly meeting to a larger membership including representatives of other Services or Departments closely associated with D Division in security matters. Among those attending were the Chief Security Officer, Ministry of Supply and representatives of the Ministry of Aircraft Production, of the Admiralty and of different branches of the War Office. The monthly meeting quickly became established as a recognised link in the security network. It served to focus the discussion of a very wide range of subjects with results profitable to the Security Service and the other Departments concerned.

D Division in relation to the War Office, the Admiralty and the Air Ministry. In spite of the separation of the Security Service from the War Office which in effect dates from 1931 - although the separation was never formally acknowledged - the War Office has continued to deal with D Division in some respects as though it were a part of the War Office. War Office files on security matters affecting all branches of the War Office are received in D Division, replies to questions raised therein being dealt with by G.1 and G.2/C & D or the Director C & D after consultation with other Divisions of the Security Service concerned; and Security Service advice is thus conveyed to the War Office through this channel. The Director C & D is frequently asked to brief the General Staff on subjects coming before the Chiefs of Staff, ministerial meetings and the Cabinet and by this means opportunity is afforded to express Security Service views on questions which would not have come to notice through any other channel. War Office telegrams, Army Council papers and inter-departmental correspondence are forwarded to the Director C & D for information if there is any security flavour in them. In short the War Office is the only major department through which the Security Service has been kept in touch with many matters on which its views are relevant and desirable. The Director C & D and G.1/C & D as his personal Staff Officer have served to co-ordinate matters affecting other Divisions of the Security Service and to furnish advice which during the war has often been sought and expected at very short notice. Officers of D Division have attended briefing meetings in the War Office to ensure that Security Service views were properly presented.

/The Director

The Director C & D has been the Security Service representative on the J.I.C. His attendance, accompanied when necessary by a specialist officer from other Divisions, has enabled him to fulfil an essential function and to represent security interests at these meetings. The receipt of a large volume of J.I.C. papers has assisted him and through him the Security Service as a whole to keep in touch with a wide range of security problems and to know when to apply the necessary correctives or to ensure that security interests are properly covered.

From March 1940 to October 1944 Brigadier Allen held the position of D.D.M.I.(S) under the D.M.I. at the War Office in addition to his appointment as Director C & D in the Security Service. This dual appointment was made at the request of the D.M.I., War Office, primarily to ensure a closer co-ordination between the Security Service and the War Office and to assist the War Office in building up their own security procedure on a sound foundation. The effect was to weld the two systems more into one by preventing overlapping and filling in the gaps. It became a process of advice, education and co-ordination. The War Office gradually became aware that they were really dealing with the domestic security of the Army and they learned of the contribution which the Security Service could make from the wider background of national security.

Although the War Office learned these lessons the same process had to be adopted later to persuade COSSAC and SHAEF that the best method of organising an I(B) Staff in the field was to draw largely on the Security Service for personnel qualified in "civil security". The War Office Manual defines Civil Security as "Measures taken within a civil population to defeat any covert attack made either on the armed forces or on the national war effort as a whole by hostile influences working through the civil community". The fundamental fact is that until a military force enters a theatre of war overseas it has had no practical experience of how to handle "civil security" or counter espionage.

The position of D.2 vis-a-vis the Admiralty and that of D.3 vis-a-vis the Air Ministry were as follows:-

In the early stages of the war the head of D.2 was to a large extent involved in work other than that concerned with industrial security. This arose from the fact that the A.D.N.I. relied on him to collaborate with other sections of the Security Service in order to deal with purely Admiralty interests in -

- (a) the declaration of protected places to cover Admiralty interests;
- (b) the detailed organisation of the Fleet base security officers;
- (c) the employment of labour from Eire within the protected areas;

/(d)

- (d) Contraband Control problems;
- (e) naval identity documents in general including the provision of passes for officers and ratings proceeding into protected areas;
- (f) questions arising from the declaration of Admiralty establishments as protected places;
- (g) the control of enemy aliens and British merchant ships and anti-sabotage measures;
- (h) war-time policy for the vetting of Admiralty employees.

He was also regarded as the channel through which sections of the Security Service directed almost all enquiries involving a naval interest, including port security control questions. The effect of this attitude of the A.D.N.I. was to render it difficult for the head of D.2 to devote sufficient time to security problems connected with important contracts and factories. At a later stage A.D.N.I.'s office widened its security field and became accustomed to deal with several individuals in the Security Service on various problems. This suited the Admiralty better and D.2 was able to devote the bulk of its time to munitions security.

D.3 in addition to acting as advisers and inspecting security arrangements in M.A.P. factories had duties which necessitated liaison with the following among others at the Air Ministry and M.A.P.:-

Liaison with Air Ministry

- (i) D. of I.(S), D.D.I.(S) and sections under them;
- (ii) Provost Marshal, who implements the security policy within the R.A.F. laid down by D. of I.(S);
- (iii) Inspector of R.A.F. Accidents, whose investigations may bring to light suspicions of sabotage of aircraft;
- (iv) Secretarial Branches who handle recruitment of civil staff.

Liaison with M.A.P.

- (i) P.S.6. (Security);
- (ii) Aeronautical Inspection Department H.Q., to whom their staff in factories report suspicious circumstances which come to light during their duties;
- (iii) M.A.P. Regional Officers, who handle routine physical protection measures for factories;
- (iv) Secretarial Branches who handle recruitment of staff.

/The fact

The fact that the Security Service had grown out of M.I.5, which was originally a part of the War Office was responsible for a desire in the Air Ministry and M.A.P. to see vetting carried out by D.3 as being a staff with "Air" interests. A system has accordingly been evolved whereby D.3 do this work in co-operation with the Assistant Director, C Division, working to a general policy and under his guidance. For this purpose D.3 deals direct with several branches of the Air Ministry and of the M.A.P.

D Sections and Intelligence. The D Sections have direct relations with sections in all parts of the Security Service and among other important functions have been responsible for bringing a number of new problems to the notice of B Division. For instance, Group Captain Archer, as already mentioned, first emphasised the importance of the machine tool industry and long before the war assisted in obtaining information about the important part played in this industry by the representatives of German firms with consequent danger to security. Again D.3 was concerned in working out practical measures for the security of Radar. Captain Bardwell of D.2 early in the war brought to notice the absence of arrangements to deal with enquiries about sabotage to shipping in foreign ports or on the high seas.

Whenever any of the D sections came into touch with or discovered a new problem, steps were taken to have it investigated in co-operation with other Divisions. Owing to the secrecy surrounding the special intelligence dealt with in B Division, officers in D Division were apt to feel that they were left in the dark and that it would have been possible to take preventive measures more effectively if they had been more closely and constantly informed of the position in regard to what was known to B Division about enemy espionage.

D.4 and S.C.O.s at Ports. The work of D.4 and S.C.O.s at sea and airports and the establishment of travel and port control has been referred to in Chapter IV, Part 1 (iv) and Chapter V, Part 1 (iv). The former dealt briefly with the developments at the beginning of the war and the latter with the important positive part played by S.C.O.s in assisting B Division in detecting enemy agents arriving from enemy-occupied territory. It has been shown that the crucial importance of the S.C.O.s' part was the result of the Home Office decision that Immigration Officers should refuse to any alien leave to land or embark if the S.C.O. advised to that effect, the reason for this procedure being that the S.C.O.s, as instructed by B Division, would often be in possession of information (i.e. information about the German Secret Service derived from secret sources) which was not available to the Immigration officer.

In addition to these important functions the S.C.O.s, under the guidance and control of A.D.D.4., had other important duties to fulfil. These

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have been described at great length in the sectional report (vide S.F.50-24-44(50)) which cannot be adequately summarised here.

Some essential points not dealt with above may be mentioned. The S.C.O.s at sea and airports were the only part of the Security Service organisation which was in direct contact with the public and they were in this position as military officers and other ranks in uniform. Unlike a police officer who has a personal liability, a military officer is bound to obey the orders of his superior and, in the case of any complaint or action regarding irregularity, it is sufficient defence for him to say that he was carrying out an order; and responsibility for his action would then fall on the officer who gave the order, in this case A.D.D.4. The situation, therefore, was one of some delicacy because, in the event of serious complaint from the public, the War Office could hardly have accepted a position under which complaints were addressed to the Secretary of State for War in regard to personnel not under his direct control and carrying out policy for which he was not directly responsible. In practice no serious difficulty arose. *? War Criminals*

The work done by D.4 and the S.C.O.s has been classified as follows:-

- (a) documentary control of travel into the United Kingdom;
- (b) documentary control of travel out of the United Kingdom;
- (c) control of travel through the military Permit Office;
- (d) physical control of travel at ports;
- (e) censorship;
- (f) security of military embarkations and operations;
- (g) security of shipping;
- (h) collection of intelligence;
- (i) liaison with Government Departments and Allied Services;
- (j) maintenance and distribution of a Black list of suspects for use at ports in this country and abroad.

A.D.D.4. has emphasised the distinction between paper control and physical control. The former is concerned with all the details connected with passports, visas, exit permits and the vetting of such cases or reference to Security Service records. Vetting can only have a negative effect

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in that the Security Service records can never be complete and comprehensive. They cannot contain information about all individual agents of the enemy or even of all persons in regard to whom it may be undesirable to allow them to travel in wartime. Security Service objections were usually upheld by the Passport Control Department, but sometimes when a refusal was likely to lead to a question in Parliament the case was referred to the Home Office and the Security Service point of view was not always adopted.

The physical control at ports involved the whole of the Security Control Officers' work in connection with travellers, seamen, fishermen, the physical protection at ports, protection against sabotage and the control of air traffic. The S.C.O.'s personal knowledge and the general body of intelligence collected by him locally and derived by him from the Security Service as a whole were main factors in this.

The distribution of duties in D.4 at Head Office was as follows from the beginning of the war until 1942:-

D.4	(in control of section):	Lt. Col. J.H. Adam 3 secretaries.
D.4.a.	Exit Permits and Military Permits:	Capt. W.S. Mars Lt. T. Nesbitt 4 secretaries.
D.4.b.	Port Intelligence, General Correspondence and Telephone Communi- cations with Ports:	Lt. Col. C.H. Burne Lt. T. Bardwell 2 civilian officers 2 secretaries.
D.4.c.	Inspection & Port Security Measures:	Cdr. Burton 2 secretaries.
D.4.d.	Circulars, Black Lists and Visas:	Cdr. Cazelet Lt. Prioleau 2 secretaries.
D.4.e.	Liaison with Home Office & Passport Office re files and records:	in charge of Head of Section 2 secretaries.

From March 1942 onwards D.4 was re-organised on the advice of D.D.O. on the following lines:-

D.4	Security control at sea and airports; Travel control; Liaison with V.P.A. re provision of police and guarding of vulnerable points:	Lt. Col. Adam in charge Major C.H. Burne deputy.
D.4.a.	Travel, Entry and Exit of Travellers at ports, vetting of applications for Visas and Exit Permits; Military Permits:	Major W.S. Mars in charge.

/D.4.b.

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- D.4.b. Intelligence and seamen, receipt and distribution of port intelligence and allied matters; security of shipping and seamen etc: Major M.B. Heywood in charge.
- D.4.c. Administration, administrative matters connected with S.C.O.s, issue of D.4 Daily Report and circulars to S.C.O.s, co-ordination of administrative information and instructions to S.C.O.s; military travel and embarkations; Black Lists: Major A.P. Noble in charge.
- D.4.d. Inspection, visits to and inspection of S.C.O.s as directed by officer in charge of D.4: Major J.G.F. Robb
- D.4(L) Liaison section in London: Miss

At the outbreak of hostilities S.C.O.s were posted with one section comprising one Warrant Officer and twelve other ranks except as otherwise stated as follows:-

Avonmouth:	Capt. G.L. Stratton, M.C.
Barry Docks:	Col. S. Mathews
Birkenhead:	Lt.Col. P.B. Kemble
Cardiff:	Col. Idwal Jones
Falmouth:	J.T.W. Filson, Esq.
Folkestone:	Sir Arthur Jelf, C.M.G.
Fishguard:	Capt. R.S. Kelway
Glasgow:	Major J.G. Ferrier Robb, M.C.
Heysham:	Major O.N. Wightman, T.D.
Holyhead:	Capt. O.B. Edwards
Hull:	B.K. Barton, Esq.
Leith:	Capt. V.M. Price
Liverpool:	Capt. A.J. Macphail
London:	W.H.A. Webster, Esq. C.I.E.
Newcastle:	Capt. F.C. Clayton, M.C.
Newhaven:	Major A.F. Mills
Newport:	Capt. T.H. Vile
Plymouth:	Capt. F.R. Floyd, M.C.
Stranraer:	W. Dyer, Esq.
Swansea:	Col. B.R. Benyon Winsor
Southampton:	J.C. Fairweather
Bristol Whitechurch:	Major E.S. Humphry
Liverpool Speke:	P.L. Taylor, Esq.
Pembroke Dock:	B.W. Allen, Esq.
Perth:	Major J.R. Couper
Poole:	Capt. C.C. Carter
Shoreham:	B.C. Gee, Esq.

This strength proved inadequate and early in 1940 representations were made that the strength should be made five officers per section. In July 1942 fifty additional officers were sanctioned. Further proposals for an increase were made in 1943, but these were not finally sanctioned until June 1944. In the meanwhile

two Inspecting Officers had joined headquarters and there had been a constant demand to supply trained Port Security Officers for overseas stations in the Caribbean and Africa. In July 1942 two officers were sent to Canada to advise on the Port Security Establishment in that country. Four officers were supplied to North Africa in 1943. After the formation of SHARP, Lt. Colonel Robb and twelve other officers together with a number of other ranks were lent for employment under the 21st Army Group. In October 1944 eleven officers and thirty N.C.O.s were supplied as the nucleus for the establishment of Port and Travel Control in India.

The actual strength of the Security Control personnel at ports grew from 29 officers and 328 other ranks in September 1939 to 117 officers and 825 other ranks in May 1943 and subsequently to 206 officers and 415 other ranks and 39 A.T.S. in April 1945. At the last-mentioned date an R.A.F. establishment was being set up at airports, to which 21 R.A.F. officers had been posted under D.4, the authorised establishment being 70 officers and 60 W.A.A.F.

Various problems and difficulties which arose during the war gave rise to proposals for future arrangements to avoid a recurrence of the difficulty caused by the absence of trained personnel prior to September 1939. These proposals were linked with other proposals regarding the establishment of an Intelligence Corps during peace-time as a reserve from which officers for a Security Service and other Intelligence duties could be drawn.

Brigadier Allen has made the following comments on the initial difficulties of creating the organisation at the ports:-

"In creating this port organisation from absolutely nothing our resources at Head Office before war broke out were too slender. Some considerable effort had been made by a travelling officer who visited the major ports in the United Kingdom and began recruiting officers and other ranks on a gentleman's agreement to come forward in the event of war. Local Chief Constables were approached and the majority of names of officers were obtained with their co-operation. The officers themselves were responsible for collecting the names of suitable other ranks.

We expected that if war did break out we should continue to recruit through our own resources; the growth of the organisation made this impossible and on grounds of manpower alone we became dependent on the 'I' Corps to provide us with personnel. The War Office did this handsomely.

The chief lessons learned from those early days are:-

/(a)

(a) Head Office must know what an organisation of this kind is going to look like. In order to do this one must have a fairly detailed knowledge of the quantity and type of ship and air traffic and the capacity of ports.

(b) Neither local authorities at ports nor departments in Whitehall were sufficiently aware of what we were going to do at the ports. Hence, port security personnel were regarded with grave suspicion, particularly by police in many places. Obviously our personnel had to learn their job from the very beginning and inevitably trod on the toes of certain local authorities such as the C.I.D. at Liverpool.

This is only one more example of the general departmental ignorance as to the functions and methods of M.I.5. All these difficulties and disadvantages had to be overcome by a laborious process of liaison and education generally. Eventually, as the organisation grew in size and efficiency its value became generally recognised. If a Secret Service is going to operate overtly in this way it is absolutely essential that all concerned should know what we are planning and why.

I would like to stress the value and importance of central control from Security Service Headquarters. Such work cannot be decentralised on a district basis.

It is essential that Headquarters should include at a pretty early stage officers who have already had experience at the ports, otherwise local problems and difficulties will not be properly appreciated.

Port Security overseas in maritime colonies and dominions had not been thought out on any proper basis. We soon learned this from reports obtained at United Kingdom ports, but we were unable to correct it until we had sufficient trained staff ourselves.

Problems which have to be handled are numerous and complex, and it is essential that the Security Service should be better prepared next time to create an organisation of this kind."

C Division. Before the war an attempt had been made to keep aliens of German and Italian nationalities out of the Armed Forces and to examine cases where persons of those nationalities applied for naturalisation as British subjects with a view to preventing undesirables from acquiring British nationality. The reasons in both cases arose out of B Branch enquiries regarding the organisation of the Nazi State. Certain cases had come to light which proved that the Nazi Government would consent to Germans acquiring British nationality while retaining

/their

their original nationality and membership of the Nazi Party if it was in the interests of Germany that they should do so. It was felt that from the security point of view this involved bad faith and constituted a danger. Up to April 1941 enemy aliens were ineligible for commissions, but after that date the door was opened, although commissions were generally limited to the Pioneer Corps. This limitation was slowly but progressively relaxed as a result of Army Council policy until eventually it became possible for an enemy alien to hold a commission in practically any corps or regiment of the army, even including the Intelligence Corps.

In consequence of the number of German and Austrian servants in this country before the war and the numbers of them employed in or near important military centres, steps were taken to prohibit the employment of a servant inside Service establishments without permission. This permission was not given without the approval of the Security Service, but there were no restrictions on the employment of aliens in the private households of members of H.M. Forces or Government officials. In May 1940 the J.I.C. recommended that all members of the Services and officials of Government Departments should be forbidden to employ enemy aliens and a month later instructions based on these recommendations were issued to all Commands at home. A circular was also issued with the approval of the Prime Minister to the heads of Government Departments drawing attention to their responsibility where aliens were employed in their households.

The main duty of C Division has been the examination of credentials of individuals, British and foreign, Service and civilian, wherever it was considered desirable to check them against Security Service records by reason of -

- (a) the type of employment involving secrecy or reliability and -
- (b) foreign nationality or connections.

The object of this check was the discovery and diversion from certain categories of employment of persons of undesirable foreign nationality or connections or persons sympathetic to Axis ideals or otherwise constituting a security danger.

This checking against Security Service records is of purely negative value; it does not mean that all undesirables are kept out of certain categories of employment, but merely that persons of whom the Security Service happen to have a record come to notice. The responsibility for deciding in each case whether an individual should be excluded from any category of employment is the responsibility of the Government Department concerned and the security records cannot be complete or comprehensive. They cannot include persons whose activities have not in some way or other brought them on to the records.

/Soon after

Soon after the outbreak of war the numbers of names submitted for vetting was so large that it substantially contributed to the breakdown of the Security Service at that time. In the middle of 1940 it was agreed at the instance of Lord Swinton that the security vetting of many industrial grades of civilian state employment should be abandoned. Further reduction in "vettable" categories were later secured as a result of the Bridges Panel Report in June 1942. These categories were then virtually limited to employment involving duties of a Top Secret or Secret character or where complete integrity was essential in the national interests.

In April 1942 the Director General issued a circular on the duties of C Division, one of the main objects of which was to ensure that the Security Service should always speak with one voice in relation to vetting cases. In June 1942 a secret memorandum on the examination of credentials was issued for the guidance of officials in Government Departments and branches dealing with vetting cases in the light of the Bridges Report. This memorandum stressed the fact that a practice had grown up of telling applicants that they would be vetted by M.I.5. or informing applicants who had been classified by the Security Service as undesirable that they had been turned down by that Service. It was laid down that the fact that the Security Service was involved should never be mentioned in such cases.

During the period from September 1939 to December 1944 C Division gave adverse information and advice in the cases of 9,943 persons. It is claimed that this action cannot have failed to make an extensive contribution to defensive security and that the fact that serious complaints have arisen in but a very small proportion of this total suggests that our organisation and methods have been built up on sound principles. As far as can be judged, there has been no defect in vetting from the point of view of security against enemy penetration in connection with the war. The chapters in this report dealing with Communism make it clear that the vetting system is in no sense an effective protection against the infiltration of Communists into a wide range of important official posts, including those of commissioned officers in H.M. Forces. This is not due to any defect in vetting procedure.

The larger aspects of the security
problem; the Cabinet Offices and the J.I.C. The account in Chapter II, Part 2 (iii) of the preventive machinery in 1914-1918 showed that branches under Lt. Colonel Holt Wilson included those dealing with preventive work generally, alien war service, overseas forces and control of ports and frontiers. During the period between the wars this organisation lapsed. Colonel Holt Wilson's duties were confined to those connected with the preparation of regulations, security chapters in Service manuals, lectures at Staff Colleges

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and arrangements for permits and passes and other preventive measures in the event of war. When war came he did not resume all the responsibilities which he had undertaken in the previous war. C & D Divisions, under Brigadier Allen, assumed some of them while those connected with Defence Security Officers in the Colonies and the organisation in the Middle East had become detached under the present A Division.

In the war of 1939-1945 C and D Divisions were not responsible over the whole field of preventive measures. They were not concerned with the internment of aliens or with action under Defence Regulation 18B. Again they were not concerned with the Postal and Telegraph Censorship and the B Division Censorship liaison, which covers a wide field of preventive security.

Apart from the question of security against espionage and of the measures necessary to prevent enemy agents from getting direct access to information, there is a wider risk, namely that of secrets becoming public property through carelessness or disregard of security instructions. Brigadier Allen has pointed out that in this sense defensive security cannot be the sole responsibility of the Security Service. The field is so wide and the channels of possible leakage so numerous that unless every Service and Government Department and every establishment concerned with important war secrets is fully alive to the dangers and is prepared to safeguard them on a carefully planned system, leakage on a dangerous and considerable scale is bound to occur. Real progress has been made in many directions and officers have been appointed to deal with security in most branches of the machinery of Government. Further developments are in progress. The Home Defence Security Executive with its original somewhat detached role has now become the Standing Inter-Departmental Committee on security under the wing of the Cabinet Offices. The (Bridges) Panel on security arrangements in Government Departments has made a useful contribution and it is expected that, in some form, it will continue to function and will be located in the Cabinet Offices. The Joint Intelligence Committee will continue as a sub-committee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee where inter-Services security problems can be discussed. Developments overseas point to the continuation of Joint Intelligence Committees in the main theatres, including occupied Europe and the Middle East, India and the Far East. Security interests will be represented on such committees and the Dominions will probably be invited to follow suit.

Brigadier Allen has emphasised the importance of the far-reaching security measures taken to protect the "Overlord" operation for the campaign in Normandy. These measures included a complete ban, with exceptions in the case of Russia and the U.S.A., on the movements and on uncensored communications of foreign diplomats. These security measures - combined with deception - gave the Allies the weapon they most needed - surprise, but with all these advantages

/and with

and with the strategic initiative in Allied hands, the whole operation could have been jeopardised if the Germans had had one really first-class channel of information, unknown to us, on which their High Command could have placed complete reliance.

(viii) A Division (Regional Control).

A Division Organisation. The organisation of A Division after the summer of 1941 is as given in the chart in Appendix II.

The main account of the work of A Division will be found under Part 4 (Internal Organisation and Staff of the Security Service), but one of its components, Regional Control, is described here because it originated from the circumstances of the war with Germany and its main functions were concerned with developments of the war situation. Correspondence between Head Office sections and Regional Security Liaison Officers in regard to Communism was conducted on different lines from that connected with the war; R.S.L.O.s only received copies of correspondence with Chief Constables. The ground for this differentiation was that the subject of Communism was handled on different lines as a matter of long-term policy.

Regional Control. This section was transferred from B Division to A Division in August 1941, but its main functions continued unchanged on lines already described in Chapter IV above. In May 1941, soon after his appointment as Director General, Sir David Petrie called a conference in connection with the regional organisation. He explained that the reasons for establishing the R.S.L.O.s had been:-

- (a) to bring the Security Service into closer touch with provincial Police Forces;
- (b) to reduce the accumulating amount of work at Head Office;
- (c) to expedite the treatment of reports and correspondence from Chief Constables;
- (d) to provide the basis of an organisation in case of invasion when Head Office might be cut off from provincial districts;

and that their principal functions were:-

- (a) to deal with Chief Constables and their staffs on all matters concerning the Security Service (with certain specified exceptions, e.g. Communism);
- (b) to assist and advise those concerned in dealing with problems of the arrest, search and interrogation of suspects of security interest;

/(c)

- (c) to deal with individual cases locally where possible and to reduce the volume of enquiries sent to Head Office;
- (d) to collaborate with the naval, military and air force intelligence officers in the regions on all matters of mutual interest;
- (e) R.S.L.O.s should not normally make enquiries on their own, but should always act in this connection through the police.

Thus, by the summer of 1941 when the re-organisation of the Security Service was gradually put into effect the position of Regional Control and the R.S.L.O.s had crystallised and, after overcoming initial difficulties largely due to the flooding of the office with numerous denunciations and reports about suspected spies, the staff in the Regions had settled down to deal with its work on systematic lines. There were certain respects in which the position was not clearly established; although the functions of the R.S.L.O.s had been defined on such broad lines as to leave it open to them to deal in their regions with any aspect of the work of the Security Service, certain exceptions developed in practice. Sections D.1, D.2 and D.3, which dealt with security in factories and other establishments under the Ministry of Supply and the Ministry of Aircraft Production, did not delegate their work to the R.S.L.O.s. The reasons for this were that these D sections had close relations with and understood the problems of their own Services and their supply departments on the one hand and also had close personal relations with individuals at the factories and other establishments on the other.

There was none the less a tendency on the part of the regional organisation to claim that their functions should be understood as embracing this among all the other aspects of the work of the Security Service.

An exception was also made at first in the case of the section responsible for the internal security of the Forces and for War Office establishments and Ordnance Factories. This exception, however, disappeared when this section (B.1 afterwards F.1) was merged in the section dealing with Communists and Fascists (F.2 and F.3). The exception originally made in regard to Fascists had broken down from the beginning, but that in regard to Communists - whereby correspondence was conducted direct between the Communist section and the police - was maintained on the ground that it was a question of long-term policy and was not directly connected with the war effort.

The question of the relative spheres of the R.S.L.O. and the S.C.O. at ports and airports under A.D.D.4. also gave rise to difficulties which were settled by the Director General in two circulars, one arising out of the Regional Officers Conference

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on the 13th and 14th May 1941 and the second in a circular issued on the 10th February 1942 which elaborated the instructions of May 1941.

The question came to a head because the section of B Division responsible for the investigation of sabotage had met with difficulties in dealing with the police in connection with enquiries in port areas. The Director General emphasised that the R.S.L.O.s and S.C.O.s were both parts of the same service and must speak with the same voice to the police and other local authorities. Each must keep the other closely informed of all matters of common interest and steps must be taken to ensure that both arranged for information to reach the sections concerned in Head Office through the appropriate channel. In practice it was found that close collaboration between the R.S.L.O. and the S.C.O. was of the utmost importance in connection with measures for detecting the arrival of enemy agents, and it was found that an intelligent and imaginative interpretation of the instructions on the subject of mutual co-operation removed the difficulties which had arisen in the early stages.

The R.S.L.O. played an important part not only as liaison officer with the Police, but also with numerous other local officials of different parts of the machinery of government. He was generally the security adviser to the Regional Commissioner for all purposes and he was in close contact with him in connection with the latter's powers for the detention of individuals under the Defence Regulations in the event of invasion. For this purpose the Regional Commissioner's Suspect List and the Enemy Aliens Invasion List were prepared. The process varied in different regions in accordance with the different roles played by the various legal advisers, Acting Inspectors of Constabulary, Principal Officers, Regional Police Staff Officers and the Regional Commissioners themselves. The R.S.L.O. had to establish satisfactory relations with all these officers and he had to prepare the Suspect Lists in consultation with the Police and with the various sections of the Security Service which were concerned with different nationalities and classes of persons. It was laid down that the R.S.L.O. should not agree to the deletion of a name from the lists without consulting the appropriate head office section, but that he could add a name on his own initiative. The cases were reviewed from time to time.

The Home Office had started to make releases of enemy aliens from internment in 1940 and this process continued throughout the war. Enemy aliens so released formed the bulk of the names on the Enemy Aliens Invasion List. Releases were not recommended by Head Office sections without consulting the R.S.L.O. and through him the Chief Constable concerned. This procedure removed grounds for complaint that in some cases aliens were released

/against

against the wishes of the Police and without their having any opportunity to protest in advance. When an alien was released the Head Office section supplied all available information to the Police through the R.S.L.O.

The R.S.L.O. was concerned with the detailed arrangements for restrictions on aliens under the Aliens (Movement Restriction) Order and with all measures connected with the restrictions placed on aliens to prevent them from entering areas adjoining the coast of Great Britain and certain other vulnerable areas.

The R.S.L.O. was responsible for liaison with the local representatives of the Ministry of Supply, the Ministry of Information, the Ministry of Labour, local Censorship units, the Radio Security Section, the Railway Police and certain semi-official organisations such as the British Council (which last undertook work among the alien communities in this country).

The contact with representatives of the Ministry of Supply was important because the R.S.L.O. was called upon to deal with questions where an individual was considered unsuitable for employment in a Royal Ordnance Factory or Ministry of Supply Depot on account of having been reported as doubtful or unreliable for reasons connected with any form of subversive activity.

Among the most important relations of the R.S.L.O. were those with the Military, Naval and Air authorities. Where the Army was concerned the R.S.L.O. was most directly concerned with the Security Officers at Command Headquarters who, in the early stages of the war, were under the Director of C and D Divisions and, after 1940, were officers on the General Staff and were known as G.S.O.2.I(B). The R.S.L.O.s had to overcome certain difficulties arising from the fact that the situation was new both to the Military authorities and the Police. They succeeded in obtaining the confidence of both. This was achieved in part by clarifying the position in regard to the functions of the G.S.O.2.I(B), the Police and themselves in connection with Security Service investigations regarding persons suspected of subversive activities. An important part in this was played by the Special Branches of local Police Forces which had been established throughout the country. R.S.L.O.s attended conferences of Police officers of Special Branches from their region and by arranging for G.S.O.2.I(B) officers to attend they were able to facilitate a mutual understanding of each other's problems.

It had been decided early in 1941 that in the event of invasion R.S.L.O.s should establish close liaison with the headquarters of Military and R.A.F. formations in their regions. For this purpose the R.S.L.O. was to be attached to Command Headquarters while his staff at the Regional Commissioner's headquarters was to be strengthened.

/Liaison

Liaison was established on similar lines with the Provost Branch of the R.A.F. The R.S.L.O. was not in equally close touch with the Naval authorities as this function was discharged by the S.C.O. who was in day-to-day contact with them.

The arrival of German secret agents in connection with the projected invasion of this country in the summer and autumn of 1940 brought the R.S.L.O.s in coastal regions into touch with problems concerning the steps to be taken to render such landings difficult. Minefields and barbed wire provided physical obstacles, but the position was not satisfactory in lonely parts of the coast. As a result of representations made by the Admiralty and the Security Service the coastguard establishment was substantially increased early in 1942 and they were given the status of members of the Armed Forces; but the position continued to present difficulties. In January 1943 contact was made with R.A.F. Radar who undertook to report suspicious aircraft movements and the suspicious movements of vessels. An exercise staged eleven months later provided a 'rude shock' by showing that neither Radar nor the coastguards was infallible and all the six men who took part in the exercise landed without attracting attention. The arrangements were, therefore, further improved and steps were taken for information about suspicious movements of any unidentified vessels to be reported to the R.S.L.O. either direct or through the S.C.O.

As part of their general function of furnishing liaison between Head Office and the Police R.S.L.O.s were called on to play a part in enquiries connected with the arrest of enemy agents whenever these occurred in or concerned their regions.

Under the more settled conditions of 1942 and 1943, the pressure of work in connection with their earlier problems having diminished, R.S.L.O.s found themselves confronted with new duties such as rendering assistance to S.I.S., S.O.E. and later O.S.S. in connection with exercises - sometimes on a large scale - provided for students under training for despatch to enemy-occupied Europe.

After the arrival of the American forces in the United Kingdom R.S.L.O.s became responsible for liaison with the American security agencies under arrangements which worked satisfactorily and involved less difficulty than had been anticipated.

In connection with the preparations for the landing in Normandy or Operation "Overlord" R.S.L.O.s were directly concerned with the question of individuals suspected as enemy agents in operational areas, but they were not directly concerned with the security of the operation itself. This was entirely a Service responsibility. The preparations for "Overlord" proved the value of the good-will which had been built up during the previous years by

/R.S.L.O.s

R.S.L.O.s with all the Services, including the American Services and with the Police. Before the operation the security net was tightened throughout the country, more attention was paid to the danger of leakage of information and increased vigilance was exercised in regard to the possible arrival of enemy agents in this country. Steps were taken to prepare a list of suspects for exclusion or restriction orders to be issued by the Home Secretary in regard to persons in the coastal areas of the South of England between the Wash and the Severn. R.S.L.O.s were advised to endeavour to persuade Chief Constables to make the list as short as possible, but it was explained that Chief Constables should be satisfied that all necessary names had been included so as to avoid any possibility of their not being able to allay apprehensions about individuals in the minds of Military commanders. After full agreement had been reached between R.S.L.O.s and Chief Constables the total number of names included in the list did not amount to more than twenty-five. This was a striking proof of the entirely different atmosphere resulting from the change in the mentality of the public and of the Services as compared with the scare period of 1940.

After operation "Overlord" had been launched R.S.L.O.s generally found that their work began to subside. The number of R.S.L.O.s and their staff was simultaneously reduced, some of the officers concerned being made available for duty in the Counter Intelligence organisation under SHAEF on the Continent.

(ix) War Room.

When the plans for the invasion of Normandy were being prepared, first under COSSAC and later under SHAEF⁺, Mr. (later Brigadier) White of B Division acted in the capacity of an adviser on counter espionage to the staff responsible for planning the organisation. Eventually, the American Army system being adopted, the organisation at SHAEF headquarters comprised the G-2 Operational Intelligence and G-2 Counter Intelligence (G-2 OI and G-2 CI) corresponding to the British formations G.S.I(A) and G.S.I(B); and G-2 CI under the direction of Brigadier White were responsible for discharging, within the zones of military operations, the same functions as were discharged by the Security Service inside the United Kingdom, that is to say, all the functions of security and counter espionage. In particular they were responsible for the arrest of enemy agents whether left behind by the Germans as they retreated or subsequently despatched by them to penetrate behind the Allied lines.

⁺ In this section the American system of nomenclature and initials is followed as far as possible. This was, rightly, the War Room practice in the circumstances, i.e. under a joint British and American Staff.

At the end of 1943 and at the beginning of 1944 a suggestion was put forward for the formation of a Central Counter Intelligence Bureau which was to be responsible for collecting and analysing, for the benefit of CI Staffs with Army Groups and Armies, all relevant intelligence about the German Intelligence Service and its agents. It was realised that O.S.S., the American Special Service, and the Security Service and S.I.S., the two British Services, between them possessed almost all the information which existed anywhere about the German Intelligence Services (the Abwehr and the Sipo und SD) and that they were the only organisations which had personnel properly trained to deal with this subject.

The problem, therefore, was to devise some means by which all this information could be made available to the CI Staff in a satisfactory form. Difficulties arose because of objections raised by S.I.S. to the proposal for a Central Bureau drawing on the records and the expert knowledge of the three Services. These objections arose from the special position claimed by Lt. Colonel Cowgill, as the head of Section V, for his organisation. In order to understand this position it is necessary to go back to the spring of 1941 when two decisions were made. The first was that, under the circumstances referred to in Chapter IV above, R.S.S. should not come under the Security Service but under S.I.S. The second was that Section V of S.I.S. should be responsible for carding information about the German Intelligence Services and their agents outside the three-mile limit, while the Security Service should only card names abroad which were of more than local importance. This was subsequently modified in practice in that the special B Division Registry (the RB Registry) carded a considerable number of names of persons abroad, including names derived from the interception of enemy Secret Services' wireless. This position, again, was subsequently modified when full carding of this intercepted (ISOS) material was developed in the ISOS Registry of Section V.

These two decisions furnished the principal grounds on which Lt. Colonel Cowgill claimed that Intelligence concerning persons outside the three-mile limit was the concern of Section V but not of the Security Service; and that he was therefore entitled to withhold it at his discretion. His attitude obstructed the comprehensive study of the enemy organisations and the collation of intelligence about them at any point as a centre. It had the effect that when the Allies landed on the Continent there was no focal point through which G-2 CI could receive and transmit intelligence derived from ISOS, Camp 020, their own interrogations and other sources. The machinery was diffused instead of being centralised.

The difficulties created by the controversy between Lt. Colonel Cowgill and B Division officers had led to proposals in the summer of 1942 for the amalgamation of Section V and parts of B Division. These

/were known

were known as the D.O.C.E. proposals. They were abandoned after lengthy discussions. They were, in fact, impracticable because by aiming at separating intelligence from the responsibility for preparing cases against individual agents they cut across all the responsibilities of the Security Service. They were, in fact, an abortive attempt at finding a focal point for intelligence in the counter espionage field by placing it in Section V; and the failure to find a solution dominated the relations between the two organisations during 1943 and 1944 with adverse effects on the efficiency of both of them. Arising out of this position an agreement was made to set up a joint organisation comprising the sub-sections of O.S.S. and S.I.S. dealing with France and the Low Countries to perform all the functions of the Security Service for the purposes of the G-2 CI formations. This new organisation was established under the name of the "War Room" and under the joint direction of the Western European sections of O.S.S. and Section V. A Security Service officer was attached as a liaison officer to whom all matters concerning the Security Service were referred and from whom information from Security Service records was received. French representatives were attached for a similar purpose.

It became apparent in the early autumn of 1944 that this organisation was not satisfactory. It did not furnish the necessary focal point for the centralisation of intelligence. On the contrary it represented a renewed attempt to place that point in Section V (instead of in the Security Service) with inadequate machinery and without the necessary staff of trained personnel. From October 1944 negotiations were carried on between the G-2 CI sub-division of SHAEF and O.S.S., the Security Service and S.I.S. (in the relevant SHAEF documents the latter are referred to as MI-5 and MI-6) for the purpose of setting up a new body of experts to inform and advise the CI Staffs in the SHAEF area about the organisation, operations and personalities of the Abwehr and the Sipo und SD (referred to in the SHAEF documents as the GIS), the former of which had now been absorbed (and purged) by the RSHA.

In February 1945 it was finally agreed that a new organisation to be known as the SHAEF G-2 Counter Intelligence War Room should be created under the direction of a British officer, Lt. Colonel T.A. Robertson, with an American Deputy, Mr. R. Blum, both of whom were to be carried on the strength of the SHAEF G-2 CI sub-division. O.S.S., S.I.S. and the Security Service (referred to as the Special Services) agreed to place at the disposal of SHAEF the personnel and records required for the purpose. It was not until the 1st March 1945 that this new machine came into effective operation. It lasted until the end of the SHAEF period in July 1945 when the "Director and the Deputy Director of the War Room became responsible to the heads of OSS, MI-5 and MI-6".

/The idea

The idea underlying this newly re-organised War Room was to create a single organ through which all the relevant and available information and advice from O.S.S., the Security Service and S.I.S. could be furnished to Counter Intelligence Staffs in the field. The War Room became the focal point of all information about the German Intelligence Services - the organisations under the RSHA and their agents - for use in the SHAEF area and for the purpose of co-ordinating the collation of intelligence and the action taken upon it both by the CI Staff in the SHAEF area and by O.S.S., the Security Service and Section V of S.I.S. outside that area. The work of the War Room now hinged on a combination of the records of the Security Service in the shape of subject and personal files, records of the Western European sections of Section V ISOS Registry, the SHAEF pink cards and, as the Allied advance progressed, captured German documents and the interrogation reports from the field. (The SHAEF pink cards, which were specially prepared for the purpose, contained information about the known officers and agents of the RSHA. These cards were used not as information cards but as pointers to the personal and subject files in which the main information about the individual or the subject could be found). This combination of records was utilised by a combination of trained personnel from O.S.S., the Security Service and S.I.S. with special knowledge of different branches of the whole subject acting in close co-operation with the staff in the original sections of the three Services which had previously dealt with it. All the available material utilised with the expert knowledge of this trained personnel was made readily accessible to the CI Staff with the armies to assist them in dealing with the enemy personnel - when captured - and their agents operating behind the Allied lines.

The elaborate but efficient organisation thus created can only be described here in a highly condensed form. Fuller details are available in S.F.50-24-44(81).

In accordance with an agreement made on the 10th January 1945 between the SHAEF G-2 CI subdivision and the Direction des Services de Documentation (DSDoc) the French Service became one of the participating "Special Services" and French officers and secretaries were drafted into the War Room. Subsequently it was decided that the DSDoc office in Germany dealing with CI matters should deal direct with the War Room and that the War Room should be responsible for giving them advice and guidance, while DSDoc in Paris should be a collecting centre of information derived from the War Room and should reciprocate by communicating information obtained by the French in the course of their investigations. Eventually a similar arrangement was extended to cover the case of the French zone in Austria.

The War Room consisted of the following sections:-

/Administrative

Administrative Sections

- WR-A Supplies and internal administration.
- WR-B The handling and distribution of papers.
- WR-X The maintenance of liaison with the communications sections of the "Special Services" and of the military as well as ensuring that the War Room had all the channels of communication which it required.
- WR-H Based on the old RB Registry (in the Security Service) which was developed and set up as the central repository of all War Room files with the responsibility of indexing and maintaining the files and preparing the SHAEF pink cards.

Intelligence Sections

- WR-C Known as the Assessment Section, was concerned with the examination and appreciation of the papers dealing with interrogation reports and with briefing the CI Staffs and interrogators in the field. It dealt with individuals.
- WR-E Known as the Publications Section, was concerned with the study of the German organisations as a whole.
- WR-D The Documents Section, was responsible for studying, evaluating and distributing captured German documents dealing with the German Secret Service organisations.
- WR-F The Special Sources Section, was responsible for examining all intercepted wireless material with a view to its bearing on the work of the other sections and was responsible for controlling the transmission of this material to the field.
- WR/
DSDoc Consisting entirely of French personnel, was responsible for all communications between the War Room and French stations abroad.

The following are a few of the outstanding points which deserve special mention in connection with the War Room. An example of the distribution given to liquidation reports prepared by the War Room indicates the extent to which information about its investigations was communicated to different parts of the machinery concerned with counter espionage in the field and among Allied

/organisations

organisations -

USFET	100
BAOR	100
AFHQ	2
US Forces Austria	20
Allied CC(BE) Vienna	20
OMG Germany (US)	6
G-2 Com. Z	2
OSS/X-2	10
MI-6(V)	30
MI-5	4
WR/DSDoc	4
G-2 War Dept.	2
ONI	1
MI-14(d)	2
MI-19 (for CSDIC/UK)	2

WR-X used O.S.S., S.I.S., SIU, SHAEP and army channels for its communications and while making use of their cyphers was thus responsible for the cryptographic security within the War Room of all telegrams concerned. The network of communications was, therefore, a large one.

The responsibilities of WR-H were as follows:-

"to make index cards; to make new files; to put all papers into relevant files; to do the necessary look-ups on names; to extract information from reports into subject files; to be responsible for the custody and the transmitting of files to various sections and individuals within the War Room. In addition to this, they were called upon to provide trace summaries to assist the work of the Assessment officers. Finally they were responsible for preparing the pro-forma for the SHAEP Pink Cards of GIS (German Intelligence Service) personnel which were sent by them to EDS/CPI* for reproduction in thirty-four copies and distribution to the various recipients in the field and elsewhere."

WR-H was divided into four sub-sections on normal lines for processing purposes. Of these four, WR-H2, which was responsible for look-ups and the general direction of the index, was sub-divided into four sub-sections corresponding to the sub-sections of WR-C, which were in this way given considerable assistance through being in touch with registry personnel who were studying the same part of the GIS.

* EDS/CPI was a SHAEP Intelligence formation which was responsible for collating, for use when the armies entered Germany, intelligence on the subject of Nazi Party, SS and Police formations. It formed a special card index for the purpose and also reproduced and distributed the cards prepared by the War Room for GIS personnel.

The maximum strength of WR-C was twenty-two officers supported by some twenty-five assistants and secretaries. It was divided into four sub-sections, each of which was responsible not for a geographical area but for a sub-division of the subject. Thus WR-C1 dealt with the officers and agents of "the old Abwehr I and III, except for IIIF and IIID, and for the KdMs and the Mil. Amt, except for Mil.Amt D, and the KOs in foreign countries", i.e. in the main with the espionage and counter espionage branches of the German Secret Services as they were finally organised with the exception of those which were connected with deception and with units in neutral countries. WR-C2 was responsible for all cases connected with sabotage and subversive activities. WR-C3 was responsible for the RSHA excluding certain details dealt with by WR-C1 and WR-C4. WR-C4 was concerned with the study of German counter espionage including those parts of the organisation which were concerned with deception and double agents.

WR-D, the Documents section, consisting of the head of the section and his deputy with twenty trained readers, was not only responsible for reading and distributing documents and making precis of their contents, but, in virtue of the experience of its staff, was able to make a positive contribution to the intelligence work of the War Room. For instance some documents captured by EDS/CPI early in April 1945 were subjected to examination by a reader who was studying materials connected with the Lower Rhineland who, as a result of a detailed analysis, made it clear that there was evidence of an intricate stay-behind network of Gestapo agents recruited mostly from the foreign worker population. The War Room at the time knew almost nothing about this particular sphere of RSHA activity, but action taken in consultation with the WR-C (Assessment section) officer led to arrests in the field and a more elaborate study of the whole operation.

WR-E consisted of three officers who had previously worked in the Radio Intelligence Section, had served as an intermediary between R.S.S., Section V and B Division of the Security Service and had produced a number of papers mainly based on ISOS material. Soon after its constitution WR-E produced a basic handbook on the German Intelligence Service as known to us in March/April 1945. This was given a wide distribution and was regarded as a standard work of reference for all CI formations in the field. It was translated into French. A number of other papers on important aspects of the German organisations were also produced (vide Appendix C in S.F.50-24-44(81)).

WR-F, the Special Sources section, was responsible for reading, interpreting and sending to the field all information obtained from the interception of GIS wireless. It was also responsible for extracting information from the same sources and sending it to the Registry for SHAEF pink cards.

/This section

This section was extremely active up to the end of hostilities in passing information to SHAEF and the Army Groups, including AFHQ in Italy. The information from these sources was particularly useful in the interrogation of difficult cases with long records of work in the GIS.

The different sections of the War Room, working in combination with the Special Services and the field, combined to produce important results. Many of these were reflected in the various documents prepared and circulated by WR-E. WR-C dealt with a number of the most important members of the old Abwehr and of the RSHA, including well-known personages such as Kaltenbrunner, Chef der Sicherheitspolizei; Schellenberg, known as Amtschef VI (the head of the branch of the RSHA operating abroad); Skorzeny, who was head of the combined sabotage organisations of the RSHA and the old Abwehr; Korvetten Kapitän Erich Pfeiffer, the head of I Marine, the naval espionage branch of the old Abwehr, who had played a prominent part in work against this country for many years; and Ohlendorff, Amtschef III, the head of the SD. Many of the more important cases, especially in the early stages, were brought over to England for interrogation at Camp 020.

The most important functions of the War Room were, therefore, to pass to the field the information obtained from ISOS and that available from the records of the Security Service dealing with enemy organisations, enemy personnel and their agents.

During the period of its existence and in the preceding months after the landing in Normandy, no enemy agents were arrested in this country, but considerable numbers were arrested in the field as the armies advanced. The majority of these were interrogated by the CI Staff at the headquarters of the Army Groups and Armies (only a few of the more important being dealt with, as mentioned above, at Camp 020) so that information based on these interrogations was flowing from the field back to the War Room and its Registry. The results of these interrogations involved an immense number of requests for traces from WR-H. The work of collating the results of these traces and passing them on to the field interrogators fell to WR-C. At the same time the B Division records which, as mentioned above, were the basis of the War Room records were supplemented by material from OSS/X-2 and Section V(F) of S.I.S. In order to complete these records, the cards in the SHAEF pink index - about twenty-four thousand in number - were compared with the B Division records and, as a result, it was found that a further twelve thousand cards had to be prepared. During its existence the War Room made forty-two thousand SHAEF pink cards and over eight thousand amendments to existing cards. It was estimated that the making of these cards involved references to the index in respect of approximately a hundred thousand names. Some two thousand personal files were made and very nearly four hundred subject files.

/These figures

These figures are some indication of the volume of work which passed through the War Room; and its importance arises from the fact that each card represented the available information about an official or agent of the Abwehr or SD and indicated an individual who was to be arrested. Unfortunately, as the War Room report states, arrangements for keeping statistical returns were not made and the number of arrests actually made is not known, but it was very large and probably exceeded fifty thousand.

In the War Room report it is suggested that the WR-H staff, which varied between fifty and seventy, was not adequate to cope with all the work required of it, because, in order to deal with the production of the pink cards, it was necessary to ignore to a very large extent the work of looking up and cross-extracting; and that this latter was of almost equal importance because all other services undertaken by the War Room for the field depended on this work being done. It is also pointed out that the position of WR-H at a distance of seventy miles from London increased the difficulties because of the lack of close personal contact.

Brigadier White has said that from the point of view of the field the War Room was a great improvement on its predecessor. It was responsible to the authority in whose interests it had been formed, namely the Intelligence Division of SHAEF, and it regarded itself as the servant of the CI Staffs. All its work was, therefore, related to the practical needs of the CI units in the field and it played a great part in the final liquidation of the GIS.

Once it was started it was efficiently organised and it achieved the purpose for which it had been created. It overcame the difficulties which had beset its predecessor - the Section V and O.S.S. War Room - which was unable to pass information sufficiently rapidly in both directions between London and the field.

An account of the War Room would be meaningless without some explanation of the organisation under SHAEF which it had to serve, that is the G-2 CI organisation mentioned above at the beginning of this section. The head of the G-2 CI and G-2 CI Staffs was Major General Strong, with an American officer as the head of G-2 CI and Brigadier White as the latter's deputy. The G-2 CI Staff consisted of three basic sections covering "Military Security", "Civil Security" and Port, Travel and Frontier control. Military Security roughly corresponded to C and D Divisions, laid down preventive security policy and vetted personnel where necessary; Civil Security roughly, but only very roughly, covered the B Division field and laid down policy for the control of the civilian population in the occupied countries; Port, Travel and Frontier control was built up entirely on Security Service lines and staffed entirely by personnel seconded from the Security Service. The

/appointment

appointment of Brigadier White as deputy to the head of the G-2 CI Staff and the seconding of trained Security Service personnel - to the number of some 80 officers out of a total of 2,600 officers and men - gave the staff in the field the necessary "steel frame" with technical knowledge based on professional experience. The result was a much closer interlocking between the G-2 CI Staff and the Services in London. Brigadier White's chief duties were to secure the necessary close collaboration. He left his position as Deputy Director of B Division to take up this new appointment towards the end of August 1944 and at once realised that the CI Staff in the field was handicapped by the fact that it had no records of the type upon which the Security Service relied. He therefore put up to Major General Strong proposals which the latter endorsed in letters addressed to the heads of O.S.S., S.I.S. and the Security Service on the 10th November 1944. These proposals eventually led to the creation of the new War Room, as described above, in March 1945.

The object in view when these proposals were framed was to cover two different situations. The first was that in which enemy agents - normally of French, Belgian or other non-German nationality - had to be detected behind our lines while operations were still in progress; the second was the very different one in which, after the occupation of Germany, steps had to be taken to "mop up" the GIS by arresting all their known officials as well as their agents.

The organisation at Supreme Headquarters in the shape of the three basic sections mentioned above was reduplicated in the CI Staff under the 21st Army Group (British), the 12th Army Group (American) on the Normandy front and the 6th Army Group (American), which advanced through France after the landing on the Riviera. Under the three Army Groups there were formations of Armies, Corps and Divisions; and at the headquarters of each were Field Security Police or CI Staff, to whom it fell to search for and arrest known enemy agents, whether of the stay-behind, line-crosser or parachutist variety. Many of these arrests were made on the basis of information obtained from ISOS, supplemented by interrogations and the results of references to the records of the three Services. The means by which this information was passed down to the lowest units who, in many cases, actually effected the arrests, was by a suitable distribution of the SHAEF pink cards which gave the necessary information to enable the Field Security Police to trace the individuals.

It was to facilitate this distribution of information that the pink cards were instituted in place of the information in the shape of a "Who's Who" as compiled by B.I. Information. The latter form, which was convenient for Security Service purposes in London, was not suitable for the purpose of effecting individual arrests in the field, i.e. in France or Belgium while the Armies were advancing

/or later,

or later, after the occupation of Germany. The cards could be broken up and distributed to the smaller units.

The War Room ceased to be subordinate to SHAEF at the end of the SHAEF period in July 1945. It had served as an intermediary between the records of the Security Service and the officers responsible for the executive action of making arrests and interrogating in the field. It thus acted as a research and analysis organisation on the grand scale; and as a centre of liaison between the Intelligence Staff in the field on the one hand and O.S.S., Section V of S.I.S. and the Security Service on the other. It achieved this purpose successfully because all the sources of counter espionage or counter intelligence information were concentrated in it instead of being separated by placing the results of ISOS (as representing the intercepted communications of the enemy) and the results of information obtained from other sources in two compartments, i.e. Section V and B Division. It thus demonstrated that if this unnatural separation had not been effected, the special arrangements to create the War Room would have been unnecessary. If all counter espionage had been concentrated in the Security Service, information would have flowed naturally between that Service and the C-2 CI Staff in the field. In other words the War Room showed that "counter espionage is indivisible", i.e. that when military operations are in progress the detection of enemy agents in the United Kingdom as a military base and in the military zone of operations are parts of an integral process. The staff in both places must depend on the same centralised records and must pool their information by contributing it to those same records. The necessity for this integration is not in any way affected by the fact that the staff in the field must be subordinate to Supreme Headquarters while that in London must continue to occupy the special position of the Security Service in the machinery of government. On the contrary these facts point more clearly and conclusively than any others, except those relevant to deception through double agents, to the conclusion that these closely related parts of a whole must both be ultimately subordinate to the Prime Minister as Minister of Defence and must be organically related to the machinery under the Chiefs of Staff.

This is the real position of the Security Service in the machinery of government. Viewed in this light its present position as nominally under the Foreign Secretary seems to be based on as complete a fallacy as are suggestions that the Home Office could control or direct its operations in spheres other than those - a very important reservation - where they touch on the province of the Home Secretary and affect the liberty of the subject, the law and the keeping of the King's Peace.

